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Thursday, 14 October 2010

(10.00 am)

Opening remarks

THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Welcome to what I think -- unless things go disastrously wrong -- will be the last day of the hearings of this Inquiry. We are all set, Mr Elias.

MR ELIAS: Good morning, Sir. Thank you.

Sir, our last witness to the Inquiry is Lieutenant General Sir Philip Trousdell. I call General Trousdell, please.

PHILIP CHARLES CORNWALLIS TROUSDELL (called)

Questions to GENERAL TROUSDELL by MR ELIAS

MR ELIAS: General, would you give the Inquiry your full name please?

A. Philip Charles Cornwallis Trousdell.

Q. You have provided to the Inquiry a report which you have signed, dated 23 September of this year. As you indicate in the declaration of the commencement of the report, you have provided it in the same way as you would have provided a report to a court.

Are the contents of it true to the best of your knowledge and belief?

A. They are.

Q. Can we look, please, at the first page of that report,

1 at MIV010048, the top paragraph please. You say:

2 "I am Lieutenant General Sir Philip Charles ...
3 Trousdell ... I was commissioned into the Royal Irish
4 Rangers in 1968, having completed a two-year
5 commissioning course at ... Sandhurst."

6 As a junior officer, you served in Cyprus, Oman,
7 Bahrain, Germany and the United Kingdom, including
8 Northern Ireland. In a more senior rank you completed
9 two tours in the Ministry of Defence, the second of
10 which was as director of public relations (army). You
11 commanded 48 Gurkha Brigade in Hong Kong. You were
12 chief of staff to land forces in Wilton in the rank of
13 major general. You tell us that you spent ten months as
14 commander operations in Sarajevo. You were commandant
15 of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, and then, on
16 promotion to lieutenant general, were general officer
17 commanding, Northern Ireland, retiring from the army in
18 the rank of lieutenant general in 2005.

19 A. That's correct.

20 Q. I outline that, General Trousdell, so that everyone will
21 appreciate the expertise that you are able to bring to
22 bear and experience in dealing with the matters this
23 Inquiry has asked you to consider.

24 Your report, as you know, forms part of the evidence
25 before the chairman to this Inquiry.

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. As I have said with many witnesses, I don't propose to
3 therefore cover all the ground that your report does in
4 the detail that it does, but to take you to specific
5 aspects of it.

6 You were considering the documentation which forms
7 the basis of much of your comment in this report I think
8 in August and the early part of September of this year.

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. It will be apparent to you from the evidence that you
11 have heard over the last week or two that things have
12 moved on even since then in terms of some of the
13 documentation and some of the procedures and practices.

14 A. Yes, that's certainly been evident over the last week or
15 so.

16 Q. I want to begin -- the first topic then, please -- by
17 considering documentation and some of the documents that
18 you have looked at in your statement. I'm going to take
19 these matters relatively shortly, not only because your
20 report deals in some detail with aspects which for the
21 most part now I think are not contentious, but also
22 because, as I say, to some extent they have been
23 overtaken by events too.

24 The first document I do want to consider with you --
25 and I don't think we need put it up -- is the Secretary

1 of State's strategic policy. I want to ask you whether
2 you refer to this -- perhaps we should just have it on
3 the screen, please, at paragraph 9, MIV010051, where you
4 refer to the fact here, as you put it in the statement:

5 "It is notable that this strategic policy document
6 does not include a specific reference to the five
7 prohibited techniques."

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. That's what you were writing in September, of course.
10 Having heard now the evidence and seen these matters
11 unfold and heard witnesses answering questions as to
12 whether reference to the five techniques should or
13 should not appear in the Secretary of State's strategic
14 policy document, do you have a view as to whether it
15 should or should not?

16 A. I think, given the fact that the banned techniques now
17 appear in every level of documentation, particularly in
18 the training documentation, I think it would be
19 unnecessary for it to appear in the policy -- strategic
20 level policy.

21 Q. Now from paragraph 10 on -- again I'm not going to take
22 you to the detail of this -- you comment on JDP 1-10.

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Of course there is the new draft in relation to that
25 which now has to be factored in, as it were.

1 Your comments in relation to JDP 1-10 centred on
2 issues of definitions, it centred on clarity, it centred
3 on concerns about sleep deprivation and how that was
4 dealt with in JDP 1-10, and you commented -- taking it
5 in the round -- that in relation to what were called
6 "permitted activities", you felt there was not
7 sufficient guidance on sleeping and waking prisoners and
8 not practical guidance on how segregation should be
9 carried out, perhaps leaving the soldiers to consider
10 sight deprivation, for example, when that may not be
11 necessary for the purpose of segregating.

12 A. Yes. Although the standard of training does seem to be
13 pretty comprehensive, there are areas which still cause
14 me concern. For example, we saw in here -- I think it
15 was last week -- the video of -- I suppose it was TQing,
16 but the bit that interested me was we suddenly saw the
17 colonel who had been captured being led into a room with
18 his goggles on. No indication at all to the audience
19 who were watching that why he had been put into goggles;
20 no indication at all that there might have been a better
21 way of doing it by avoiding the room through which he
22 eventually went. Indeed, looking at the scene, as far
23 as I recall, there was one signals operator sitting in
24 front of one set in the gloom. It didn't seem to me to
25 be a reason to deprive somebody of their sight.

1 The way the scene was played, of course, we then saw
2 him being led into his interrogation or into his TQing
3 episode wearing his goggles, which is remarked on
4 elsewhere in how you TQ that you don't behave like that.
5 So to me there are still areas which I covered in my
6 report that don't appear to have been tackled.

7 Q. But it is clarity in training as well as clarity in
8 documents that you --

9 A. Well, they are absolutely linked. If you write
10 a confusing and ambiguous document, there is every
11 chance that that's how it will end up at the soldier
12 training level, so clarity is absolutely required. It
13 does appear to me, having come back into this world
14 after five years out, just how many documents and
15 publications there are. I know the theory is that they
16 should nest on top of each other from strategic policy
17 down to perhaps an aide-memoire in a soldier's hip
18 pocket, but there seems to be an enormous spread and it
19 struck me, reading them, that profusion breeds confusion
20 in this particular area.

21 Q. I'm going to come back to that in a moment if I may,
22 documentation generally. Just before we do, could I ask
23 you, because you comment on it starting at paragraph 30
24 in your statement -- again that need not be put up -- on
25 J3-9, the operating document for Afghanistan -- you say

1 as to that that you are now satisfied that there's
2 better cascading, as I think you put it, of the
3 prohibition on the five techniques through that
4 document, but you comment that there's a lack of
5 emphasis within it on the command responsibility for
6 detention.

7 A. Yes. I believe there is a lack of emphasis there.
8 There is an absolute responsibility laid into the chain
9 of command for making sure that things such as the
10 prohibited techniques do not take place. But I do think
11 that it's a good example of how things are meant to
12 cascade that there can no doubt that the soldier at the
13 lowest level will have been fully informed and indeed
14 trained on the banning of these particular techniques.

15 Q. I'm going come back to command responsibility --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- I think, as you know, in quite a lot of detail in due
18 course.

19 So moving from specific documents, can I ask you,
20 then, about your view about the documentation generally
21 and ask you to bear in mind the evidence that I know you
22 have heard in relation to what I'll put in shorthand as
23 the "plea for plain English" and perhaps to ask you this
24 question to incorporate in your answer: is there
25 necessarily a military style or format or an army style

1 or format? Should it be maintained? Does it need to be
2 maintained?

3 A. Well, I think they are two different questions there.
4 There is style and format.

5 I was an instructor for two years at the junior
6 staff course, which is where all captains go. I was
7 also an instructor for two years at what was then the
8 Army Staff College. In both of those academic areas
9 there was huge emphasis placed on training officers to
10 write simple unambiguous English. It was seen as an
11 absolute requirement for a professional staff officer to
12 be able to express himself on paper in short, crisp
13 sentences, because the belief was that if you put pen to
14 paper -- and that applies as much as if you put finger
15 to keyboard -- but if you publish something that is
16 ambiguous, the God of War will get in there and cause
17 confusion, because the battlefield is a place of
18 confusion and chaos, and the staff officer's job is to,
19 to the best of his ability, remove the chance of error.

20 I think it's really an absolutely basic requirement
21 of a good staff officer and a good leader to be able to
22 express themselves on paper and verbally without leaving
23 room for confusion.

