

4. Following a staff posting as a Colonel in MoD, I commanded 24 Airmobile Brigade at Colchester in 1995-96, deploying to Bosnia as part of the UN's Rapid Reaction Force in 1995. I was Chief of Staff, HQ Northern Ireland, 1997-98, at the time of the ceasefire and the Good Friday Agreement, after which I became Director of Army Plans & Resources in 1999.
5. I was promoted Major General in January 2000, and commanded Multi-National Division (South West) in Bosnia before assuming command of 1(UK) Armoured Division ('1 Div') in November 2000.
6. I was General Officer Commanding (GOC) 1 Div which deployed to Iraq on Op Telic 1 in early 2003. In mid-May 2003, I left 1 Div to become Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (Operations) ('DCJO(Ops)') at PJHQ, Northwood.
7. In 2005, I became Commander of the Field Army, and spent a further 6 months in Iraq as Deputy Commanding General and Senior British Military Representative Iraq. I retired from this post in October 2007.

Rank and role during Op Telic 1

8. I was GOC 1 Div until mid-May 2003, when I was replaced by Peter Wall. I think I left theatre on 14 or 15 May 2003. From there I took up a post as Deputy Chief of Operations ('DCJO(Ops)') at PJHQ. As such, my responsibility was to ensure 1 Div was successful in fulfilling the task allocated to it in Op Telic I.

Understanding of conditioning

9. The term 'conditioning' is familiar to me. I understand it to refer to the use of techniques - stress positions, white noise, sight deprivation, food, water and sleep deprivation - prior to questioning. I understand that these techniques are known as 'the Five Techniques'. I am aware that we were

accused of using these techniques in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, and the subsequent prohibition of their use. I know that they contravened the European Convention of Human Rights. I am, and always have been of the belief that such techniques are not to be used.

10. I have been asked by the Inquiry what is the source of my knowledge of "conditioning" and my belief that the five techniques are not to be used. In response, the source of my knowledge on 'conditioning' and my belief that this should not be done is my education, training and professional development since the late 1970s onwards.

11. Regarding my own experience of conditioning techniques:

- a. Sight deprivation as an aid to interrogation: I have seen UK soldiers blindfolded as part of conduct after capture training, where they are being taught how to resist enemy interrogation. In such training, it was never suggested that such techniques were permitted; rather, it was to prepare soldiers in the event that the enemy did not act according to the Geneva Convention. Since the Baha Mousa incident, it is now explicitly stated in the training that the use of these techniques are not permitted.
- b. Stress positions: Again, I have seen stress positions used upon UK soldiers as part of resistance to interrogation training but never heard it suggested that such techniques were permissible for use by the British army.
- c. White noise: I have never seen white noise being used as a conditioning technique.
- d. Food or drink deprivation: I have never observed food or drink deprivation being used as a conditioning technique.
- e. Sleep deprivation: I have never observed sleep deprivation being used as a conditioning technique.

12. I am familiar with the term 'the shock of capture'. I understand this to refer to the period immediately after capture, when the prisoner is in shock and