


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JOINT SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION
Defence Intelligence & Security Centre
Chicksands, Shefford, Beds. SG17 5PR

Tel/Fax: [REDACTED]
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23 Jul 02

UK DEFENCE POLICY FOR TACTICAL QUESTIONING AND INTERROGATION


At the last Defence HUMINT Working Group (DHWG) I promised to produce a paper arguing for a coherent TQ and Interrogation capability. The first draft is enclosed for your comment.

I am not sure when the next DHWG is planned but it would be appropriate if your comments could be incorporated into a version for discussion at that meeting. It will be for the DHWG to decide the further staffing of the paper.

Anticipating a DHWG sometime in September, could I ask that you review this version and pass comments to me by 30 Aug 02. This should allow me a couple of weeks to incorporate your comments and disseminate the next version for perusal before the meeting.



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Enclosure: UK Defence Policy For Tactical Questioning and Interrogation (Draft 1)

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g. Former Director of the CIA, William J Casey, stated; "The wrong picture is not worth a thousand words. No photo, no electronic impulse can substitute for direct on-the-scene knowledge of the key factors in a given country or region. No matter how spectacular a photo may be, it cannot reveal enough about plans, intentions, internal political dynamics, economics, etc. There are simply too many cases where photos are ambiguous or useless, and electronic intelligence can drown an analyst in partial or conflicting information.

7. Consequences of Failing to Maintain A TQ Capability. Until the deployment of an ad hoc team from the Joint Service Intelligence Organisation (JSIO), on Op JACANA, only the RN retained a declared requirement for TQ. As Op JACANA has proved, the consequence is that deploying units were not appropriately trained to handle PWs (in any quantity) nor were they trained to conduct TQ or sustain the 'shock of capture' which is critical to successful interrogation.

8. Consequences of Failing to Maintain An Interrogation Capability. The dangers of failing to maintain an interrogation capability are:

a. It will not be possible to exploit PW other than by cursory TQ at the Point of Capture.

b. Potential intelligence will be lost post-TQ, and there will be no opportunity to re-visit PW as a result of collateral information or to respond to changes in Information Requirements.

c. An important skill in the Defence HUMINT spectrum will be denied to commanders.

d. Short-notice operational requirements, such as Op JACANA, could not be met because trained interrogators and linguists would not have been retained at a sufficient state of operational readiness in posts dedicated to this task. The only earmarked interrogator and linguist posts reside within reserve units¹⁰ but, because of the traditional reticence to sanction interrogation operations, these personnel have never been mobilised and are now extremely vulnerable to disbandment when scrutinised for financial efficiency. It is impractical and operationally imprudent to rely on the services of interpreters acquired from the local population.

¹⁰ HMS Ferret (RNR Interrogator Branch), 7630 Sqn RAuxAF and 22 (V) MI Coy totalling 110 interrogators of all ranks. These units rely on 'life support' from the unit/formation to which they are attached and do not include any PW handling capability.

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CURRENT SITUATION

9. Throughout the UK Armed Forces only JSIO is authorised to train personnel in TQ and Interrogation¹¹. Regulars no longer routinely receive interrogation training; the bulk of the courses being made up of the 3 reservist interrogator units listed at footnote 10 above. Only the RN has regularly placed personnel on the TQ course and RN TQ-trained personnel are present in every ship and submarine and some RM units. HQ Land has recently decreed that all major units going onto the JRRF roster send 2 personnel to a TQ course. The first of these, including Op JACANA personnel, attended the course ending 05 Apr 02. The RAF have no stated requirement to train personnel. Consequently Army and RM non-spearhead, and RAF units, are unable to meet the first requirement of the PW chain.

10. There is no MOD-endorsed doctrine for interrogation. The advent of the Field HUMINT Team (FHT) concept may have complicated understanding; they can be tailored to conduct TQ but they are not resourced for full interrogation purposes. It is important, for presentational reasons, that Joint Forward Interrogation Teams (JFITs) are considered separately from FHTs.

11. The latest calls for operational support (Ops VERITAS and JACANA) have highlighted the parlous state of UK Armed Forces' preparedness and ability to conduct TQ, interrogate or simply *speak* to any Arab or Afghan. The Reservist interrogation units have not trained in a properly-conducted exercise for at least 3 years. They have no vehicles or equipment with which to do their job



CRITERIA FOR OPERATIONAL INTERROGATION CAPABILITY

12. Number of PWs. The likely numbers of PW will be considered in the estimates process and are part of the Commander's responsibilities (Reference A, Chapter 2). The estimated number of PW will indicate the troops to task for TQ, interrogators and PWHO. Specifically trained personnel in each unit liable to take prisoners should conduct TQ. This suggests that all High Readiness units should have sufficient qualified TQ personnel and have been exercised alongside the PWHO and interrogators.

13. Legal Considerations. Specific political and legal implications will need to be considered and authority to conduct interrogation given.¹² Concerns regarding the use of the word 'interrogation' will undoubtedly arise but should not inhibit the authorisation of the methods themselves. If necessary each of the methods (commonly termed 'approaches') could be viewed separately and authorised on a sliding scale in much the same way as Rules of Engagement.

