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Military Operations 2

Directorate of Military Operations

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

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
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Your Reference: JSIO/2010

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UK DEFENCE POLICY FOR TACTICAL QUESTIONING AND INTERROGATION

References:

- A. JSIO/2010 dated 23 Jul 02.
 B. LAND/Cts/Int/Sy2513 dated 29 Aug 02.

[REDACTED]		MOD FORM 102	
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- Introduction. Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Reference A, which is a timely contribution to the wider Future HUMINT and MI capability work currently ongoing.
- Scope of Paper. Given the advanced state of staffing to identify what capabilities MI is to fulfil and how best to do so, it is suggested that the further staffing of a separate paper dedicated to Tactical Questioning (TQ) and interrogation may complicate matters. This does not seek to undermine or devalue the critical role played by TQ and interrogation; simply to suggest that the ongoing reviews of MI in general and HUMINT specifically, may be the most suitable vehicles for addressing most of the issues raised. Alternatively, as TQ and PH are all arms activities, these issues could be usefully separated from that of interrogation; the correct resourcing of which will have to form part of the ongoing MI capability reviews.
- Proposals. The following detailed comments are made on the paper's proposals.
 - Subparagraph 17a. The mandatory training of personnel from units at High Readiness in PH & TQ skills is welcomed, not withstanding the increased training burden on JSIO that this will generate and which has already been highlighted at Reference B. Alternatively, it may be possible to redefine training responsibility, with units and formations conducting PH training in an ITD type format. TQ training should remain the responsibility of JSIO, but could concentrate on fewer, selected personnel, possibly no lower than BG level, where the likelihood of having suitably qualified linguists is greater.
 - Subparagraph 17b. The establishment of a JFIT capability will require enhancement to the DHU, whether that capability is vested in a stand alone JFIT or an expansion of the tasks of the [REDACTED] FHTs and thus an increase in their manpower. This issue is best taken up within the Future HUMINT Capability paper, currently at 3* draft.
 - Subparagraph 17c. MO2 believes that the skill sets of the Tri Service Reserve Interrogation units could not be expanded to include other HUMINT skills, for reasons of

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individual suitability, availability of resources and the need to protect against skill fade in current trades. There is also concern at the comment that [REDACTED] may be offered as a savings measure in STP03. While the presentational aspects of the mobilisation of reserve units to conduct interrogation, as opposed to de-briefing or TQ, would have to be very carefully handled, these units currently remain the Armed Forces Forces' [REDACTED] and deployable interrogation assets. Furthermore, the linguistic capability provided by members of these Reserve units needs to be retained. It is suggested that the use of reserves to provide the 'trusted interpreters' outlined at Paragraph 15, could reduce the training burden on Regular interrogators and at the same time avoid some of the more difficult presentational issues.

d. Subparagraph 17d. MO2 is unclear as to what formal action JSIO would like to see undertaken, to ensure that commanders consider the issue of PWs in their operational estimates.

e. Subparagraph 17e. MO2 would welcome further detail from JSIO on how it envisages that this type of training could be effectively conducted. Effective training for the full spectrum of personnel involved in PH, TQ and interrogation will cut deeply into field exercises, both in terms of time and manpower.

4. Recommendations. MO2 has detailed comments on the paper's recommendations as follows:

a. Subparagraphs 24a & 24b. These subparagraphs could be combined if 'standing' was inserted before 'interrogation capability' in subparagraph 24.a.

b. Subparagraph 24c. The linguistic capability of the Tri Service reserve units is the most important skill set that they possess. Given the infrequency and political sensitivity of the conduct of interrogation, as opposed to TQ and de-briefing, it is believed that the focus of these units should be linguistic rather than interrogation skills.

b. Subparagraph 24e. MO2 cannot endorse a requirement that directs what commanders should and should not include in their estimate processes.

5. Conclusion. JSIO's paper is a welcome addition to the wide ranging staffwork, currently being conducted in the field of MI capability. It is believed that the issues raised would now best be taken up by incorporating them into papers already circulating at 2 and 3* levels¹. The paper's proposals and recommendations are on the whole sound and MO2 would support their inclusion in the ongoing reviews of MI & HUMINT capability, with the separation of TQ & PH from interrogation as appropriate.

{signed on CHOtS}

S G HEATH
Maj
for DMO

¹ 'A Policy Framework For Delivering MI Capability - 2 Star Circulation': D Int 1/531 dated 8 Aug 02. 'Future Human Intelligence (Humint) Support To Operations': 3 Star draft dated 22 Aug 02.

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