24 As to the format, there were many long hours at
25 Staff College correcting the format that was used by the

1 students because there is a laid out format for almost
2 every military document. While this is a world in which
3 the pedant flourishes, it is done for a reason. It's
4 done so that when you are under pressure, when you have
5 come in off an operation and you have dealt with the
6 dead and the wounded and you have dealt with the
7 prisoners and you have to sit down and write something,
8 you need able to do it in a format that allows it to be
9 simple and unambiguous. That is why there is this
10 system of paragraph numbering and annex numbering and
11 all the other things that you will see in military
12 documents. So it is -- it may be an alien world to
13 those who have not been trained in it, but it is
14 reassuringly comfortable to those who are writing under
15 pressure.

16 Q. So the format is not an issue for you anyway?

17 A. I'm not saying that it couldn't be improved or
18 simplified, but it's there for a purpose.

19 Q. You will have seen and heard witnesses referring to
20 documentation which contains inconsistencies,
21 documentation which contains even typos. Does that
22 surprise you?

23 A. Yes, it does, because it shows that somebody who is
24 a trained professional staff officer or senior civil
25 servant doesn't have an eye for detail. And if you

1 don't have an eye for detail in the operational writing
2 area, then you are going to make mistakes.

3 Q. So perhaps finally on this issue: what do you say to the
4 plea for plain English?

5 A. I stand four square behind it.

6 Q. Could I move on, General, please to sight deprivation?
7 You deal with that at two places in your statement. You
8 begin with it, but I would like to take you, please, to
9 paragraph 91 at the very end of your statement at
10 MIV01076, where you are referring particularly to slide
11 and lecture notes, "... to exclude the mention of
12 blindfolds".

13 You there set out the reminders that you were
14 suggesting should exist if sight deprivation is to be
15 used at all and the training that should be given:

16 "Sight deprivation is for operational security or
17 force protection reasons only ...

18 "[It] ... is for the shortest possible time.

19 (c) If [it] ... is necessary then blacked-out
20 goggles are to be used ...", but if none, a blindfold,
21 but this would be exceptional, and of course the
22 requirement that hoods are never to be used.

23 You will have heard the proposition that I think
24 both Mr Moss and I were putting to witnesses in relation
25 to sight deprivation, which I think was accepted, that

1 there must in the first place be an emphasis on avoiding
2 the use of goggles --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- if there is some other means of dealing with the
5 security problem -- you would no doubt agree with that?

6 A. I do, yes.

7 Q. -- so it should effectively be a last resort. Also we
8 have been suggesting to witnesses that, if it is used,
9 a record should be made of that fact.

10 A. Yes, I think the need to produce a coherent document
11 about what has happened to somebody who is in your care,
12 for the reasons that Dame Anne Owers was telling us
13 about yesterday, both to ensure that the person is being
14 treated properly, but also so that that document can be
15 produced in evidence if there are accusations of
16 malpractice, is very important.

17 As to the deprivation of sight, if we really do
18 believe as an army that our values and standards are
19 right and that we treat people in a humane way always,
20 then the teaching should be that somebody is deprived of
21 their sight only in exceptional circumstances. And if
22 it means the guards having to take a longer route -- and
23 would only be marginally longer -- in order to avoid
24 areas that need to be avoided for force protection or
25 security reasons, then that is what the teaching should

1 be. That, of course, will mean a rewriting of the
2 training notes and presumably the production of another
3 video, but this is small beer given that what we are
4 trying to do is ensure, in an age of instant news, that
5 the army is seen to be doing it correctly.

6 There is behind all this for me not just a legal
7 reason for doing it, although that's hugely important --
8 to me there is the whole business of the nation's
9 mission being achieved properly, because if you get
10 these things wrong, if a soldier hasn't understood and
11 gets this sort of thing wrong, it will emerge and the
12 nation's name will be sullied and you will not have
13 achieved your mission.

14 So I think there is so much more riding on this
15 because this sort of area is a classic example of where
16 a minor tactical error can have huge strategic -- can
17 produce huge strategic problems for a nation. So even
18 something as small as "Did you put goggles on him? Did
19 you make a record of it? Why did you do it?", these can
20 have strategic effects, therefore they have got to be
21 got right.

22 Q. No doubt you have heard the evidence about it, the
23 interchanged use of blindfolds or goggles.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. No doubt you would say one needs clarity about that.

1 A. Well, here again, it is clarity of expression. To find
2 an expression in one of the teaching notes saying "You
3 should blindfold them with goggles" is clearly nonsense.
4 I know what the man is trying to say. He is trying to
5 say "Deprive him of sight by using goggles". But here
6 is an imprecision of language that may cause confusion.

7 Q. I think perhaps you sum it up at paragraph 3 of your
8 statement, if we could go back to that at MIV010049.
9 Towards the foot of paragraph, General, you are dealing
10 with sight deprivation, confusion of terms and matters
11 of that kind, and you say, seven or eight lines up from
12 the bottom of this paragraph:

13 "The guidance to troops at all levels must be
14 unambiguous and practical."

15 Does that sum it up?

16 A. It does. But if I may just expand slightly? One of the
17 things that I have noticed in some of the lower-level
18 documents I've read and the training notes and the
19 PowerPoint slides is an imprecision of military
20 professional language, by which I mean, if you were to
21 be a surgeon, you wouldn't say to another surgeon, "We
22 are going to hack this man's leg off"; you would use
23 a professional set of words which define and describe
24 precisely what the procedure is that they are going to
25 undergo. I think it is just as important in our

1 profession that what at one stage was called "the
2 language of tactical debate" is used all the time
3 because these words mean precise things and convey
4 a precise set of options or activities. I think that
5 falls into the consistent terminology area as well.

6 Q. You go on to say in the rest of that paragraph:

7 "In the tactical questioning and interrogation ...
8 materials with which I have been provided, it is clear
9 that blindfolds are still being referred to."

10 You say it is not appropriate for the reasons that
11 you have given.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You shouldn't be teaching blindfolding if what you
14 really mean is blacked-out goggles.

15 A. Absolutely.

16 Q. I suppose that unambiguous and practical guidance --
17 although you were setting it here in the context of the
18 training for the use of deprivation of sight -- that
19 would apply, would it, across the board to the
20 instruction that needs to be given in relation to the
21 details of prisoner handling?

22 A. Absolutely, because if you say to a soldier "Go and do
23 something", he needs to understand professionally what
24 he is required to do. The handling of prisoners at
25 soldier level, guard force level or at the point of

1 capture is inherently a very simple procedure. Where it
2 becomes less simple is because of the legal requirements
3 that are laid, quite correctly, on the people involved
4 in doing it. So you have to simplify for the soldier
5 what it is he is required to do.

6 Now I don't, for instance, believe that a soldier
7 taking somebody into custody, to use a very general
8 term, needs to know that under the Geneva Convention and
9 other laws there are definitions of what a "detainee"
10 is, what a "prisoner of war" is and so on and so forth.
11 So you need to simplify what it is that the fellow under
12 pressure has to do. One of the ways of doing that is
13 using language that he will already have heard and
14 understood.

15 Q. Consistency as between the training and the aide-memoire
16 which he will refer to if he wants to know what he
17 should do?

18 A. Yes. You need to hear, in the stress of battle, words
19 that you have already heard before, have understood and
20 have rehearsed.

21 Q. May I move on, please, to ask you just a little about
22 training in prisoner handling, LOAC and detention issues
23 generally if you like? You heard Brigadier Purdy
24 suggest that he would like this aspect of training to be
25 in the DNA of every soldier. You put it at paragraph 36

1 that you would like to see it become a core skill and --
2 if we could have paragraph 36 on the screen, please,
3 thank you very much -- at the foot of paragraph 36 you
4 say this:

5 "The probable key to success in this area and a way
6 of increasing the resources available to the CO is
7 defined in the detention section of the most recently
8 issued joint commander's operational training
9 requirement ... cited in the witness statement of
10 Colonel McNeil, paragraph 7, where PJHQ is reported to
11 have stressed the need for training in detention to be
12 placed earlier and deeper in the individual training
13 syllabus so that it becomes a core skill."

