



MILITARY CORRECTIVE TRAINING CENTRE

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AGC (MPS) POST OPERATION REPORT

OPERATION TELIC

PART ONE – OFFICER COMMANDING'S REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

1. A platoon of 12 AGC (MPS) provided specialist detention and custody capability throughout theatre under OPCOM 5 RMP, the L of C MP Regt at third Line. MPS troops were subsequently attached TACOM various units throughout the period of deployment, in order to support the mission theatre wide.
2. MPS troops under TACOM QDG Prisoner of War Handling Organisation (PWHO) were initially engaged in providing essential planning input regarding the Divisional Collection Point (Div CP) and providing PW Handling Training and Advisory Teams, training combat units throughout 1 (UK) Armd Div. The additional training of those units earmarked to man the PWHO Div CP was also conducted by MPS. As hostilities commenced the MPS main effort switched to manning the key nodes within the PW handling chain from the Brigade Collection Points (Bde CP) rearwards. MPS provided an LO throughout the war fighting phase of the operation to the US 800th MP Bde.
3. During Phase 4 Ops, MPS were tasked to identify, advise and supervise the reconditioning of existing detention facilities and the building of new detention centres. This done, MPS were tasked to provide local IZ (police) prison staff with the necessary direction, training and supervision in order to operate such facilities. In addition, in order to protect UK interests in accordance with the Geneva Convention, MPS provided a monitoring team at the Theatre Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca, to monitor the treatment of UK captured detainees and internees transferred to US custody.
4. Utilising the spare capacity of the LO to 800th MP Bde, who was for a useful period of time co-located with HQ JFLogC, MPS had also prepared and developed, in support of J1 JFLogC, an own forces detention and advisory capability.
5. Following the lessons learned from OP GRANBY and OP AGRICOLA, a platoon of 12 MPS, deployed for the first time in a war fighting role. Undoubtedly the transferable skills utilised by the MPS



were fundamental to the success of the UK PWHO. Recruiting NCOs from all arms and services who have sound leadership ability and with a proven track record within their former cap badge, the MPS were able to deploy a highly qualified and all arms experienced team. As a result of their peacetime role at the MCTC, they possess up to date, highly transferable custodial skills, which enabled the execution of the PW plan.

6. Having regular MPS assets with a solid background in soldiering in theatre ensured the switch from the war fighting demands of PW Handling to Phase 4 tasks - the operation of civil prisons in accordance with UN minimum standards - was to prove seamless. Indeed the identification, refurbishment and training was conducted in a way that resulted in the Al Ma'Qil prison being opened some 5 weeks after the cessation of major combat missions.

7. The combination of soldiering, leadership and custodial skills, combined with the ability to train others, were essential given the autonomy and the requirements of MPS elements who were some of the most widely dispersed elements in theatre.

LINES OF DEVELOPMENT

8. Concepts and Doctrine. All activity in relation to PW handling was conducted in accordance with JWP 1-10 which takes into account the Geneva Convention 1949 and additional protocols. Whilst proving to be a useful document overall, the JWP 1-10 has a number of shortcomings, including insufficient detail regarding the role and operation of the Bde CP and explicit reference to the MPS capability and role at each nodal point within the PW chain. In short, a full review of JWP 1-10 should now be undertaken, in particular, should PWHO remain an overall J1 responsibility?

9. In relation to own forces detention, JSP 469 was used as a framework in order to provide safe working practices and to meet the timelines demanded in cases of pre charge and post charge custody. Following direction from OSCA, there was to be no deviation from CSDR 2000. In effect, this meant no change to normal working practices for the MPS in dealing with the custody of service personnel. That said, the complexities of CSDR 2000 presented challenges to G1 staff within the operational, environment especially where augmentees were utilised.

10. In respect of the operation of civil prisons, JSP 470 and HM Prison Service 'Expectations' were used as a framework, albeit heavily constrained by local conditions. The UN minimum standards in relation to prisons were also used as a guiding principle in the establishment of positive regime change within custodial practice in the UK AO. Utilising these documents and guidelines and as a result of the PW experience, the Force Detention Centre SOP from OP AGRICOLLA was expanded, utilised and translated into Arabic. The head of the UN prisons team within Iraq fully endorsed the document, taking it to pass on to other coalition partners with the suggestion that they adopt it within their AO.

11. Structures. JWP 1-10 covers the numbers of MPS personnel required within each facility as PWHO assets; but its suggestions for not only MPS but all arms are unrealistic and need to be reviewed as per Annex G. In order to deploy MPS assets quickly, 12 x MPS deployed under 5 RMP and not the PWHO (based around RHQ and HQ Sqn QDG). 5 RMP were a JF Log C unit whilst QDG PWHO was initially part of DSG. As a result, valuable time was lost in embedding MPS assets within the organisation of which they were to be a part.

