


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23 Jul 02

**UK DEFENCE POLICY FOR TACTICAL QUESTIONING AND INTERROGATION**


At the last Defence HUMINT Working Group (DHWG) I promised to produce a paper arguing for a coherent TQ and Interrogation capability. The first draft is enclosed for your comment.

I am not sure when the next DHWG is planned but it would be appropriate if your comments could be incorporated into a version for discussion at that meeting. It will be for the DHWG to decide the further staffing of the paper.

Anticipating a DHWG sometime in September, could I ask that you review this version and pass comments to me by 30 Aug 02. This should allow me a couple of weeks to incorporate your comments and disseminate the next version for perusal before the meeting.



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Lt Col  
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Enclosure: UK Defence Policy For Tactical Questioning and Interrogation (Draft 1)

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g. Former Director of the CIA, William J Casey, stated; "The wrong picture is not worth a thousand words. No photo, no electronic impulse can substitute for direct on-the-scene knowledge of the key factors in a given country or region. No matter how spectacular a photo may be, it cannot reveal enough about plans, intentions, internal political dynamics, economics, etc. There are simply too many cases where photos are ambiguous or useless, and electronic intelligence can drown an analyst in partial or conflicting information.

7. Consequences of Failing to Maintain A TQ Capability. Until the deployment of an ad hoc team from the Joint Service Intelligence Organisation (JSIO), on Op JACANA, only the RN retained a declared requirement for TQ. As Op JACANA has proved, the consequence is that deploying units were not appropriately trained to handle PWs (in any quantity) nor were they trained to conduct TQ or sustain the 'shock of capture' which is critical to successful interrogation.

8. Consequences of Failing to Maintain An Interrogation Capability. The dangers of failing to maintain an interrogation capability are:

a. It will not be possible to exploit PW other than by cursory TQ at the Point of Capture.

b. Potential intelligence will be lost post-TQ, and there will be no opportunity to re-visit PW as a result of collateral information or to respond to changes in Information Requirements.

c. An important skill in the Defence HUMINT spectrum will be denied to commanders.

d. Short-notice operational requirements, such as Op JACANA, could not be met because trained interrogators and linguists would not have been retained at a sufficient state of operational readiness in posts dedicated to this task. The only earmarked interrogator and linguist posts reside within reserve units<sup>10</sup> but, because of the traditional reticence to sanction interrogation operations, these personnel have never been mobilised and are now extremely vulnerable to disbandment when scrutinised for financial efficiency. It is impractical and operationally imprudent to rely on the services of interpreters acquired from the local population.

<sup>10</sup> HMS Ferret (RNR Interrogator Branch), 7630 Sqn RAuxAF and 22 (V) MI Coy totalling 110 interrogators of all ranks. These units rely on 'life support' from the unit/formation to which they are attached and do not include any PW handling capability.

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### CURRENT SITUATION

9. Throughout the UK Armed Forces only JSIO is authorised to train personnel in TQ and Interrogation<sup>11</sup>. Regulars no longer routinely receive interrogation training; the bulk of the courses being made up of the 3 reservist interrogator units listed at footnote 10 above. Only the RN has regularly placed personnel on the TQ course and RN TQ-trained personnel are present in every ship and submarine and some RM units. HQ Land has recently decreed that all major units going onto the JRRF roster send 2 personnel to a TQ course. The first of these, including Op JACANA personnel, attended the course ending 05 Apr 02. The RAF have no stated requirement to train personnel. Consequently Army and RM non-spearhead, and RAF units, are unable to meet the first requirement of the PW chain.

10. There is no MOD-endorsed doctrine for interrogation. The advent of the Field HUMINT Team (FHT) concept may have complicated understanding; they can be tailored to conduct TQ but they are not resourced for full interrogation purposes. It is important, for presentational reasons, that Joint Forward Interrogation Teams (JFITs) are considered separately from FHTs.

11. The latest calls for operational support (Ops VERITAS and JACANA) have highlighted the parlous state of UK Armed Forces' preparedness and ability to conduct TQ, interrogate or simply *speak* to any Arab or Afghan. The Reservist interrogation units have not trained in a properly-conducted exercise for at least 3 years. They have no vehicles or equipment with which to do their job



### CRITERIA FOR OPERATIONAL INTERROGATION CAPABILITY

12. Number of PWs. The likely numbers of PW will be considered in the estimates process and are part of the Commander's responsibilities (Reference A, Chapter 2). The estimated number of PW will indicate the troops to task for TQ, interrogators and PWHO. Specifically trained personnel in each unit liable to take prisoners should conduct TQ. This suggests that all High Readiness units should have sufficient qualified TQ personnel and have been exercised alongside the PWHO and interrogators.

13. Legal Considerations. Specific political and legal implications will need to be considered and authority to conduct interrogation given.<sup>12</sup> Concerns regarding the use of the word 'interrogation' will undoubtedly arise but should not inhibit the authorisation of the methods themselves. If necessary each of the methods (commonly termed 'approaches') could be viewed separately and authorised on a sliding scale in much the same way as Rules of Engagement.

14. Deployability. JFITs will need to be deployable and must be sustained in the Area of Operations (AO). JFITs will not be able to operate in isolation of the PWHO and should be viewed as a specialist team that will be attached under the operational command of the force being supported, usually at the highest level possible. It should be noted that the guard force is not part of the PWHO but is dedicated to, and trained by, the JFIT. In operations where

<sup>11</sup> Bids from sponsors: RN 40 / Land 28. Places approved by DISC under SOTR 2003/04: RN 28 / Land 20.

<sup>12</sup> It cannot be stressed highly enough that all current UK interrogator-qualified Armed Forces personnel are trained to operate within the terms of the GC.

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