


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From Brigadier W H Moore



Commander
Headquarters 19 Mechanized Brigade
Operation Telic 2
Allsopp Lines
BFPO 647

Ptarmigan: [REDACTED]
Patron Ext: [REDACTED]
Mobile: [REDACTED]



Major General G C M Lamb CMG OBE
General Officer Commanding
Multinational Division (South East)
British Forces Post Office [REDACTED]

15th August 2003

Dear General Graeme,

FIFTY DAYS ON

Now that we have been in command of the AO for 50 days I thought it timely to give you my thoughts as to what UK is achieving in SE Iraq and, more importantly, what it is not.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

We have accomplished a great deal. While I suspect that we will never be totally in control of Al Basrah and Maysan provinces we have made great strides in laying the foundations for a secure environment for their citizens. The IZ Police are better than they were, and while there is still much to be done in this respect, the liaison, co-ordination and training of them is progressing. It will be some time yet before they are "adequate" but tangible progress has been made. The formation of many new security guard services has also allowed us to move forward, if only in that it has permitted the release of soldiers from static guards. The Facilities Protection is not even adequate and will always require monitoring and propping up, but they do represent a step in the right direction.

The formation of the PSU is an exciting project that will add real capability to the IZ Police. I am grateful that you have supported this financially, and we are now sourcing the high powered help that is required for its training. While this will take out some key players from across the Brigade, the pain will be worth it in the long run. The formation of the ICDC will also offer much although I am concerned about the need to staff such an organization from 19 Mechanized Brigade once the training has been completed. This will remove the C2 structure from my BGs at exactly the wrong stage of the tour, and I would ask that this manpower is sourced from elsewhere. Furthermore, we cannot train the PSU and man the ICDC at the same time. I am, nonetheless very grateful for the loan of the multiples from 9 GS Regiment to ease our current tasking.

The Oil, Power and Electricity Police Forces are to be subsumed into the IZ Police, which will allow them more flexibility and an easier C2 structure with which to deal.

The militia – particularly the Fawj – continue to provide a challenge to our authority and the sooner they are absorbed into a more formal organization, the New Iraqi Army or a derivation of the ICDC, the better. We will then have much more control over them.

GOVERNANCE SUPPORT TEAMS

The GSTs have been successful but are really only able to tinker in terms of the bigger requirement. That said, without them the CPA in both Maysan and Al Basrah would have collapsed. High up among the success stories has been the use of the TA in their civilian employments. Had we not had bankers, financial consultants, utilities managers and the like we would have struggled. The imposition of a head of the GST in Maysan has been a success, although we do need one in Al Basrah in order to free me up more.

CPA(S) has not been a success. Too much navel gazing, structuring and restructuring, and too little direction has left them impotent, ineffective and irrelevant. Most people now come to us for help which is frustrating – albeit understandable - as it takes me away from commanding my brigade.

UK PLC

The Military, and to an extent the MOD have done well in Iraq. The boys won the war relatively quickly and clinically and have set about trying to win the peace. My soldiers are being well supported from the UK. Unfortunately the MOD has not been assisted by the other Ministries and we are now in grave danger of losing the peace. The riots over the last weekend are testament to this. Countless delegations come to see me about the lack of progress made over utilities and key infrastructure, and I find myself agreeing with their analysis: that UK as a whole is not serious about the SE of Iraq, that our means are insufficient for our stated ends.

Consider the facts. 19 Mech Bde force levels were predicated on a benign environment that saw economic regeneration running hand in hand with security sector reform. Unfortunately we are now not able to achieve the tactical effect required, because the operational and strategic enablers are not in place to allow us so to do. We are facing a worsening security situation which is not of our own making, and apart from pushing and goading CPA and applying liberal amounts of sticking plaster to various crises, we are working extremely hard at winning battles but will inevitably lose the campaign. Nor are more forces all the answer. Against such a situation, the whole British Army would not be enough. We must get support from the other UK Ministries or we, as a country will fail, and we will fail publicly.



Apart from the military, there is nothing tangible in the 2 provinces that show UK's commitment to the reconstruction of Iraq. There are no clinics staffed by British doctors and nurses. There is no cultural office with which to engage the Iraqi people. There are no police advisors or training teams with which to improve the capability of the IZ Police. There are no teachers or educationalists to help reform the schooling. There are no local government officials or accountants to resolve the financial crisis. Unemployment is widespread. Apart from security firms, I have had little or no sight of UK contractors in my AO. There is not even a British Council or a High Commission and we are nearly 4 months on from the end of the conflict. UK Plc may not have been prepared for Phase 4, but we should be here now and making a difference and we are not.

It is our soldiers who are bearing the load of this inactivity; covering cracks, doing more than is expected of them and trying to turn their considerable skills to other areas. It is our soldiers who bear the brunt of the Iraqi frustrations – they are the face of the coalition – and they are being held responsible for something that is outside of their competencies and their remit. If a UK pan-government approach is not adopted towards the improvement of SE Iraq, we will lose this campaign and with it the lives of some of our soldiers. This is one place where we will not get away with a quick in and out strategy, and I hope that history is not about to repeat itself as far as UK and Iraq are concerned.

I know that you understand all this, but I am getting increasingly frustrated that the super human efforts of my soldiers are not being properly supported by UK Plc and the other ministries. These people need to be dragged out here with money and equipment in order to complement the very real achievements made by the military. I would ask you to ensure that this view is represented across Whitehall in an attempt to galvanize the rest of the UK into action. Al Basrah and Maysan could be hailed in the future as UK success stories, but UK Plc needs to work very hard and very quickly if this is to be the case (failure and national humiliation are possible). A lack of strategic intent and commitment will directly and dramatically increase the threat to the soldiers on the ground.

The boys are highly motivated, they are working hard and are being extremely well led. I have huge confidence in the Brigade's ability to deliver, and to make a difference. UK Plc now needs to follow suit.

Yours Sincerely,

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