14 A. Yes, and I think that statement by PJHQ is very
15 important because it demonstrates that the lack of
16 ability in this area or the shortfall in doing it has
17 been picked up in the lessons learnt procedure, has been
18 fed back from, in this case, I think, Afghanistan to
19 PJHQ, who have put in hand some remedial work.

20 I understand that in the infantry training
21 organisation in Catterick that this area has now become
22 part of phase 1 training for soldiers. It is clear too
23 that, in the pre-deployment training, there are
24 exercises that have been written by OPTAG and others to
25 make sure that units are rehearsed in this area. Both

1 Brigadier Purdy's report and the land warfare report,
2 which was published earlier this year, indicate that
3 this is happening, but it's not quite as good as it
4 should be yet, so work in progress, I think.

5 But the core point you make to me about, to use that
6 expression again, "the DNA", I think is absolutely
7 fundamental. Again I would say that it's fundamental
8 not just because the army has to obey the law, but
9 because what we are doing in handling CPERS at all
10 stages is we are carrying out an operational act. We
11 are taking people into detention in order that we may
12 find out what they know and that information is
13 translated into intelligence and that intelligence forms
14 the underpinning of subsequent operations. So making
15 sure that everybody understands that and increasing the
16 resources available to the CO in that sense has an
17 operational imperative for the whole business of
18 handling CPERS in every category.

19 Q. In relation to training in this area, as I think you are
20 aware, General, certain issues were raised indeed in the
21 earlier modules, but issues that have been raised which
22 you will have heard in the last ten days or so include,
23 for example, the take-up, if I can call it that, of
24 MATTs training, how many are actually doing their annual
25 training, bearing in mind the question of record-keeping

1 in that area, which you will be aware of, but also the
2 nature of the training: is it box ticking? Is it DVD
3 watching? Is it practical exercise? Is it repetitious?
4 Is it boring? Who sets the tone? How is the message
5 freshly reinforced every year?

6 A. Well, the first reassuring thing, I think, is that we
7 have seen that the theory, the documentation, the
8 subject matter experts, the slide packages, the scripts,
9 the MATT material is all in place. It's available.
10 Every unit can have it. Every soldier will have his
11 values and standards pamphlet.

12 But I think you address exactly the right area of
13 concern: is it taking place? Is it taking place in
14 a manner that is fresh, stimulating, attractive to the
15 audience who are sitting watching it, who may well have
16 seen it many times before. I mean, a 12-year man,
17 probably a senior corporal, junior sergeant, will have
18 gone through phase 1 training in his climb to the rank
19 of sergeant, he will have had this addressed to him at
20 various training areas and in his CLM, his command
21 leadership management training, and he will have seen it
22 twelve times in his unit. You can see that he may not
23 be paying complete attention to what is being said at
24 this stage.

25 So we come to the other bit of the question about

1 the tone. This area of training is so important -- to
2 pick up my point of a few minutes ago -- it is so
3 important to the operational outcome of a mission that
4 it is the responsibility, in my view, of the commanding
5 officer and the regimental sergeant major to absolutely
6 make people who deliver this training for them
7 understand how important it is, and it's an area in
8 which he should encourage novel ways of delivering the
9 training material.

10 The way the commanding officer will make sure this
11 thing is being taken seriously in his unit is to take it
12 seriously himself. If the commanding officer sits in on
13 this sort of training, then it happens and it happens to
14 a high quality. That is an undeniable relationship of
15 a commanding officer and the people who work for him.
16 So this is really, in my view, a major command
17 responsibility.

18 Q. So if we look at paragraph 59 of your statement,
19 please --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- just towards the bottom of the page, three lines from
22 the bottom, you say this:

23 "How this material is put across depends to a large
24 extent on the leadership demonstrated by the CO and his
25 command team in a unit. How MATT 7 is delivered and

1 what effect it has is just the type of inquiry that
2 should be made by senior members of the chain of command
3 when visiting a unit. I have no doubt that this happens
4 during the final stages of preparation for deployment on
5 operations, but if this is to be embedded as a core
6 skill for all soldiers then the chain of command needs
7 to keep the pressure up."

8 And how is that pressure kept up?

9 A. Well, if I may give you an example. When I was
10 commanding in Northern Ireland, we had a new army
11 directive about education of soldiers and education for
12 promotion. Packages were sent out to units across the
13 army with the directive about how this was to be done.
14 It was very important to the army; it was very important
15 to me. I went to visit a unit who were on operations in
16 Northern Ireland supporting the police service in
17 Northern Ireland and I was briefed by the commanding
18 officer about his patrol programmes and how he was
19 carrying out his operation. I said to him, "If you were
20 doing that incorrectly, I would know about it. Now,
21 tell me, how are you implementing the new directive on
22 education?" And I talked to him for about half an hour
23 about it.

24 The next unit I went to two days later, I went in to
25 see the commanding officer and he said, "The thing

1 I would really like to brief you about, General, is the
2 education programme in this unit because the jungle
3 drums have been beating". So if a brigade commander
4 goes to see a commanding officer and says to him,
5 "I would like you, in half an hour's time, please, to
6 produce the statistics for the number of people who have
7 been through MATT 6 and 7", well that commanding officer
8 may find some difficulty in achieving it, but the next
9 commanding officer will have them sitting on his desk
10 waiting for the brigade commander. That's how it works.
11 It's called "leadership".

12 So there is no doubt -- and that is exactly what
13 I meant by senior members of the chain of command asking
14 the right questions, and it applies exactly to the
15 commanding officer going to see his company commander or
16 even a platoon commander and saying, "How many people in
17 your platoon have gone through law of armed conflict
18 this year and how did you teach it?" Somebody described
19 it as "leadership by walking around", but it's how it
20 works.

21 Q. If the figures in relation to what I have called the
22 take-up or the non-compliance, in reality --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- with MATT training is anything like correct, what is
25 your reaction to that?

1 A. I was horrified by it.

2 Q. Where does the fault lie for that, if you can pinpoint?

3 A. Well I think it was Brigadier Purdy who explained that
4 the new joint personnel administration computer is
5 unfriendly in this area and that you cannot load in
6 a block of names; you have to go to each person's
7 individual record. Well even, I suspect, if a unit is
8 working hard to do that, I suspect entering 700 or 800
9 names is going to take an awful long time, so I think
10 there will be a lagging indicator there.

11 I was interested to see that one of the brigades --
12 I think he mentioned 4 Brigade -- are working round that
13 by keeping their own unit records, and I do know that
14 happens because commanding officers want to be able to
15 know that people have undertaken the training. After
16 all, in a sense, you are licensing people to go on
17 operations by making sure they have done this training,
18 and I suspect that the explanation that we heard from
19 Brigadier Purdy was pretty close to the truth.

20 But no matter how bad the computers are or how many
21 private records -- not private records, but unit
22 records -- have been maintained, there is clearly
23 a large gap between the intention of mandatory annual
24 training and how it is being taken up. But I would say
25 that this doesn't mean that people are going on

1 operations without having done this training.

2 It appeared to me, listening to the evidence, that
3 in mission-specific training and the use of the
4 operational law team, that this area is addressed on top
5 of MATT 7. I make that assumption from what I've heard,
6 but I don't know that to be the truth.

7 Q. So even though it may be deficient here, it may be made
8 up there before specific deployment?

9 A. Yes. But if it is to be embedded in the DNA, it needs
10 to be done at every possible opportunity.

11 Q. May I move on then, General, to touch, please, on
12 detention facilities? You deal with this in your report
13 at paragraphs 33 and 34, where you were asked the
14 question, "What guidance is now given regarding the
15 types of building ..."

16 I'm going to summarise, if I may, what you say here,
17 which is really this, isn't it: it is difficult to be
18 prescriptive because of the many and varying
19 circumstances that inevitably must apply --

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. -- but your view is that what should be provided for
22 prisoners is facilities of a similar standard to that
23 which the troops themselves enjoy in the same facility.

24 A. I come back to a point I made some moments ago about the
25 values and standards of the army. It's quite clear in

1 those values and standards that we treat people
2 properly.

3 Now if we believe that, then we have to do the
4 things that I've mentioned here, accommodation, bedding,
5 food, water, shelter, otherwise we are not treating
6 people properly. And if we are not treating people
7 properly, then we don't believe in what we are doing in
8 our values and standards.

