

house. This was a very strict policy aimed at preventing the spread of infections and disease.

6. Description of JEM

I would describe JEM as focused, driven, determined, knowing what he wanted to achieve, confident in his own abilities, fair and demanding.

I would say that he was a very good Commanding Officer although at times could be over controlling. An example of this was his punishment of Somme Company for the actions of two soldiers who after becoming drunk took a vehicle and crashed it into a mobile shop at Basra Palace where Somme were located. Upon hearing about this incident, JEM went to address Somme Company and immediately meted out punishment without reference to the OC, Major Edward Hemesley.

I would say that JEM worked extremely hard on the tour and had a phenomenal amount of energy.

7. Various Personalities within QLR

WO1 (now Captain) George Briscoe – I would say that George Briscoe was not a particularly strong RSM but he was a decent, straight guy who definitely would not have condoned abuse of Iraqis. I believe if he had had any suspicions of such abuse taking place he would have investigated and report them.

Major Richard Englefield – I have known Richard Englefield for a long time and have a lot of respect for him. He is presently 2IC of 1QLR.

Major Edward Hemesley - Hemesley was OC of Somme Company based at Basra Palace. Somme was a surge company providing special weapons support. Their only area of responsibility was a small section at the side of the Shat – Al – Arab River. Hemesley was upset with JEM over the way JEM dealt

with the incident involving the two drunken soldiers but the situation was resolved following our return from Iraq.

Captain Kellioh – Kellioh was not particularly active and could often be found sunbathing in the courtyard of the Medical Centre. He was known for his all over suntan.

Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) Mark Kenyon – Mark Kenyon was the most able of the officers commanding the sub units and that is why JEM gave him the most difficult area. Corunna was based at the Old State Building and for part of the tour shared the compound with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). I think the CPA, who were based in a different building on the compound, moved out during the second half of the second part of the tour.

Kenyon is presently based at DIFID Victoria Street London undertaking a staff posting. He is to command the Second Battalion of the Duke of Lancaster Regiment. The Duke of Lancaster Regiment will comprise 1 QLR, 1 Kings and Kings Own Royal Border Regiment (KORBR).

Major John Lighten – Lighten, who is presently on re-settlement, is a training Major with Tyne Tees Regiment. I understand JEM put Lighten and Burma Company in the same camp as him so that he, JEM, could keep an eye on Lighten and if necessary give him a metaphorical kick into action. Burma had to commute to their area of responsibility and were also responsible for guarding the Headquarters camp. At some stage as part of the camp guard duties a member of Burma Company was put on the roof of the accommodation block opposite the detention centre with a radio. I do not know when this practice started.

Captain Peter Madden (Padre) – The Padre was generally around and about camp although he did on occasions go out. He was a very nice chap but not somebody who talked the soldiers language.

Corporal Don Payne – I only really saw Payne if I was going out on the CO's Tac. I did not have a view about him one way or the other. The Regimental

Police and PT guys were part of CO's Tac (which was nicknamed the Viper Squad). They were well practised and drilled at what they did.

In regard to the other defendants I do not recall them apart from Peebles.

Major Mike Peebles – Peebles arrived after me and took over from Royce as BGIRO, ISTAR and Liaison Officer. He was not perceived to be up to acting as Battlegroup Warfare Officer and I took on that role. However even though Peebles was not up to tactical consideration of operations he was perfectly capable of fulfilling the administrative tasks which he was given. As far as dealing with detainees was concerned, once operations had been carried out, given the pace of life at the time my focus would shift to the next operation. The same would apply to JEM.

I was aware detainees would be tactically questioned to ascertain whether they should be interned and sent to Umm Qasr, handed over to the Iraqi Police or released. There were no trained tactical questioners within Battlegroup and therefore we were dependent upon tactical questioners coming from Brigade.

In the event that detainees were sent to Umm Qasr for internment, no information was received from the TIF which had been obtained during questioning and which may be of use to the Battlegroup or indeed Brigade. If criminals were handed over to the Iraqi Police they were of much less interest but similarly no information would be sent back to Battlegroup which could assist intelligence wise.

Dealing with detainees was the role of the BGIRO and people under his command i.e. the Provost Staff. I never had any cause to believe that Major Peebles was not capable of carrying out the straight forward role of BGIRO.

Lieutenant (now Captain) Craig Rodgers - I did not have much direct contact with Rodgers and did not really know him.

8. Deaths of Captain Dai Jones and 3 RMP

I was present in Iraq at the time of both incidents. My recollection is that JEM's message to the O Group was that we must crack on and not let these occurrences cloud our judgement and cause us to treat the Iraqis any differently.

I did not form any impression about the mood of the soldiers following the deaths but I am sure if the mood was turning or was a cause for concern I would have been aware of that as a potential problem.

9. Rumours of Treatment of Iraqis Generally

When I first arrived on tour I had heard rumours about over robustness by British soldiers towards Iraqi civilians (not detainees). I had not heard anything in regard to QLR specifically. I was aware of the allegations relating to Camp Breadbasket and also the Irish Guards incident. I had become aware of these incidents whilst working at PJHQ prior to deploying to Iraq. I think I discussed these rumours in passing with Major John Lighten, OC of Burma and WO2 Darren Leigh.

I have been asked if I heard any rumours or reports about ill treatment of Garamsche Tribe members held at Corunna Company lines and a suggestion that an Iraqi had his wrists broken at Anzio Company lines. I did not hear any such reports or rumours. I have been asked about an incident apparently reported whereby soldiers allowed an Iraqi to be beaten up by other Iraqis in the back of a Saxon. I was unaware of that specific incident but that was the type of rumour I had heard.

In regard to the theft of dinar during Operation Salerno, I shall comment on that below. I believe however that this was not the first occasion where soldiers had

I was aware that very shortly after Musa's death an instruction was received that hooding should cease immediately.

In regard to the memo prepared by Fenton for Brigadier Moore dated 18th September 2003 (RJE/2 – pages 155 – 158 – volume 3) I have considered this document and do not believe that I provided the information to Fenton which he sets out in the document.

I prepared the memo dated 17th September 2003 which was sent to Brigade enclosing Lt Craig Rodgers statement setting out the events which occurred at the TIF after his arrival with the detainees (RJE/2 page 159 volume 3).

13. Treatment of Detainees

1. Conditioning – I was not familiar with this expression
2. Shock of capture – I understand shock of capture to mean maintaining disorientation of the captured person. I have never been trained in this technique but would imagine that it should only take place for a relatively short period of time as the captured person would become used to his captured state.
3. Hooding – I was aware that hooding took place for security purposes and disorientation. A potential terrorist would be hooded if being moved around camp in order that he could not familiarise himself with the layout. I would not have expected a detainee to be hooded once in the detention centre. I was not aware that detainees were hooded whilst in the detention centre. In order to prevent detainees making contact with each other prior to tactical questioning they could be separated. I would say that given the extremely high temperatures, despite the desire to maintain shock of capture detainees should not be kept hooded whilst in the detention centre.