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D/IIT/1/1

21 May 2004

APS3/Secretary of State

Copy to:

- PS/Minister AF
- PS/PUS
- PSO/CDS
- PS/CDI
- MA/DCDS(C)
- MA/CJO
- MA/DCJO (Ops)
- DG Op Pol
- MOD Legal Adviser
- ACDS(Ops)
- Hd of Sec(HSF)
- Director Iraq
- PJHQ CivSec
- AG DCS

NOT SUBMITTED

*spoke to APS/sofs3 + agreed
that there was no requirement.
Information held in case subject
re-raised.*

■ 21/5

UK FORCES USE OF HOODING

My D/IIT/1/1 dated 17 May provided consolidated advice on the use of hooding. I was unable to provide definitive advice on possible links between hooding and CO/SIB investigations. We have now reviewed the details of the SIB investigations.

2. The majority of the 54 SIB investigations in Iraq relate to shootings or vehicle accidents, but some relate to allegations of abuse during arrest and detention. It was common practice to use hoods while transporting detainees with battle groups until they were transferred to detention centres and so some of the allegations are unavoidably linked to the use of hoods. We are not aware of any allegations of abuse that involve hooding and interrogation. There are potentially links between hooding and the Baha Musa case. There three other cases that involve fatalities, one of which concerns the an individual who was forced to jump into the Shat Al Arab and drowned. In the other two cases (both heart attacks), we have been able to confirm that they had been hooded during their detention but have been unable to be ascertain whether they were hooded at the time of their death.

3. My minute also identified anecdotal evidence about the use of hoods at the JFIT facility. The details are as follows. The detainees were required to wear

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hoods until they had been processed into the centre. In some cases we understand that this may have taken some time, however this is understood to have been for a maximum of a matter of hours and not days. The military rationale for obscuring vision was as follows:

- To deny the prisoners the opportunity to observe details of the area they were being held in. Many of the prisoners were suspected terrorists but they were eventually released back into the community. Knowledge of the layout of the facility would have been invaluable should they have wished to attack it in the future.
- The position of the holding area was such that it would have allowed the prisoners to observe the living accommodation inhabited by the interrogators.

3. I attach a definitive brief on hooding which has been updated to reflect these additional facts and updated defensive lines.

Stuart Kistruck
Dep Hd IIT

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