9 I do, however, believe that in order to help guide
10 the thinking of people who are putting an operation
11 together in which they know they are going to detain
12 people, then there does need to be not a hugely
13 complicated list of every single facility that might be
14 required and it doesn't need eight reference documents
15 to every legal requirement -- there should be a simple
16 one-pager so that, when the commanding officer turns to
17 his planning staff and says, "It looks from intelligence
18 as though we are going to capture probably ten people.
19 Can you make sure the facilities are right for holding
20 them?", that the planning staff merely have to look at
21 one piece of paper and say, "This is what we need to
22 do".

23 Q. "These are the fundamentals"?

24 A. "These are the fundamentals, and we know, because we are
25 trained professionals, that we've got to treat these

1 people correctly. And we know, as trained
2 professionals, we have to treat them correctly because
3 that is how we are going to get the information out of
4 them that we require".

5 Q. I think you don't, in your report, deal with inspection.
6 You will have heard quite a bit of evidence in relation
7 to that over the last ten days. Could I just ask you
8 whether, having heard that evidence, you have comment to
9 make in relation to internal and independent or external
10 inspection of facilities?

11 A. I thought Dame Anne Owers covered this very well
12 yesterday. Clearly the unannounced inspection is the
13 gold standard, but, as we have so frequently heard, the
14 application of that in the forward edge of a battle area
15 is difficult to achieve.

16 That doesn't mean that we should therefore say
17 inspections are not going to happen. It is better, in
18 my view, to have an announced inspection rather than no
19 inspection at all. But I think we also need to make
20 people understand what the inspection regime is about.
21 The inspection regime is in my view -- and my view
22 reflects how the army does its inspections -- the
23 inspection is there to assist people by uncovering areas
24 where they may not be getting it right and to be able to
25 pass on best practice.

1 So to deviate from your question for a moment, every
2 year a unit is inspected by a variety -- sometimes it
3 seems an unending stream -- of subject matter experts,
4 and they will come and look at your motor transport
5 records, they will come and look at your personal
6 administration records, they will come and look at your
7 shooting records, everything. These used to be
8 draconian visits, much feared, but that didn't do any
9 good. So these inspections are now as I have described
10 them. They come to assist and help, point out the
11 errors of your way and offer you guidance. I believe
12 that's what we should be looking for in the prison
13 inspections or the detention facility inspections.
14 I believe on the whole that that would be a worthwhile
15 thing to do.

16 I also believe that these inspections don't have to
17 be formal. If you have a person attached to you, maybe
18 from the Royal Military Police, who is there to ensure
19 that his expertise in this detention area is passed on
20 to you, then it is absolutely the correct thing for the
21 commanding officer to do to say to this corporal,
22 probably, I should imagine, "Tomorrow I'm going it down
23 to see C Company. There's a spare seat in the
24 helicopter. I want you to come with me. I shall be
25 talking to the commanding officer about his operations,

1 but while you are there, can you go and just run an eye
2 over their detention facilities?" This seems to me to
3 be not gold standard, but would certainly reassure not
4 only the commanding officer, but all those over-watched
5 people who are in that particular RMP's over-watch
6 grouping.

7 So he would be able to say to the officer of the
8 Royal Military Police in brigade headquarters, "I was
9 down at C Company 1 Blandshires yesterday. Their
10 facility is really good. They are really on top of it".
11 So it is reassurance to everybody that this is going
12 well. So that's the sort of inspection I'd be looking
13 for. And, of course, the further back you go, the
14 easier it is to do the gold standard.

15 Q. I was rather going to put that to you. The further
16 forward you go, it may become, mightn't it, as witnesses
17 have told us, impracticable to carry out any sort of
18 inspection to the very forward posts, if you like?

19 A. I think so. But we also have heard that the desire is
20 to get CPERS out of those dangerous forward facilities
21 at the earliest possible moment. So perhaps the
22 inspection regime is less relevant there because people
23 are held for such a short time. I don't mean, by "less
24 relevant", that the commanding officer who owns the two
25 TQers there hasn't got an absolute responsibility for

1 making sure they are doing their job properly and within
2 the areas that they are allowed to operate in. I don't
3 mean to sound casual about that. That is still
4 a command responsibility.

5 Q. We are going to come back to that in just a few minutes,
6 I think.

7 I suppose it would be the case, would it, that if it
8 is impracticable to inspect on any basis -- any
9 realistic basis -- forward posts, the need for the
10 embedded training, the core value, the need for
11 accountable procedures, becomes the greater?

12 A. Indeed. And as a commanding officer, if I understood
13 that the battle picture was evolving in such a way that
14 an outpost was going to have to hold detainees of some
15 nature for a period that would begin to appear to me to
16 be too long, I would absolutely make it my business to
17 speak to the company commander and remind him what his
18 responsibilities are in this particular area because it
19 would concern me that we were beginning to run up
20 against the advisory time limits that have been the norm
21 for the area in which we were operating.

22 Q. So, General, that leads me on to what I'm going to call
23 "accountability for detainees" and how we deal with what
24 may be perceived by the Inquiry to be the problem that
25 has been revealed.

1 Can I put it in this context? It may be thought
2 that one reason why the Baha Mousa assaults were able to
3 occur was because of a lack of accountability in 2003 of
4 many of those charged with ensuring the welfare of those
5 detainees. Accountability achieved by records, for
6 example, there appear to have been none -- records of
7 medical examination, records of visitors, matters of
8 that kind which we are going to come to in a moment or
9 two. It is really in that context that I just want to
10 ask you some questions about how that might be dealt
11 with.

12 You deal with record-keeping in your report.
13 I don't take you to the passage of it because I think
14 what you say about record-keeping is that things are
15 obviously now much better --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. -- as compared to 2003. What you do say, I think, is
18 that it is essential, in your view, that movement of
19 prisoners is properly mapped out by record-keeping.

20 A. Yes, that's true.

21 Q. You also, of course, relate the record-keeping to your
22 comments as to access to prisoners.

23 A. Yes. Can I just first say that my knowledge of what
24 went on in the Queen's Lancashire Regiment is only based
25 on what I have read in the documents that I have been

1 provided with by the Inquiry.

2 Q. Yes.

3 A. I wasn't here for Module 2. However, I think I have
4 quite enough experience in how units operate to be of
5 some assistance.

6 Accountability is linked very closely to the
7 understanding of what will happen to you if you step out
8 of line. If you are in a unit where, through some means
9 or another, you know that you can do something and, to
10 use the vernacular, get away with it, there will be no
11 punishment if you are found to have been doing it, then
12 people will start to misbehave in an area where they
13 know there is no punishment, and very soon I suspect
14 they will be pushing against that and saying, "Well, you
15 know, we get away with that, it's quite all right, we
16 can do this as well". So I think accountability has to
17 be -- that somebody who is made accountable has to
18 understand what the penalty is for stepping out of line.

19 There is then the whole training package to train
20 people to understand what their role is and what their
21 responsibility is. That, of course, then makes them
22 accountable for those actions and understanding what the
23 penalties are if they fail to carry them out properly.

24 It seems to me reading about the whole detention
25 episode in the Baha Mousa episode was that there was

1 somehow -- or to put it in another way, the people
2 involved seemed to have formed a clear understanding
3 that what they were doing was acceptable, and that
4 appears to have been underpinned by an understanding
5 that, even if it wasn't acceptable legally, nobody was
6 going to do anything about it anyway.

7 To me that is described as a failure of leadership.
8 So all the individual bits that went on I think spin out
9 of the same central problem of a passive understanding
10 that "The chain of command in that organisation won't do
11 anything about what we're doing" and therefore,
12 I suppose, in a sense it's institutionally acceptable.

13 Q. So it stems from that. Record-keeping is one part,
14 is it, of the jigsaw that will improve matters in that
15 area?

16 A. Yes, because it demonstrates that if you have a process
17 where somebody keeps records of arrival times, of
18 feeding times, of periods of sight deprivation, records
19 of when the doctor attended, records of periods of being
20 questioned, all that --

21 Q. If I may just, intervene, perhaps also records of
22 visitors might be an important point in this
23 particular --

24 A. Indeed. The whole business of visitors -- as I said in
25 my report, to have people turning up as though they were

1 going to look at some trophies or something in a zoo,
2 "We have a whole lot of CPERS, let's go and have a look
3 at them" -- this is an indication of moral degradation
4 in an organisation and it is absolutely against the
5 values and standards of the army, which I should point
6 out were published in the year 2000 in their
7 first iteration, were issued to all soldiers. So in
8 2003 it is difficult to understand that that
9 underpinning of our culture had not reached all levels.