12. An additional MPS officer embedded within the Div Pro desk would be a major step forward. This would enable greater liaison between MPS at the Div CP or detention facility and Div legal and G2 representatives. This is particularly important during the transition to and on execution of Phase 4 Ops where the distinctions between PW, internee and detainee become important, especially within the context of the international community and media.

custody SNCO to authorise detention. There were not enough RMP SNCOs to facilitate this and so no follow-up investigations were initially conducted by RMP. During the early stages, no legal defence was initially available to suspects whilst Custody Reviews were lacking. This led to frustration and serious self-harm incidents among the detainees.

50. Al Ma'Qil Prison. On 02 Jun 03, under the direction of the MPS, Al Ma'Qil prison in Basrah opened providing a pre trial detention capability for some 240 prisoners; although with further work this could have been expanded to admit some 300 prisoners. The facility had been used by the old regime offering a 700 prisoner capacity. Staffed by some 100 IZ police prison staff, the role of the MPS was to direct, train and operate the facility with the aim of handing the operation over to the IZ governor and his team as soon as practical. The MPS would then adopt a prisons inspectorate function across the whole AO. Under MPS direction and supported by 1 RMP, the prison had been refurbished during the previous 2 weeks. The prison was formally visited by the ICRC on 10 Jun 03. The issue of C2 in respect of MPS was, particularly during this period, was unclear. The PI was dealing with the detention and management of criminal detainees at Camp Bucca whilst attempting to hasten and monitor the repatriation of PW also held at Camp Bucca. Further prison site reces and recommendations were made during this period. In particular, two police station custody suites were established in Al Amarah and Maysan province, whilst a site for a potential 1500 man prison at AS Sinaiyah in Basrah was identified as a future prison. Outline plans were discussed and the site was being secured for this purpose and the establishment of this facility is likely to become the MPS main effort in the future.

51. Key Lessons.

- a. The lack of an identified or formed dedicated PWHO presents considerable problems throughout a war fighting operation. There is an urgent requirement to identify or establish an organisation to deal with war fighting PW Issues.
- b. Many units had been incorrectly briefed regarding PW handling procedures prior to deployment. In particular, the 'bagging' or hooding of PW as a matter of routine had been widely briefed. Given the potential harm to UK interests, there is an urgent requirement for specialists to conduct all PW handling training. This task is best conducted by MPS.
- c. Given the need to implement a workable detention policy, there is a requirement to establish a close liaison between Legal, RMP, MPS and Civil affairs at Div HQ. An MPS officer is best qualified to provide custodial input at the Div level, particularly regarding the establishment and operation of civil prisons.
- d. Troops on the ground were not aware of the differences between detainee, internee and PW. As a result, paperwork was often not present and therefore individuals were incorrectly processed as PW.
- e. The Prisoners were transferred to US custody and as a result, security and control of detainee movement was often out of the control of MPS/PWHO.
- f. Prison design and refurbishment recommendations affect custodial care and security, therefore structural changes to prison buildings should only be undertaken on MPS advice.

52. Detailed Comments Detailed comments are at Annex C.

SUSTAINABILITY

RESTRICTED

ANNEX C TO
MCTC/03/02/30
DATED OCT 03

OPERATIONS LESSONS OP TELIC

Ser	DTG	Initiator Appointment Unit	METL(L)	Title of Lesson	Observation / Lesson	Recommendations / Action
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1.	06 Apr 03	Capt N B Wilson, OC MPS OP TELIC		Lack of dedicated PWHO.	The constant retasking of units led to a lack of continuity within the PWHO.	A dedicated PWHO is established.
2.	20 Feb 03	Capt N B Wilson, OC MPS OP TELIC		PW handling training out of date.	Prior to arrival in theatre many units were out of date regarding the correct treatment of PW, in particular, with regards to the routine "bagging" of PW.	MPS should be the lead arm for the delivery of PW handling and detention issues throughout the services. MPS training advisory teams should sponsor the relevant ITD, directly support BATUS, OPTAG and all major exercises involving PW/detention serials.
3.	10 Apr 03	Capt N B Wilson, OC MPS OP TELIC		MPS Div Staff Officer.	The need to establish a workable detention policy and establish civil detention and prison capability requires custodial experience.	The Div SO2 Detention should be an MPS Officer.
4.	10 Apr 03	Capt N B Wilson, OC MPS OP TELIC		Confusion regarding status of prisoners	Following the introduction of the law and order detention, peace troops on the ground were confused regarding the status of individuals and the procedure for dealing with them which resulted in criminal detainees being processed as PW.	Changes in policy and amendments to documentation must be passed on to BG and prisoner holding area prior to implementation. MPS.

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