

STAFF - INVESTIGATION
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(Continuation Sheet)

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Continuation of statement of:	Captain BARBER		

of the main headquarters and accommodation complex. At AZ there was a small building to the NE end of the camp that had three rooms. Each room was approximately 6m by 6m and had windows for ventilation. At AZP there was a gate house type building just inside the main gate. It had two rooms each of which was about 6m x 4m. It was situated on a small road island on the main entry / exit road into camp. All of the facilities were chosen because they were easily guarded, isolated any detainees from British Troops and they afforded detainees protection from the elements. Detainees were isolated from British Troops to stop them gathering any intelligence on the layout of the camp or on movements within the camp.

It must be noted that these detention facilities were only used during specific pre planned BG operations. During each of these operations the detention facility would be used to detain all arrested individuals. The BG Int Cell, led by myself, would then identify and coordinate the questioning of each individual. As the questioning process progressed individuals would be released if I deemed that they were of no intelligence value. Those that were of intelligence value would be interned at the Theatre Internment Facility (TIF). The TIF was at Camp Bucca in Umm Qasr and was predominantly an American facility with a small British Contingent. The British Contingent included members of the Joint Forces Intelligence Team (JFIT). JFIT would exploit any intelligence value that the detainees had and then feed the information into the chain of command.

When an Iraqi national was detained by UK forces he was classified into one of two categories, these were criminal or as being a threat to UK Forces. Those detainees that were criminals were moved directly from the point of arrest to be handed over to the Iraqi Police. Those that were deemed to be a threat to UK Forces were moved to AAK, AZ or AZP for review. The arresting Call Sign would then contact myself at AZP to discuss the case. I would decide if the case warranted Internment, if so the detainee would be brought to AZP where I would complete the necessary paperwork and the detainee moved to the TIF. At all times the arresting Call Sign would be responsible for the movement, safety and protection of the detainee. Even when they were held at UK locations the arresting call sign was responsible for the detainee.

All soldiers within the Regt were briefed on arrest and restraint procedures during pre deployment training. All soldiers also completed ITD training of the Laws of Armed Conflict which covers the handling of prisoners. During the deployment I briefed the chain of command at the COs daily O Group as to the process that was required. Namely that prisoners must not sand bagged, that only "plasti-cuffs" were to be used as a restraint and that prisoners must be given water and shelter from the elements. The Regt was briefed via the chain of command that detainees were not allowed to communicate with each other. For security reasons detainees were made to wear blacked out goggles when entering and leaving camps. Sand bags were only used once early in the tour, however, in response to a Bde Order this procedure was stopped. As a result of the size of the AOR it was impossible for me to ensure that all detainees were treated correctly and this responsibility was vested in the Chain of Command. During pre planned BG Ops when I deployed all detainees were treated within the guidelines of Bde Order and the Geneva Convention.

Signature: GR BARBER

Signature Witnessed by: AJ HOWELL

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Sheet No	3	Case No:	64695/03
Continuation of statement of:		Captain BARBER	

I have today been asked by SSgt Howell my knowledge of the following terms:

'Shock of Capture'. I can state that I am familiar with this term. I first heard the term during OP TELIC 2. I understand this term to mean the disorientation felt by an individual who has been detained by soldiers unexpectedly. I was not aware of this term before deploying to Iraq. I was briefed on the concept by Bde G2 staff, in particular SSgt Davies.

The term 'Shock of Capture' was used in reference to the immediate post detention questioning of an individual. The "shock of capture" is maximised in order to afford the UK Forces the greatest chance of gaining useable intelligence from the suspect.

Conditioning. I can state that I am unfamiliar with this term.

Hooding. I can state that I am familiar with this term, having heard it numerous time in my Army Career. I understand this term to mean the placing of a sand bag over an individuals head. This has the effect of blinding him.

I understand the purpose of hooding is to assist in maximising the shock of capture.

Restraints. I can state that I am familiar with this term, having heard it numerous times in my Army Career. I understand this term to mean restricting the physical freedoms of a detained individual.

I understand the purpose for the use of restraints is to minimise the chance of escape and to minimise the threat to British soldiers.

Sleep Deprivation. I can state that I am familiar with this term, having heard it numerous times during my Army Career. I understand this term to mean the effect on an individual caused by long hours without sleep.

Detainees held by 40 Regt RA were never in detention long enough for sleep deprivation to become an issue. The maximum time a detainee was held by 40 Regt RA was 12hours. Sleep deprivation only affected British Forces and was not an issue for detainees.

Stress Positions. I have heard this phrase a number of times in my Army Career. It refers to certain positions that an individual can be forced to adopt in order to maximise the shock of capture and induce excessive fatigue. Stress position were not part of 40 Regt RA procedures, I was not aware of them being used by any Regt during OP TELIC 2.

I had never heard the term Tactical Questioning (TQ) before CO 40 Regt RA had assumed command of his AO. The TQ process is not a process with which I was familiar before deploying to Iraq. TQ was only used in 40 Regt during pre planned BG Ops. There was a severe lack of TQ qualified

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