14. Deployability. JFITs will need to be deployable and must be sustained in the Area of Operations (AO). JFITs will not be able to operate in isolation of the PWHO and should be viewed as a specialist team that will be attached under the operational command of the force being supported, usually at the highest level possible. It should be noted that the guard force is not part of the PWHO but is dedicated to, and trained by, the JFIT. In operations where

¹¹ Bids from sponsors: RN 40 / Land 28. Places approved by DISC under SOTR 2003/04: RN 28 / Land 20.

¹² It cannot be stressed highly enough that all current UK interrogator-qualified Armed Forces personnel are trained to operate within the terms of the GC.

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significant numbers of PW are anticipated, the JFIT should be established in the AO early. Where singleton or a very small number of subjects are anticipated or identified, consideration should be given to the deployment of specialist interrogators when required or, if possible, the subject should be moved to a designated interrogation centre in the UK.

15. Linguist Support. It is a GC requirement, and common sense, that PWs are questioned in a language they understand. Reference D states that: "*The single most important quality required of any interrogator is clearly identified as being language proficiency - a point many might consider obvious, but one to which scant attention has often been paid.*" Anything that strays from a direct one-to-one dialogue can only degrade the product. This constraint is common throughout the HUMINT spectrum. UKMOD thinking, coloured as it probably is by 30 years of Northern Ireland HUMINT operations, has consistently failed to find a sustainable solution for appropriate language training and this has impacted on the language training of regular interrogators. The clear deduction is that the capacity of the interrogation organisation to process PW is not dependent on the number of interrogators but on the number of interpreters. Preferably the interpreter will be interrogator-trained but, if this is not possible, the interrogator (who will be trained to use interpreters) can only work through a trusted interpreter.

16. Scale of Effort. Although planning is still in the preparatory stage, the organisation of MI Support to Large Scale War Fighting (One Division comprising four brigades plus HQ ARRC Land Component Commander plus Corps Troops) calls for [REDACTED] JFITs allocated variously throughout the structure. FHTs cannot conduct interrogation simultaneously with other tasking, therefore the reservists are currently the only source of interrogators. However, there is a reticence to accept their continued existence justified on this capability alone¹³ and there has been a reluctance to mobilise them when required. Part of the reason for the latter is the time that it takes to complete the mobilisation process which usually exceeds that available before the capability is required in the AO. The root cause is predominantly the lateness of the decision to employ interrogation which dictates that a regular cadre (probably [REDACTED] JFIT) needs to be retained at a readiness which can deploy when required, which would then give sufficient time to mobilise the reserve JFITs.

PROPOSALS

17. It is proposed that:

- a. At least two personnel from each HM Ship/Company/Squadron of High Readiness units receive TQ training. Spare capacity on TQ courses would be available to personnel from units at lower readiness.
- b. A standing JFIT (with appropriate linguistic support) is established, probably within the emerging Defence HUMINT Unit (DHU).
- c. HMS Ferret, 7630 Sqn RAuxAF and 22 (V) MI Coy be protected to ensure that up to [REDACTED] JFITs could be deployed. However, the linguistic skills of these personnel should be utilised more fully within the HUMINT spectrum and they should be trained in other HUMINT skills.

¹³ CO JSIO was informed on 29 May 02 that RAF Waddington (which administers 7630 Sqn RAuxAF) intended to offer the unit as an efficiency saving measure in STP 03.

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- d. Formal action should be taken to ensure that the estimated number of PWs is incorporated into the estimates process in order to derive the TQ, interrogation, guard force and PWHO requirement.
- e. The TQ, interrogation, guard force and PWHO organisation supporting High Readiness formations should be exercised regularly.

SUMMARY

- 18. PW continue to be a vital component of the MODUK HUMINT effort but JWP 1-10 is not being complied with.
- 19. The lessons of history have not been learned and has resulted in an inability to meet current operational requirements.
- 20. The sensitivities caused by the word "interrogation" have resulted in an unwillingness to countenance legal methods of acquiring information from unwilling human sources.
- 21. TQ, the PWHO and interrogation are part of the same continuum which PW undergo from the point of capture to their eventual repatriation or release and cannot be considered in isolation.
- 22. Regular High Readiness units should contain at least two trained Tactical Questioners at HM Ship, Company, and Squadron levels respectively.
- 23. A permanent JFIT should be established and up to [REDACTED] JFITs maintained by protected High Readiness Reserve units who should also provide linguistic support to other defence HUMINT capabilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 24. It is recommended that MODUK:
 - a. Accepts the need for an interrogation capability noting the proposals at Paragraph 17.
 - b. Endorses the establishment of a permanent JFIT.
 - c. Directs that each Service retain a capability (probably of reserves) specifically dedicated to the linguistic support of HUMINT operations which has an interrogation capability embedded within it.
 - d. Endorses the requirement for a TQ capability within High Readiness units.
 - e. Endorses the requirement that the PW factor be included in the estimates process prior to all operations.

Annex:

- A. The Spectrum of Defence HUMINT *Nil att'd*

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