10 Q. Can I just take you to your own paragraph 39 in relation
11 to this? Thank you very much.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. I just leave aside the first sentence for a moment.

14 "To allow unrestricted access to detainees is to
15 treat them to with a lack of dignity which runs contrary
16 to everything that the army has embedded in its values
17 and standards. Apart from that, it is also an
18 indication of a badly run unit if soldiers feel that
19 they can go and stare at prisoners as though they were
20 some captured exhibits."

21 You make this point:

22 "This is certainly not allowed in unit guard rooms
23 where soldiers may be serving periods of disciplinary
24 detention and it should certainly not be allowed either
25 in a detainees' facility."

1 A. To pick up your point in your question, visitors to
2 soldiers undergoing detention in a guard room are, of
3 course, listed in the guard report, so it is
4 a controlled area. The very lack of record-keeping in
5 this particular incident is to me a clear indication of
6 an organisation that was not in control of itself.

7 Q. Well now, moving on, but maintaining, if we may,
8 accountability, can I take you, please, to paragraph 32
9 of your report -- we find it at MIV010057 -- where there
10 is reference to an officer being placed in charge of the
11 unit holding area. You say halfway through the
12 paragraph:

13 "It is however an interesting question as to whether
14 guidance should go further and require that a specified
15 officer is identified prior to operational deployment
16 and trained in detention matters so that he can play the
17 part of the CO's adviser on detention matters."

18 May I call the individual that perhaps you are there
19 referring to the "detention officer" for the purposes of
20 my questions to you?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Can we just examine that a little? Does it follow from
23 what you say here that you would prefer that rather
24 than, as it were, wait until a unit holding area is set
25 up when we are operational, that there should be

1 a detention officer appointed at some earlier stage?

2 A. My views on this have been shaped by what I have read in
3 the last couple of months and what I've heard in this
4 room and, for the reasons that I explained earlier, that
5 the detaining of prisoners is an operational requirement
6 in order to obtain information on which you can base
7 future operations, I begin to feel more and more
8 strongly that in the commanding officer's command group
9 there should be somebody to whom he can refer about all
10 matters of detention, and we could call him the
11 "detention officer", as you suggest.

12 He should be, in my view, somebody who doesn't just
13 do detention on operations, but has oversight for the
14 commanding officer about the unit guard room in the
15 peace-time location as well as what happens on
16 operations, because there must be a coincidence of legal
17 requirements training, restraint and all the other
18 things involved in detaining somebody that read across
19 from the peace-time operation into the war-time, if
20 I may use that expression -- the operational area
21 anyway.

22 Q. You go on to stress in paragraph 32, as we can see, that
23 you think it better that there should be a specified
24 officer identified. You say:

25 "At present, there could be situations in which

1 different officers can be appointed to run the UHA at
2 any given time which would not bring the advantages
3 [which the proposition you now make would bring] of
4 a single officer in whom detention responsibilities are
5 vested."

6 You go on to make the point -- and I know you want
7 to underline it:

8 " ... this must in no sense detract from the overall
9 responsibilities of the commanding officer."

10 Perhaps we can come back to that and his overriding
11 responsibilities in due course.

12 But the detention officer, if I may call him that,
13 what would you believe his appropriate rank to be if he
14 were to be appointed?

15 A. Well, my views on what I wrote in 32 have changed
16 slightly. I think that you need a detention officer who
17 is a subject matter expert, who is part of the
18 commanding officer's command group and he would not be
19 the man who ran the unit holding area. That would be
20 a task given to fit in with the combat plan. So it may
21 be a company commander. It depends what's happening.
22 But the unit holding -- the man in charge of the unit
23 holding area, just as the commanding officer does,
24 requires somebody to whom he can turn for expertise, to
25 make sure he is doing it properly.

1 So I think the detention officer would be an officer
2 who already works in battlegroup headquarters. He
3 wouldn't be an officer whose sole task was to do this.
4 He would be an officer who had been trained to have the
5 expertise. In my view, the sort of person who would
6 pick this up could be the adjutant. The adjutant is the
7 commanding officer's right-hand man. He is his staff
8 officer. If the adjutant rings up somebody, you know
9 that the voice you are hearing is that, in fact, of the
10 commanding officer because that's the authority with
11 which he speaks.

12 In peace-time he is the person who deals with all
13 legal, disciplinary and detention matters in the unit
14 anyway, along with the regimental police and the
15 regimental sergeant major, but he is the officer who has
16 that responsibility. It seems to me that since he is
17 already trained in those aspects, that it would not be
18 a major training module to give him the legal
19 understanding and the technical and procedural
20 understandings about how captured personnel are to be
21 dealt with.

22 What this means is the commanding officer, who
23 clearly would still be responsible for what happens in
24 his unit, would have somebody to whom he could turn for
25 advice. But it also means that, in planning an

1 operation, he has somebody who has this particular level
2 of expertise to ensure it's written into the operation
3 order, and it also means that the commanding officer
4 could say to the detention officer, "It appears that
5 B Company are likely to take quite a lot of prisoners in
6 the operation that's coming up. Just ring the company's
7 second in command and make sure that they are absolutely
8 in accord with all your teachings".

9 Of course, if you have this officer, then on all
10 your mission-specific training -- indeed maybe all your
11 normal training -- it means that you can rehearse, as
12 a commanding officer, the whole structure in your
13 organisation that deals with prisoners, and the
14 detention officer would be perfectly capable of writing
15 some serials into a training exercise that, for
16 instance, rehearses the TQers and that rehearses
17 soldiers in how they should act as guards. So you would
18 up the level of expertise and professionalism in a unit
19 by having somebody like this.

20 Q. So that we understand this, General, you suggest the
21 adjutant would be, if you like, in a very good position
22 to do this --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- with training that we will just elaborate on in
25 a moment. You wouldn't be prescriptive, would you, that

1 it must be the adjutant, but he would seem to be
2 somebody that could do it? Is that the position?

3 A. No, it would go against all my experience to issue
4 a directive to a commanding officer to say, "This is to
5 be the adjutant". What the commanding officer needs to
6 understand is the effect that this appointment will
7 produce for him and the principles underpinning it and
8 then he should nominate the person that he wants. For
9 instance, his adjutant may be about to go off on a long
10 training course and would not be available during a
11 field training period in which he wanted to rehearse
12 this. So I think you have to leave that up to the
13 discretion of the commanding officer.

14 Q. But there should be a detention officer?

15 A. I think so.

16 Q. It must be a senior officer for the reasons you have
17 given?

18 A. Well, he needs to be in the command group --

19 Q. Yes.

20 A. -- so he and the commanding officer are used to dealing
21 with each other, and it means that when a member of the
22 command group rings either into the unit or to brigade
23 headquarters, they understand that this man is speaking
24 with the voice of the commanding officer.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Before you go on -- it may be you are going

1 to cover this, Mr Elias -- but may I just ask you this,
2 General: do you see any overlap with the detention
3 officer and his responsibilities and the regimental
4 sergeant major and his responsibilities for the provost
5 staff and do you envisage any of the provost staff
6 taking any responsibility for CPERS?

7 A. Sir, the adjutant -- if you were to use the adjutant --

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

9 A. -- and the regimental sergeant major already work as
10 a team to handle discipline in the unit --

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

12 A. -- and I think it would be a useful relationship to take
13 into an operational area. But I recognise that many
14 commanding officers like to travel with their regimental
15 sergeant major because it means, when they go into an
16 operational area and they go and visit a company, the
17 regimental sergeant major takes the opportunity to go
18 and speak to the company sergeant major, the senior NCOs
19 and those people with whom he has a particularly close
20 relationship. And I think that's important that that
21 slightly traditional way of working carries on. So it
22 means the regimental sergeant major is quite often out
23 on the ground. So maybe you would look to the
24 regimental police sergeant to be the man with whom the
25 detention officer builds up a working relationship about

1 the handling of CPERS.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: So what you're envisaging is the CPERS side
3 of it being, as it were, separate from the ordinary
4 provost side of dealing with custody of soldiers?

5 A. Not entirely, Sir, no. I think that one of the things
6 that is really important in the handling of CPERS, as we
7 have already talked about, is the record-keeping.

