

responsibility (see MOD042676) adding a further level of ambiguity to the situation as this statement does not make it clear which J division is responsible for which aspect of tactical questioning. In fact, my understanding at the time was that the J3 division was responsible for directing and issuing instructions for tactical questioning of PWs.

34. In the event, I do not remember being directly involved in PWHO matters during TELIC 1 or subsequently. The main focus of the J2 division was the deployment, commissioning and maintenance of the intelligence architecture (which, due to highly compressed timescales was a significant challenge) and the generation of a comprehensive intelligence picture. The sorts of issues that my staff and I were focussed on in the context of the Iraq campaign are described below at paragraph 40. It should also be remembered that Iraq was only one of several theatres in which forces commanded by the CJO were involved (although the greatest in scale), and similar capability and intelligence planning issues existed in the other theatres (Balkans, Afghanistan, Overseas Commands (Cyprus, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar) and thus contributed to the workload of the J2 staff.

35. Documents MOD037447 (apparently intended for COS) and MOD042671 (apparently intended for VCDS) note the lack of a coherent system for providing a deployable interrogation and tactical questioning capability. These papers appear to be drafts that were circulated among the members of the Defence HUMINT Policy Group. I do not know if final versions were ever produced. Whilst I do not know who all the members of that group were (and I cannot remember whether as ACOS J2 I was a member of the group but if I was not it was likely I was represented on the group by a member of my staff), I am sure it would have included ADI (HUMINT), Colonel Bob Kett (who was probably the author) as well as staff from Defence Intelligence and Security Centre (DISC) Chicksands who conducted training in this area. Concerns over the difficulties arising from the problem of deploying sufficient trained

personnel to meet the Op TELIC requirement (as determined through the intelligence planning process which was the responsibility of J2 at PJHQ) were raised with the DGIC and his staff by my team and me during the briefing sessions (on progress with intelligence planning described above paragraph 30). I believe the note from Colonel Kett (MOD042058) was written in response to DGIC's concerns regarding points raised at the first update briefing provided by PJHQ J2 staff to DGIC and his team, which I believe was attended by Colonel Kett (and others). Among other things, the note acknowledges a likely shortfall in those trained to conduct prisoner handling and tactical questioning in the event of a medium or large scale war fighting operation (Op TELIC was I think considered large scale) and a need to develop doctrine for tactical questioning. But in the context of the documents describing the progress of developing policy on interrogation and questioning and the date of the note (some three months before Op TELIC 1) the note appears reassuring in its statement that 'despite the outstanding work to be done to develop doctrine for TQ plans are well advanced for any Gulf deployment in the near or medium term' (although at that stage the exact timescale for Op Telic was not known).

36. It was against this background that PJHQ J2 planners were attempting to set and provide direction to this important dimension of a major operation.

Orders, Instructions and Guidance

37. As explained above, at paragraphs 5 to 9, I had received no training in interrogation, tactical questioning and prisoner handling. However, I understood the Law of Armed Conflict and the Geneva Conventions to be of general application to interrogation, tactical questioning and prisoner handling.