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All DHWG Members**UK DEFENCE POLICY FOR TACTICAL QUESTIONING AND INTERROGATION**

References:

- A. JWP 1-10 – Prisoners of War Handling.
- B. STANAG 2033 – Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW).
- C. STANAG 2044 – Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW).
- D. Prisoners Intelligence and War¹.

INTRODUCTION

1. Reference A sets out the current UK PW handling principles and processes for PW handling and References B and C detail the UK-signed STANAGS which underpin it. Currently, there is no coherent operational capability for Tactical Questioning (TQ) and Interrogation that enables MODUK to comply with any of these references. History and recent operational experience suggests that ignoring this capability (mainly because of political sensitivities) results in the denial of valuable intelligence.

PURPOSE

2. This discussion paper argues for a coherent and sustainable Tactical Questioning and Interrogation capability and makes recommendations.

ASSUMPTIONS

3. The following assumptions are made:
- a. That the full ISTAR intelligence spectrum will be utilised whenever possible.
 - b. That intelligence derived from PW in accordance with the Geneva Conventions² (GC) is both ethically acceptable and required.
 - c. That the GC will be complied with in their entirety.
 - d. That MODUK will comply with References A-C whilst they are extant.

¹ A Defence Fellowship Study conducted at Kings College London University 1988-1989 by Col D M Burrill Late INT CORPS.

² The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Protocols Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

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CURRENT SITUATION

9. Throughout the UK Armed Forces only JSIO is authorised to train personnel in TQ and Interrogation¹¹

Only the RN has regularly placed personnel on the TQ course and RN TQ-trained personnel are present

are unable to meet the first requirement of the PW chain.

10. There is no MOD-endorsed doctrine for interrogation. The advent of the Field HUMINT Team (FHT) concept has complicated understanding but FHTs are unable to meet the first requirement of the PW chain. It is vital that Joint Forward Interrogation Teams (JFITs) are considered separately from FHTs.

11.

CRITERIA FOR OPERATIONAL INTERROGATION CAPABILITY

12. Number of PWs. The likely numbers of PW will be considered in the estimates process and are part of the Commander's responsibilities (Reference A, Chapter 2). The estimated number of PW will indicate the troops to task for TQ, interrogators and PWHO. Specifically trained personnel in each unit liable to take prisoners should do TQ. This suggests that all High Readiness units should have sufficient qualified TQ personnel and have been exercised alongside the PWHO and interrogators.

13. Legal Considerations. Specific political and legal implications will need to be considered and authority to conduct interrogation given.¹² Concerns regarding the use of the word 'interrogation' will undoubtedly arise but should not inhibit the authorisation of the methods themselves. If necessary each of the methods (commonly termed 'approaches') could be viewed separately and authorised on a sliding scale in much the same way as Rules of Engagement.

¹¹ [REDACTED]
¹² It cannot be stressed highly enough that all current UK interrogator-qualified Armed Forces personnel are trained to operate within the terms of the GC.