8 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

9 A. If you have a number of CPERS -- I suppose even one --
10 they need to be properly administered --

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

12 A. -- and there needs to be a record kept of that
13 administration and there needs to be somebody who has
14 that responsibility clearly writ as their
15 responsibility. It seems to me that the regimental
16 police, the provost sergeant, is the man who already
17 does that for soldiers under sentence and therefore
18 would not have to be too much further trained to enable
19 him to do it for CPERS as well.

20 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I quite understand. That seems to me,
21 on the face of it, to be sensible. What, of course,
22 I would then be anxious to avoid is the sort of
23 situation where the regimental sergeant major is able to
24 say, "Well, this has all been taken out of my hands,
25 CPERS, I have nothing to do with it". I would like to

1 be clear about what are the sort of lines between the
2 two different functions of CPERS and provost with the
3 ordinary soldier.

4 A. Well, in the field I don't think you would find
5 regimental soldiers undergoing periods of detention.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Things have gone wrong if they are.

7 A. Yes, I think a bit of a flaw in the system if that
8 happens. So I think there can be an operational
9 relationship for the detention officer, the provost
10 sergeant and the CPERS holding facility, and I think
11 that it would be safer if the regimental sergeant major
12 was removed from that chain, definitely positively
13 described as not being involved, apart from his normal
14 regimental sergeant majoring duties.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: Which is presumably to know what is going on
16 in any event.

17 A. Yes, I mean he is a conduit of information into the
18 commanding officer.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I follow.

20 A. I don't mean to say by that that the regimental sergeant
21 major should not go to the CPERS handling facility and
22 say to the sergeant, "Is everything all right? Are you
23 happy? Are you being overstretched?", that sort of
24 normal pastoral care of a regimental sergeant major.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I follow.

1 MR ELIAS: Sir, may I just say this? It has been commented
2 on by one or two that when you are asking questions your
3 microphone is not on and you are not being heard from
4 time to time. Forgive me for raising that --

5 THE CHAIRMAN: If it is anything to do with technology, I'm
6 bound to have got it wrong. On the other hand, it is
7 displaying a red light. I'm probably not close enough
8 to it.

9 MR ELIAS: We have just jumped on a little ahead of where
10 I'm coming to because we are going to deal with what you
11 described as the "custody sergeant" --

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. -- and I think that is the issue that you were just
14 discussing with the chairman. Could I just come back to
15 the detention officer for a moment or two, please?

16 Whoever the detention officer, adjutant or other, he
17 would need, would he, additional training, which would
18 be training in the law of armed conflict and in the law
19 generally relating to detainees to the highest level?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And he would need, would he, training in techniques and
22 methods such as he might find at Colchester?

23 A. Yes. I think that would be a useful adjunct. It may
24 not be an absolute core requirement, but he certainly
25 should, in my view, spend a period at Colchester so that

1 he sees best practice going on and is exposed to those
2 people who the army now recognises as being the subject
3 matter experts in detention.

4 Q. Because I think we have to have this in mind if we are
5 considering practicalities, enhanced training of that
6 kind for your detention officer, whosoever he or she may
7 be, would that have, in your view, significant resource
8 implications?

9 A. Oh, no, absolutely not. I would see this as being --
10 well, what would happen is the requirement would be
11 stated and then there would be a thing called
12 a "training needs analysis" undertaken to find out what
13 the core attributes that require to be trained and then
14 there would be some peripheral ones that would be nice
15 to have. That's how it normally ends up. And you would
16 be trained in the core activities and maybe when you're
17 on a training exercise -- and we have seen that these
18 now run with the MPS present -- maybe that's where you
19 get a few of the not absolutely necessary but good to
20 have bits.

21 So my mind's eye view of this is that this is a very
22 low training load because you have an adjutant who has
23 studied the law of armed conflict, he has done his
24 annual tests, the MATT, he has been off on the unit
25 disciplinary course anyway, because you have to do that

1 as adjutant, and I see this as quite a small add-on,
2 involving maybe a week -- off the top of my head:
3 a couple of days at Colchester, maybe a day with the
4 operational law team at Warminster, maybe a visit to
5 PJHQ, perhaps when the commanding officer goes there for
6 his legal update. So I don't see this as a major load
7 at all.

8 Q. Nobody should recoil from this because of resources?

9 A. No. I think they should advance into it with open arms
10 because it is a seriously good upgrade for a staff
11 officer to have.

12 Q. I'll come back to the detention officer in a moment, if
13 I may. If we move on then, please. If we look at
14 paragraph 37 of your statement at MIV001060 and at
15 paragraph 38 you refer to the need for the recognition
16 that:

17 "... one person should be responsible for the
18 reception of detainees, for their routine administration
19 [in the ways that you were describing earlier on,
20 I think, the record-keeping and so on] ... and for their
21 correct documentation before despatch to the next
22 holding area, the employment of somebody in a custody
23 sergeant role seems to me to be very necessary."

24 Just to be clear about it, therefore, that is by no
25 means the role of the detention officer?

1 A. No, quite separate and at a lower level.

2 Q. And although you say a lower level, perhaps you would
3 agree, would you, that the role is nonetheless, when we
4 are talking about CPERS, a very important one?

5 A. I think it's absolutely important that those tasks are
6 carried out over a sustained period with efficiency and
7 an eye for detail.

8 Q. And so, as I think you have already told the chairman --
9 I will just ask you so that we have it at this point, as
10 it were -- who strikes you as being the appropriate
11 candidate for custody sergeant?

12 A. Well, in the logical sequence, which leads me to think
13 the detention officer should be the adjutant because he
14 is already involved in that broad area, it appears to me
15 that the provost sergeant, the regimental police
16 sergeant, is a man who has already been trained in
17 a variety of these skills. Just as I believe the
18 detention officer needs a very small extra piece of
19 training to cover the CPERS activities, it seems to me
20 that logically the regimental police sergeant would be
21 available for that job.

22 Q. Again, just so we cover it, would you be prescriptive
23 about that or are you saying that appears to you, in
24 current terms, to be the appropriate appointment?

25 A. I think I would be prescriptive about it, and the reason

1 for that is that every job in an infantry battalion has
2 a job description and, next to it, it shows the courses
3 which you are mandated to attend before you take on that
4 appointment or during the early period of your
5 appointment. It seems to me that you would enhance the
6 ability and the standing, perhaps, of the provost
7 sergeant by rewriting his job description in order to
8 cover this area, so I would say he is the man. I think
9 it also -- on operations, this is a sergeant who
10 I expect would have the capacity to take this on as his
11 main job.

12 Q. You will have heard, General, the evidence that the
13 Inquiry has heard over the last week of the aspiration,
14 anyway, that there may be more MPS staff or more RMP
15 availability at some time in the future, depending, no
16 doubt, upon resources and matters of that kind, of
17 course. Would you see the availability of military
18 police, for example, as displacing that role for the
19 provost sergeant?

20 A. Well, I understand that my argument in this area -- my
21 proposal in this area -- was rather elegantly holed
22 below the water line by the provost marshal army when
23 he was sitting in this seat, but I think we just need to
24 revisit that. What he was saying is that he has, in his
25 organisation, the expertise to cover this area and,

1 indeed, we see in the evidence that from the Secretary
2 of State downwards the PMA is now seen as the subject
3 matter expert in this area.

4 I don't doubt that in Colchester and in members of
5 his Royal Military Police -- but not all of them -- that
6 they have the expertise to advise in the whole area of
7 CPERS. But I have some concerns about his proposition.
8 The first one is that the army is not going to get any
9 bigger. Its manpower is absolutely capped. Indeed it
10 may be about to get smaller. So if you need to have
11 more military police or MPS, which he says he requires,
12 that manpower can only come from somewhere else in the
13 army. There has to be a compensating reduction if he
14 increases. So I think he will have a very hard fight on
15 his hands to persuade other areas of the army that they
16 have got surplus manpower, manpower that they don't
17 really require.

18 So I think that he will have difficulty in bringing
19 his very good plan to fruition. I therefore believe
20 that there is a way of achieving the effect that he
21 wants to create -- which is people with a higher
22 standing and expertise in this area -- I believe you can
23 create that effect by having a detention officer and
24 having a unit provost sergeant who has also been trained
25 to carry out those activities.

