



**JOINT SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION**

Defence Intelligence & Security Centre  
Chicksands, Shefford, Beds. SG17 5PR

Tel/Fax: Military Chicksands [REDACTED]  
Civilian [REDACTED]



CO  
JSIO

Your Ref:

Our Ref: JSIO / 5201

Date: 21 May 03

F BRANCH JSIO - OP TELIC POST OPERATION REPORT

References:

A: JWP 1-10 - Prisoner handling

Background

1. F Branch JSIO deployed on Op TELIC at the end of Feb 03, returning during Mid Apr 03. During the deployment the team was required to carry out a wide variety of Humint tasks. The aim of this report is to describe the activity of the JSIO team and to illustrate areas where improvements are required both to the delivery of training and to operational procedures. At Annex A - C of this letter is a breakdown of the activities carried out and the lessons identified.

2. [REDACTED]

3. On 28 Feb 02 a two man advance party deployed to Camp Udairi in Kuwait, joining H Sqn Joint NBC Regt, the UK host unit within the IEB. The main party deployed on 04 Mar 03. A nominal roll is at Appendix 1 to Annex A.

The Intelligence Exploitation Base (IEB) Task

4. The task of the advance party was to integrate the JSIO team into the UK element [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] H Sqn provided life support and other admin assistance within their capability and were extremely helpful throughout the time the JSIO team were with them. The only issue not fully resolved was a lack of team vehicles, this being due to a lack of promised backfill from Strike Comd.

[REDACTED] This was eventually achieved, however, 2 weeks were lost in frustrating attempts to achieve any sort of actual integration. [REDACTED]

SECRET

BMI Downgrade - RESTRICTED

MOD042844\_PR

PH&TQ & INTERROGATION

1. A major part of the tasks undertaken by the FHT was the conduct of TQ and Interrogation against captured Iraqi military and detained civilian personnel and a useful amount of tactical intelligence was gained.. The demeanour of all those subjected to TQ'ing was such that no lengthy Interrogations were required although some TQ sessions were robust in nature.
2. The Bde PW cage was administered by 1 Royal Irish Regt and although some advice on structure, guarding and procedures was given overall they did a professional job.
3. Although units had copies of JWP 1-10 it was evident that few had had the time or inclination to read it. Understanding of the PW chain was limited and the apparent common desire was to get rid of the problem as quickly as possible. This urgency would be commendable if the correct procedures had then been followed. They were not.
4. JWP 1-10 as the doctrinal piece on PW handling is outdated and assumes that capturing units will have the time and manpower to carry out what is a complicated and bureaucratic procedure whilst in close proximity, if not contact, with an enemy. It fails to take into account that units will probably not have Interpreters sufficiently far forward to make the process work, and appears to be based in an era when Battalions were 1200 strong. The whole process of PW handling proved to be fundamentally flawed, and had more prisoners been captured than was the case, would quickly have become unworkable.
5. Throughout the Bde AOR there was a significant lack of understanding on the subject of prisoner handling, leading to a great many problems:
  - a. Capturing troops are unaware of correct PW handing methods.

Military personnel cover what they should *not do* to PWs in the Geneva Conventions ITD, as well as receiving ROE briefings etc. However, at no time to they receive training on what they *should do* with PWs. This lack of understanding manifested itself in many areas:

- (1) Rarely were the exact circumstances of capture made known to the TQ team, indeed, in many cases no information about the capture was ever made known. In other cases conflicting accounts about the capture of PWs were never adequately explained.
- (2) Rarely did PW's equipment, weapons or documentation accompany the PW to the point of TQ'ing, thereby leaving a gap in knowledge. In several cases equipment was never released by the capturing unit who claimed that it had 'not been checked by ATO'. This latter point is clearly nonsense as no sane soldier would carry around booby-trapped equipment in the expectation of being captured with it. There were also instances where personal belongings had been removed, were unaccounted for and were subsequently lost/stolen. Although the later accusation is unproven, many prized items reported taken with a PW simply disappeared.