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All DHWG Members**UK DEFENCE POLICY FOR TACTICAL QUESTIONING AND INTERROGATION**

References:

- A. JWP 1-10 – Prisoners of War Handling.
- B. STANAG 2033 – Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW).
- C. STANAG 2044 – Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW).
- D. Prisoners Intelligence and War¹.

INTRODUCTION

1. Reference A sets out the current UK PW handling principles and processes for PW handling and References B and C detail the UK-signed STANAGS which underpin it. Currently, there is no coherent operational capability for Tactical Questioning (TQ) and Interrogation that enables MODUK to comply with any of these references. History and recent operational experience suggests that ignoring this capability (mainly because of political sensitivities) results in the denial of valuable intelligence.

PURPOSE

2. This discussion paper argues for a coherent and sustainable Tactical Questioning and Interrogation capability and makes recommendations.

ASSUMPTIONS

3. The following assumptions are made:
- a. That the full ISTAR intelligence spectrum will be utilised whenever possible.
 - b. That intelligence derived from PW in accordance with the Geneva Conventions² (GC) is both ethically acceptable and required.
 - c. That the GC will be complied with in their entirety.
 - d. That MODUK will comply with References A-C whilst they are extant.

¹ A Defence Fellowship Study conducted at Kings College London University 1988-1989 by Col D M Burrill Late INT CORPS.

² The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Protocols Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

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CURRENT SITUATION

9. Throughout the UK Armed Forces only JSIO is authorised to train personnel in TQ and Interrogation¹¹

Only the RN has regularly placed personnel on the TQ course and RN TQ-trained personnel are present

are unable to meet the first requirement of the PW chain.

10. There is no MOD-endorsed doctrine for interrogation. The advent of the Field HUMINT Team (FHT) concept has complicated understanding but FHTs It is vital that Joint Forward Interrogation Teams (JFITs) are considered separately from FHTs.

11.

CRITERIA FOR OPERATIONAL INTERROGATION CAPABILITY

12. Number of PWs. The likely numbers of PW will be considered in the estimates process and are part of the Commander's responsibilities (Reference A, Chapter 2). The estimated number of PW will indicate the troops to task for TQ, interrogators and PWHO. Specifically trained personnel in each unit liable to take prisoners should do TQ. This suggests that all High Readiness units should have sufficient qualified TQ personnel and have been exercised alongside the PWHO and interrogators.

13. Legal Considerations. Specific political and legal implications will need to be considered and authority to conduct interrogation given.¹² Concerns regarding the use of the word 'interrogation' will undoubtedly arise but should not inhibit the authorisation of the methods themselves. If necessary each of the methods (commonly termed 'approaches') could be viewed separately and authorised on a sliding scale in much the same way as Rules of Engagement.

¹¹ [REDACTED]
¹² It cannot be stressed highly enough that all current UK interrogator-qualified Armed Forces personnel are trained to operate within the terms of the GC.

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14. Deployability. JFITs will need to be deployable and must be sustained in the Area of Operations (AO). JFITs will not be able to operate in isolation of the PWHO and should be viewed as a specialist team that will be attached under the operational command of the force being supported, usually at the highest level possible. It should be noted that the guard force is not part of the PWHO but is dedicated to, and trained by, the JFIT. In operations where significant numbers of PW are anticipated, the JFIT should be established in the AO early. Where singleton or a very small number of sources are anticipated or identified, consideration should be given to the deployment of specialist interrogators when required or, if possible, the source should be moved to a designated interrogation centre in the UK.

15. Linguist Support. It is a GC requirement, and common sense, that PWs are questioned in a language they understand. Reference D states that: "*The single most important quality required of any interrogator is clearly identified as being language proficiency - a point many might consider obvious, but one to which scant attention has often been paid.*" Anything that strays from a direct one-to-one dialogue can only degrade the product. This constraint is common throughout the HUMINT spectrum. UKMOD thinking, coloured as it is by 30 years of Northern Ireland HUMINT operations, has consistently ignored the need for language training of regular interrogators. The clear deduction is that the capacity of the interrogation organisation to process PW is not dependent on the number of interrogators but on the number of interpreters. Preferably the interpreter will be interrogator-trained but, if this is not possible, the interrogator (who will be trained to use interpreters) can only work through a trusted interpreter.

16. Scale of Effort. Although planning is still in the preparatory stage, the organisation of MI Support to Large Scale War Fighting (One Division comprising four brigades plus HQ ARRC Land Component Commander plus Corps Troops) [REDACTED] allocated variously throughout the structure. FHTs cannot conduct interrogation simultaneously with other tasking, therefore the reservists are currently the only source of interrogators. However, there is a reticence to accept their continued existence justified on this capability alone¹³ and there has been a reluctance to mobilise them when required. Part of the reason for the latter is the time that it takes to complete the mobilisation process which usually exceeds that available before the capability is required in the AO. The root cause is predominantly the lateness of the decision to employ interrogation which dictates that a regular cadre (probably one JFIT) needs to be retained at a readiness which can deploy when required, which would then give sufficient time to mobilise the reserve JFITs.

PROPOSALS

17. It is proposed that:

a. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] receive TQ training. Spare capacity on TQ courses would be available to personnel from units at lower readiness.

b. A standing JFIT (with appropriate linguistic support) is established, probably within the emerging Defence HUMINT Unit (DHU).

¹³ CO JSIO was informed on 29 May 02 that RAF Waddington (which administers 7630 Sqn RAuxAF) intended to offer the unit as an efficiency saving measure in STP 03.

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- c. [REDACTED] be protected to ensure that up to [REDACTED] JFITs could be deployed. However, the linguistic skills of these personnel should be utilised more fully within the HUMINT spectrum and they should be trained in other HUMINT skills.
- d. Formal action should be taken to ensure that the estimated number of PWs is incorporated into the estimates process in order to derive the TQ, interrogation, guard force and PWHO requirement.
- e. The TQ, interrogation, guard force and PWHO organisation supporting High Readiness formations should be exercised regularly.

SUMMARY

18. PW continue to be a vital component of the MODUK HUMINT effort but JWP 1-10 is not being complied with.
19. The lessons of history have not been learned and has resulted in an inability to meet current operational requirements.
20. The sensitivities caused by the word "interrogation" have resulted in an unwillingness to countenance legal methods of acquiring information from unwilling human sources.
21. TQ, the PWHO and interrogation are part of the same continuum which PW undergo from the point of capture to their eventual repatriation or release and cannot be considered in isolation.
22. Regular High Readiness units should contain [REDACTED] respectively.
23. A permanent JFIT should be established and up to [REDACTED] JFITs maintained by protected [REDACTED] who should also provide linguistic support to other defence HUMINT capabilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

24. It is recommended that MODUK:
- a. Confirms the need for an interrogation capability.
 - b. Endorses the establishment of a permanent JFIT.
 - c. Directs that each Service retain a capability specifically dedicated to the linguistic support of HUMINT operations which has the interrogation capability embedded within it.
 - d. [REDACTED]