1 I would underpin that by saying that -- very
2 understandably -- much of what we have heard in this
3 room is Afghan-centric, and I believe that what is
4 required is for the services to understand the
5 principles that have been exposed in many areas and to
6 strip away the Afghan answer to those principles and to
7 retain the principles so that they can build on those
8 for future operations.

9 I'm not optimistic that in future operations there
10 will be a surplus of RMP and MPS who have been sitting
11 waiting to join units to be their experts on operations
12 and I find it quite difficult to believe that there will
13 be jobs created for MPS and RMP in non-operational times
14 so that they are available to deploy when they are
15 required. I just don't see that as being an efficient
16 use of military manpower.

17 So in the much bigger picture, I really do believe
18 that the detention officer and the custody sergeant/unit
19 provost sergeant idea is worth exploring very
20 thoroughly.

21 Q. As to that, can I just take you to the last sentence of
22 paragraph 38, where you say this -- and again you
23 underline it in relation to the detention officer, as
24 I'll call him, and the custody sergeant:

25 "... the appointment of a custody sergeant cannot be

1 allowed to reduce the responsibility of the CO in
2 ensuring that this part of his unit is functioning
3 smoothly and in accordance with the rules and
4 regulations."

5 Can you assist the Inquiry, then, with how you see
6 the interaction of the CO, the detention officer and the
7 custody sergeant in practice?

8 A. Yes. I think that under the pressure of events on Telic
9 and Herrick, that we have seen the emergence in the area
10 of CPERS of two separate columns. One is the column
11 under which are listed those people who have
12 responsibility for ensuring that this activity is
13 carried out to the letter of the law and in accordance
14 with values and standards, and I would suggest, without
15 going through the whole chain of command, that in that
16 list of responsible people sits the brigadier, the
17 commanding officer and the company commander because he
18 owns two TQers.

19 They have the absolute responsibility for ensuring
20 that this goes properly, to use a rather wide term.
21 Alongside them now sits a governance over-watch team,
22 and that goes from the provost marshall army through the
23 major of the Royal Military Police in the taskforce
24 headquarters, including, in the Afghan terms -- I think
25 he is called the "joint force support officer", who

1 holds the responsibility for detention, for authorising
2 detention -- and then perhaps, at a lower level, you get
3 the RMP corporal or the MPS sergeant who may be in
4 battlegroup headquarters as an adviser and then we,
5 perhaps in the future, would see the detention officer.

6 Those people are the advisers and the over-watch of
7 those people who have the responsibility for executing
8 the activity. I would put the custody sergeant into
9 that responsibility chain because he is responsible for
10 carrying out important but quite minor administrative
11 duties.

12 Q. If we were therefore looking at the practicality as from
13 the CO, detention officer to sergeant, the day-to-day
14 practicality, how do you see the interaction between the
15 three? I mean, in other words, can the commanding
16 officer simply say, "Well, I have a detention officer
17 now, he will do it" and the detention officer say,
18 "I have a custody sergeant now, he will do it" or must
19 it operate in some different way?

20 A. I think that cascade would be a recipe for disaster
21 because nobody is taking responsibility.

22 I would see it working something along these lines:
23 the commanding officer has many advisers and he takes
24 advice from them and he tells them what he wants them to
25 do. I think the relationship between the detention

1 officer and the commanding officer would be along those
2 lines. The commanding officer planning an operation
3 says to the detention officer, "I think we are probably
4 going to take a large number of detainees in this
5 operation. Make sure -- I'm giving you an order, this
6 is your responsibility -- make sure that B Company have
7 got everything they require for their TQers and for the
8 fact they are going to hold some people for five hours".
9 So there is the detention officer being given a direct
10 order by the commanding officer. He is accountable for
11 making sure that happens.

12 He would say, perhaps, to the custody sergeant -- if
13 we can just use that shorthand --

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. -- "By tomorrow morning I want to make sure the unit
16 holding area has got 20 beds. You have got all the
17 documentation ready", and will give him a set of orders.
18 That sergeant now becomes accountable for that little
19 bit of responsibility which he has been given. So there
20 is a clear link -- well, loop, probably -- of
21 responsibility in action established there.

22 The commanding officer is, of course, absolutely
23 responsible for this and he therefore must, in my view,
24 build into his programme of events of this operation
25 a brief -- probably brief -- moment when he drops into

1 the holding area, maybe before it is active, and says to
2 the sergeant "Just run me through briefly what you are
3 doing here. Have you got everything you require? Has
4 the detention officer been to see you?" So the
5 commanding officer is keeping his finger on the pulse.
6 So that's the sort of relationship I would see building
7 up.

8 Q. As a loop, as you describe it?

9 A. Yes, because it is absolutely important that, when you
10 hand somebody a mission, there is honesty involved, you
11 believe that that person is competent and has been
12 trained to accept the mission you give him, and he has
13 to be honest enough to say, "Yes, I'm very happy with
14 that" or "No, I don't think I have enough resources".
15 That establishes the loop which involves finger on the
16 pulse, mentoring, reassurance, and that is very
17 important.

18 Q. You are now bordering on leadership and mission command
19 and I want to come on to that, next.

20 Perhaps, Sir, before we do, we can take the break.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: We will come on to it in ten minutes' time.

22 (11.26 am)

23 (Short break)

24 (11.36 am)

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

1 MR ELIAS: General Trousdell, I wanted to move on, then,
2 please to leadership and mission command. Can you begin
3 perhaps by telling us about mission command?

4 A. Yes, certainly. Mission command is a system of
5 leadership and coordination and issuing of orders which
6 was codified in the army in, I think, about 1986. It is
7 designed to ensure that there is coordination of effort
8 across the whole chain of command, from the top of an
9 operation to the bottom of it.

10 It's designed to allow controlled initiative to
11 flourish. By "controlled initiative", I mean that
12 people are encouraged to use their initiative in support
13 of their mission, but it is of necessity limited by
14 time, resources and so on, so it's not unrestricted
15 initiative.

16 The best thing for me about mission command is that
17 it creates an atmosphere in which leadership can
18 flourish because it is strong leadership which makes the
19 whole machine work. What mission command requires is,
20 at the highest level, a good deal of thinking because,
21 when you are handed a mission, you are also normally
22 handed some tasks to achieve. But because your superior
23 officer doesn't know everything that's going on in your
24 particular area of operations, you are then required to
25 carry out an analysis to discover what are the implied

1 tasks. So you end up with a person who has a mission,
2 he has some issued tasks and he has some implied tasks,
3 and this is all designed to ensure coordination of
4 effort.

5 So when the commander has carried out this analysis,
6 he then articulates what is known as the "intent", and
7 you will see in much of the witness statements early on
8 in the Inquiry that I've read senior officers talking
9 about their intent. A classic is one General
10 Robin Brims talking about how he planned the operation
11 in Iraq and he talks a lot about his intent, and he
12 makes much that his intent is that this will be a humane
13 operation and we --

14 Q. Can we just look at that since you raise it?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Can we have a look -- I think this is what you are
17 referring to, is it -- at MOD054392, the Op Telic GOC's
18 directive 1. Under "Intent", in the first paragraph:

19 "The objective is to guide your thinking, planning
20 and preparation. This will allow anticipation, freedom
21 of action and corporation -- to maximise mission command
22 in the execution of specific plans ...", and so on.

23 If we go over the page to paragraph 17, there
24 paragraph 17 and on, the mission --

25 A. Yes, and very clearly explained about how he wanted this

1 operation run and what they were to achieve. The other
2 thing in that intent is his tone.

3 Q. If we go to paragraph 22, perhaps this demonstrates
4 specifically what you were referring to, does it?

5 "We shall increasingly be in the public eye. We
6 represent our country in the coalition and once
7 battle is joined will be the focus of our country's
8 media ..." and so on.

9 A. Yes, absolutely. He lays out in this intent very
10 clearly the context in which the operation is going to
11 take place, how he wishes it to be conducted, and he
12 does, as well, this very important thing of setting the
13 tone for the operation about how he wants it to be run
14 in a -- in the sort of air of the moral component of
15 emotions and humanity. The really important thing in
16 mission command about the commander's intent is that it
17 must be fully understood two down.

