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Headquarters 7th Armoured Brigade
Operation TELIC
British Forces Post Office [REDACTED]

Ptarmigan [REDACTED]
Fastnet [REDACTED]



Reference: 3558/G3

See Distribution

6 June 03

7TH ARMOURED BRIGADE

POST OPERATION REPORT & LESSONS REPORT

OPERATION TELIC

References:

- A. 7 Armd Bde Op GRANBY Post Op Tour Report, 1991.
- B. HQ 4 Armd Bde Post Exercise Report, Exercise Saif Seria II, 2001.
- C. S of S for Defence Announcement to the House of Commons 20 Jan 03.
- D. LAND Op TELIC Mounting Order 20 Jan 03.
- E. 1 (UK) Armd Div Op TELIC Deployment Warning Order 22 Jan 03.
- F. HQ 7 Armd Bde War Diary Op TELIC.

PART ONE - COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

1. We must learn from the lessons from this campaign and not allow victory to deny our pursuit of military excellence. I enclose below the first cut of our POTR. The detail is in the Annexes but I highlight the following:

a. Successes.

i. Intelligence. Strategic intelligence collection assets such as [REDACTED] produced timely (often immediate) tactical intelligence allowing swift action.

ii. Armour in OBUA. Daring use of CR2, WR and CVR(T) in an urban environment completely overmatched the enemy¹.

¹ The result was the acme of the manoeuvrist approach: the effect was to shatter the enemy's cohesion and will to fight.

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23. Detailed Comments Detailed comments can be found at Annex G.

RECOVERY

24. To follow in a subsequent report.

RECUPERATION

25. To follow in a subsequent report.

CONCLUSION

"Train hard, fight easy" - Erwin Rommel.

26. High Intensity Warfighting is the *raison d'etre* of an Armd Bde; they are specially designed and trained to win wars. The very existence, let alone the training, of such a force is costly in both time and money. However, the events of Op TELIC have further emphasised the high value in war of a well trained, highly protected, mobile and devastatingly potent formation. The victory in Iraq was decisive and impressive but the flexibility shown in the stabilisation operations immediately and then for 3 months afterwards was a significant achievement. History and previous reports such as those at Ref A and B remind us that many of the lessons from Op TELIC we should have learnt before. It is now time to break that unfortunate cycle and reinforce this current success by addressing the key weaknesses identified, notably:

- a. Logistics must now be energized as a system from factory to frontline and it must train and be regularly tested.
- b. Our Land/Air Integration must improve and thus grant an even greater output from our high investment in armoured forces.
- c. Never again must we send ill-equipped soldiers into battle.

27. The Desert Rats have had a busy tour. We deployed and prepared in short order, conducted a highly successful offensive operation into Iraq, fought the fabled '3-Block War', liberated a city of 1.5 million people with very few casualties and then switched straight into a successful stabilization operation for 3 months in a hot and demanding environment. On balance, the numerous strengths outweighed the observed weaknesses and 7 Armd Bde prevailed largely due to its finest asset- the British Soldier.

[Original Signed]

C J PARKER
Major
for Commander

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Ser	DTG	Initiator Appointment Unit	Title of Lesson	Observation / Lesson	Recommendation / Action
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
32.		1 RRF	EPW, EPW	Handing by sub-units was not done particularly well. At BG level it required the Int Sgt to assist the RSM in running the BG cages as there were no qualified PH&TQ pers within the Provo Sect. The BG was under strength on qualified personnel to handle and question prisoners.	Pre-deployment trg should include more EPW handling trg for sub-units and must cover the documentation and procedures for movement of EPW in more detail. There must be at least one member of the Provo Sect trained in PH&TQ so that they are not reliant on the Int Cell for this capability.
33.		1 RRF	Single Source HUMINT.	The reliance on single source HUMINT caused problems in the initial stages of the transition to Ph 4 ops. This was made more difficult by the lack of PHT availability at a critical time when tps were not sufficiently confident in dealing with such sources. Once the tps became more confident they realised that they were excellent HUMINT gatherers and the situation improved considerably.	More pers within the BG need to be trained in PH&TQ and more interpreters need to be available earlier in future.
34.		1 RRF	CDR Data.	The met data used for the Chemical Downwind Reports that the BG received for the first 5 days of the war was from CA COYOTE. This was up to 100km south of BIA and would have had an impact on the way in which the warning template was applied possibly exposing tps to a chemical hazard unnecessarily.	More accurate met data should be provided.
35.		1 RRF	Intelligence Infrastructure.	Intel infrastructure was not sophisticated enough to deal with the complications of Phase 4 type ops. In the initial stages of transitions architecture needed to be in place to support int gathering. Basic computer system would have enabled into capture. e.g. CI's, V Checks etc.	Spec Int instruction to be brought in early for transition to Phase 4 ops. It should not have come as a surprise.
36.		1 RRF	Situational Awareness.	We had to fight to get information on our friendly flanks and the force as a whole. 16 AAst Bde, 3 Cdo Bde, the MEF, the war. Blue Force Tracker was our best way of working out the friendly advance towards Baghdad. The second best was the BBC world service.	Provide regular overviews on the war from a friendly perspective. Integrate Blue Force Tracker.
G3 - OPERATIONS					

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