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## JOINT SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION

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COS DISC (via SO2 Ops)

JSIO/2102 

2 May 00

INTERROGATION – DOCTRINE, ASSETS, TRAINING AND THE WAY AHEAD

Reference

A. JSIO/2102 dated 13 Apr 00 (attached)

INTRODUCTION


1. Ref A is a document to promote discussion on a largely-neglected HUMINT skill. The paper articulates the commonsense concerns of bringing this intelligence collection function to bear should it be required.
2. Direction from DMO and ADI HUMINT would be a useful starting block, perhaps with an initiating conference as the catalyst. JSIO would host such a forum.

OTHER ISSUES

3. The constraints of interrogation being linked to Article 5 operations is a major factor in limiting collection by this means. Legal advisors, during the Kosovo air campaign, refused to allow the interrogation of any Serb (pilot, MUP etc) who had the potential to be captured. Debriefing was allowed but only with the subject's consent. This may well be tenable and excusable when UK is involved in multinational operations but not when the national interest may be the sole concern (as in the Falklands War). Even then, the use of 'softer' terminology was required ('Specialist Tactical Questioning' - see Ref A). If we intend to use interrogation (or more acceptable terminology) as a legitimate means of collecting intelligence in future operations less than Article 5 level, it should be so stated.
4. The dilemma for those who must deliver the skill is clear – train, equip, exercise and sustain a body of troops who may never be used because of legal considerations when conflict is technically defined or allow the skill to fade? Operationally, it would be untenable to be unprepared but central support for this particular course of action, with the spin-off for funding and equipment, will be a factor.
5. Interrogation training for Regular tri-service personnel is conducted in English – a major limitation on their real use.

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6. JSIO is the functional employer of RNR and R Aux AF interrogators; their primary employment leaves them vulnerable to cutting or disbandment without doctrinal support. In an attempt to broaden their employability whilst exercising their collection and language skills, it remains an aspiration to train them as debriefers in order to support DDT when required. Debriefing is a topic covered in the current interrogation course but only as a short module; it may be necessary to complete an esoteric Debriefing Course to ensure that they have an adequate reassurance level of training before being allowed to collect information from the public. This is currently proving difficult because of the increase in other training commitments.

SUMMARY

7. It is evident that the interrogation function has not been properly addressed for several years. It is still regarded as a useful weapon in the HUMINT armoury, enabling the discipline to span all types of operational scenarios. Direction and firm policy need to be the start point for any re-examination.

8. The issues requiring clarification are complex, especially legal parameters; this is traditionally a charter for procrastination but they should not be allowed to slow the pace of change if this is what is required.

RECOMMENDATION

9. It is recommended that a suitable working group – perhaps a subset of the Defence HUMINT Working Group – be convened to address the issues raised in the paper. Membership to be directed by ADI HUMINT / MO.



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