



Total Pages: 5

GOC Directive 1

03 Feb 03

See Distribution

**OP TELIC – GOC's DIRECTIVE ONE**

**INTENT**

1. I intend to issue Directives to supplement the various Op Orders that we have, and will continue to issue. The objective is to guide your thinking, planning and preparation. This will allow anticipation, freedom of action and cooperation – to maximise Mission Command in the execution of specific plans.
2. Directive One seeks to release the very evident talents of senior Commanders and Staff in preparing the Div for operations in Iraq.

**CURRENT SITUATION**

3. We have been ordered to deploy. Div HQ, BDE HQs and JHF HQ are now in Camp RHINO and have declared IOC. The DOA for our full force is set. We must retain the agility to attend to DOA adjustment – intended or otherwise.
4. We are deployed as part of National and Coalition diplomacy. Iraq must disarm itself of WMD, or we shall be ordered to employ force to disarm Iraq of WMD.
5. The UK Land Contingent is very significant in size and capability. But we are part of a wider Coalition. Within the Land Component we are a Division within 1 MEF, itself alongside V(US) Corps, both responsible to CFLCC for the execution of plans.
6. We are OPCOM CJO with all UK national direction, freedoms and constraints channelled through NCC. Currently, we are working direct to PJHQ until NCC is established in the Region. We contribute significantly to UK's strategic effect.
7. We are TACOM CG 1 MEF. We create tactical effects to enable decisive delivery of his plans. We are integrating with HQ 1 MEF and its subordinate formations. Whilst we have been planning within 1 MEF for barely a month, much of 1 MEF has been planning, even conducting scenario related training, for many months.
8. The circumstances in and to which we are deploying are evolving and volatile. We must expect these circumstances to change and change again before we are given orders to employ force.



**CURRENT PLANNING**

9. We now have a Base Plan. But this must not be regarded as The Plan, not least because of the points at Paragraph 8. The Base Plan will evolve consequent upon further analysis. And we shall develop Branch and CONPLANS as appropriate. The Plans for execution will be ordered at the last safe moment.

10. We have identified 5 critical elements of 1 (UK) Armd Div's AO upon which we need to have an effect:

- a. Iraq's Armed Forces
- b. Irregular Forces working against the Coalition.
- c. Oilfield Infrastructure.
- d. UMM OASR.
- e. BASRAH.

11. But we do not know the condition, nor intent, of these critical elements at some future point when we are deployed to create the required effect. Therefore, we must focus on comprehending the effect and how we shall employ our forces and resources to achieve it, against a range of circumstances – hostile to benign. Working groups have been established at Div and/ or Bde level to take this forward. We shall have timely Backbriefs in order to understand and give future direction. We must also hold in mind:

- a. The effect we create on one element will impact, for better or worse, on another.
- b. We are part of a bigger Coalition plan achieving impact for the benefit of other Coalition forces.

**OUR FORCE – 1 (UK) ARMD DIV**

12. The Div is made up from many other formations. 3 Cdo Bde, 7 Armd Bde, 16 AA Bde, and the JHF already have very strong, public, identities. We must build on this and establish a strong identity within the Coalition. We must strive to be professional, disciplined, determined, quietly confident in our abilities and at all times acting decently.

13. We must establish our connectivities and processes. Div HQ must work especially hard to understand the differences in method, borne of organisation, employed in 3 Cdo Bde, 16 AA Bde and JHF. Our staffs must co-operate closely, beware of assuming things will be done automatically, and avoid surprising (by omission or commission) one and other.

218

14. We must also establish all our personal and electronic connectivities and processes with HQ 1 MEF. Our force is designed to be supported by 1 MEF deep assets. We must establish the techniques for delivering this in a timely, effective and safe manner. We must test ourselves in the most demanding circumstances.
15. Being an ally is a two- way street. When you find someone or something odd, reflect with certainty that someone finds you and your people very odd too.
16. We must understand that our Rear Parties are based both in Germany and UK. We must recognize the differences and strive to keep our messages joined up.

#### CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

17. We must be clear – when we employ force this is war. We are invading Iraq. The enemy will fight back. We must expect the Regime to act unethically and contrary to laws of war. It will seek to create chaos. It will sacrifice its own citizens in order to achieve this. We must be ready to overcome use of chemical and biological weapons.
18. We win. We overcome whatever obstacles are put in our way.
19. Invading and winning requires analysis:
  - a. We are invading but only to disarm Iraq of WMD. In process we shall liberate the people from the consequences of a Regime that refuses to recognise the will of the International Community.
  - b. We only win on successful implementation of Phase IV. See Paragraph 21.
20. We are manoeuvrists. We must grasp opportunities to deliver our missions with minimum kinetic force. Iraq must still exist after the conflict as a sovereign state, stable and able to defend itself.
21. As we enter Iraq in Phases II/III, everything behind us is automatically in Phase IV. The Phase IV requirements have yet to emerge. I am confident that our people have the physical and mental agility to attend to it quickly, thoughtfully and effectively when the requirements emerge, and we judge the moment has arrived. But 2 important points:
  - a. There must be no triumphalisms on achieving Phases II/III. Indeed we must restore, foster, Iraqi dignity in our AO and work together as far as possible to achieve Phase IV for their benefit.
  - b. We shall probably be the first Coalition forces to implement Phase IV. We can set the pace. The world media will be reporting our activities.

219

22. We shall increasingly be in the public eye. We represent our country in the Coalition and once battle is joined will be the focus of our country's media. We expect to be accompanied by accredited correspondents, who in accepting a degree of censorship expect in return the opportunity to report. We must recognize that essentially our aims are contradictory. So we must be neither naïve nor unduly officious. Professional respect and cooperation should allow us to use this powerful medium to put our message across. We must identify the core message and determine the best way of putting them across. The Media's impression of us must be that identified at Paragraph 11 "professional, disciplined, determined, quietly confident in our abilities and at all times acting decently".

### TRAINING

23. We have limited training opportunity in Theatre. Time, space and sustainability are all at a premium. I assume within your forces you have the skills and drills in place. The focus of our training must therefore be:

- a. Integrating our skills and drills with each other in the Div. I must be able to TASKORG BGs from one Bde to another. Recce Squadrons must be ready for regrouping. CS and CSS must be regroupable and responsive to other regroupings.
- b. Integrating skills and drills with 1 MEF.
- c. Mission rehearsals according to the Base Plan and Branch/CONPLANS.
- d. Training to manoeuvre must, at a minimum, be achieved through MAPEX and CPX. Not only is this important for Commanders and HQs from BG upwards, but it integrates CS and CSS.

24. We must exploit the opportunities of the Base Plan which connects 3 Cdo Bde with 15 MEU, 7 Armd Bde with RCT 7 and 16 AA Bde with RCT 5.

25. Further training direction will be issued as opportunities and circumstances become clearer. Do not hesitate to demand opportunities for essential training you identify for your command. Meanwhile the Main Effort is warfighting based on the Base Plan and CONPANS ideas.

### SITUATION AWARENESS, DISCIPLINE AND SECURITY

26. Uninformed soldiers, poor discipline and security lead to low morale:

- a. We must establish throughout 1 (UK) Armd Div an attitude of mind that is robust and capable of enduring the uncertainties, fear and confusion associated with war. People must accept we do not know what tomorrow will bring, nor how long this deployment will last. We must encourage people to live for the day, take prudent measures for their next, and be confident in their ability to handle every eventuality.

*(Handwritten initials)*

b. We must explain the circumstances of Iraq and the Coalition. But not speculate as to what might be. This generates rumour, the very stuff of uncertainty and confusion. We must deal in facts.

c. Let us insist on the highest standard of (self) discipline from the moment of arrival in Theatre. It will be a significant Force Protection measure before we are ordered to employ force, it will significantly improve our sustainability (people and equipment) on employment, and it is the primary antidote to fear. Good discipline leads to trust, confidence and camaraderie – a virtuous circle. This is the state from where we shall prevail.

R V BRIMS  
Maj Gen  
GOC 1(UK) Armd Div

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Comd 3 Cdo Bde  
Comd 7 Armd Bde  
Comd 16 AA Bde  
Comd JHF

Information:

CG 1 MEF  
NCC Comd (Via PJHQ)  
SBLA  
Comd JFLogC  
CO Jt NBC Regt

Internal:

Action:

CRA  
CRE  
Comd Log Sp  
Comd ES  
Comd Med  
COS

DCOS  
CO QDG  
Legal  
POLAD  
Ch G6/1 ADSR