18 So here we have a divisional commander issuing his
19 intent, which would be thoroughly understood by the
20 brigade commander and would be thoroughly understood by
21 the commanding officer. The doctrine is that you need
22 to understand the higher command's intent two up because
23 that allows you to conduct your operation so the whole
24 thing is in a coordinated sense, you are not running
25 some particular mission, and the expression that is

1 used is "in order to" -- "We are going to do this in
2 order to ..." It is that "in order to", the unifying
3 purpose in mission command, which allows everybody to
4 work together to know what they are trying to achieve.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Would it be not, I hope, wasting too much
6 time if we found what I think is the same mission
7 command document of S009 in the JFIT?

8 MR ELIAS: We will seek to turn that up, Sir. Making
9 a similar point --

10 A. Well, I have certainly, in my reading of these
11 documents -- the first thing I did when I received all
12 my documents was to see if mission command had worked.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

14 A. And I have followed the divisional commander's intent
15 certainly into the heart of QLR. There is one company
16 commander who quite clearly mentions what the divisional
17 commander wanted and he would have picked that up from
18 the brigade commander's intent. So in a sense, from the
19 top to the bottom in the operation -- and we remember
20 that General Peter Wall, when he took over from
21 General Brims, maintained this directive. He makes
22 a point about doing that. So for the first deployment
23 and the subsequent deployment, this intent was
24 absolutely embedded in all the troops who were doing it.

25 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

1 A. There is a continuity.

2 There are other parts of mission command that
3 I think are important for the Inquiry. The first is
4 that the decision-making in this doctrine is pushed to
5 the lowest competent level. That is very important
6 because it allows, in Douglas Hurd's expression, the
7 army to punch above it's weight. So you insist that
8 people are trained so that they can accept
9 responsibility, and accepting of responsibility is a key
10 part of how we train junior NCOs upwards.

11 The next thing that happens is that subordinates are
12 told what effect they are to create, rather than being
13 told how to do their job. So you have to have a sense
14 of mutual trust and respect -- a component of
15 leadership -- so that you can say to a corporal not
16 "I want you to go to X and do Y", but "I want you to go
17 to X and create an effect in order to do something
18 else", so this gives him the freedom to use his
19 initiative.

20 MR ELIAS: Discretion within bounds.

21 A. Discretion within bounds, yes, absolutely, and it is
22 really important if you are going to get the tempo of
23 operations quick enough to defeat the enemy, so that you
24 are moving quickly mentally as well as physically.

25 In the human area, the moral component, to make this

1 work requires some things which leaders have to work at.
2 It requires mutual trust, not only that you trust the
3 guy you are giving the mission to, but that he trusts
4 you as well. It requires mutual professional respect:
5 "I know that you are capable of doing this because in
6 the area in which you operate you are a professional.
7 I'm prepared to accept this mission from you because
8 I know that it is a professionally constructed mission".
9 So that needs to work.

10 It requires extreme honesty, and one of the
11 hallmarks of the military, in my view, is this
12 unemotional honesty in talking to people. You need it
13 because when you offer somebody a task -- I don't mean
14 it's not an order, but when you offer the mission -- you
15 have got to have honestly assessed that the person is
16 capable of carrying it out. And the guy who accepts the
17 mission has to be honest with you and say, "I'm sorry,
18 I don't think I can do that" or "I haven't got the
19 resources to do that". So there has to be this honesty
20 in it.

21 The honesty also comes into -- and this is very
22 important in the CPERS area that we have just been
23 talking about -- there is honesty in agreeing the
24 oversight regime because when you discuss the mission
25 with the person who's accepting it, you need to both

1 agree that you want to hear every Friday morning at
2 10 o'clock how the mission is going or you want to
3 hear -- you want to have a written report once a week,
4 and, of course, how you do that depends on the amount of
5 risk being carried in the mission. It allows you to
6 keep your finger on the pulse without appearing to be
7 meddling and destroying the trust and respect.

8 So agreeing the oversight regime is important, just
9 as agreeing the limitations of activity as you have just
10 described it. In doing this, the commander
11 absolutely -- in the battlegroup, for instance, the
12 commanding officer is still absolutely shouldering the
13 responsibility for the outcome. This is not to say that
14 the subordinate has responsibility for making it work
15 properly, so he has that, but the overall
16 responsibility -- and, in my experience, the higher the
17 risk involved in the operation, the more questioning the
18 battlegroup commander has to do to make sure he is
19 absolutely certain that everybody understands what's
20 required, and the higher the risk, then the more formal
21 the oversight procedure is that the commanding officer
22 puts in place.

23 So it is formal for high risk and that really means
24 that he can afford to be informal on lower risk things.
25 So it may be just a matter of ringing up and saying how

1 it's going or dropping in to see somebody who is
2 involved in it.

3 In all this, another difficult area in
4 a hierarchical organisation is that the commanders at
5 all levels have to be -- how shall I phrase this -- big
6 enough people to accept constructive criticism from
7 their subordinates, because although it's hierarchical
8 and though the commanding officer is the commanding
9 officer and the company commanders are company
10 commanders, they don't have all the answers and nobody
11 should expect them to.

12 Therefore, in developing these missions and
13 operations, you have to accept that there will be people
14 of a much junior rank -- you don't have to accept, you
15 should welcome -- that there are people of a junior rank
16 who say to you, "Major Smith, I'm not sure that's going
17 to be the best way of doing it. Could we not possibly
18 do it this way?", because that iterative process is
19 really important in team-building and it is really
20 important to find the best answers.

21 The final part of mission command that I think is
22 important for the area the Inquiry is concerned with
23 is -- in the doctrine of mission command, it is the
24 fourth question in the doctrine and it is known as
25 "question four". This is that everybody is mandated to

1 say, having accepted the mission and got it going, "Has
2 anything so fundamentally changed since I accepted this
3 mission that I should reconsider what I'm doing?" So
4 there is no helter-skelter down the black run, "We have
5 launched the mission, we can't do anything about it".
6 At every stage those people involved in it are mandated
7 to ask that very difficult question, "Should I be doing
8 something?" This is now so firmly embedded in the army
9 that when you have an upset or when something goes
10 wrong, there is always some joker who will turn to you
11 and say "Bit of a question four moment, I think, boss".

12 So this is a very well-embedded system and it is how
13 all the training is based and it's how people are taught
14 to behave. It gives you agility, both mental and
15 physical, it allows you to up the tempo of operations
16 and it allows everybody to understand what is going on
17 and what role they play in it.

18 Q. Thank you for that detail. Does it follow, just to pick
19 up on one or two aspects of it, that there isn't room,
20 from a leadership perspective, for the commanding
21 officer who says "Don't tell me you can't do it", that
22 sort of approach, "I don't want to hear ..."?

23 A. No, there should not be, in the normal run of things,
24 a person in a position of enormous responsibility and
25 authority who says "I don't want to hear you" because

1 that to me is to deny the fundamental task of that
2 person.

3 Q. How does a commanding officer then give the confidence
4 to those in the chain below to raise the sort of issues
5 that you have indicated you might expect to be raised?

6 A. By going and sitting with them, being with them and
7 saying, "Corporal Smith, have we got this right? Is
8 there anything you would like to add to the plan?",
9 because the more you encourage people to do that, the
10 better they become at their job. Their self-confidence
11 expands, their self-esteem increases. You will probably
12 find that Corporal Smith has a nugget of information
13 that you had simply forgotten about or never knew about
14 and it makes the organisation really healthy.

15 Q. So does it come down to a phrase I think you use in your
16 report, that it's the CO's tone again which is
17 important?

18 A. Yes, absolutely. It's difficult to paint a picture of
19 a good commanding officer without making him appear to
20 be a paternalistic avuncular tribal leader. He is the
21 person who, because he is put in a position of
22 responsibility and authority, people naturally look to.
23 Because soldiers understand that he may order them into
24 extremely difficult, unpleasant and dangerous activities
25 and locations, they are forever assessing him, just as

1 if you are a lieutenant with your platoon, they have got
2 you under the microscope the whole time and quite right
3 too. You would be a very strange person if you didn't
4 assess the whole time that person who is going to tell
5 you to go and put your life in danger.

6 So the commanding officer and -- all people in
7 authority, including the members of the sergeant's mess,
8 are the subjects of perpetual inquisitiveness by those
9 they command. This is not just on their professional
10 standards, it's how they behave. It's how they conduct
11 their daily life really, because if a commanding officer
12 is known to be -- let's say something extreme --
13 a habitual drunkard, the people in the battalion will
14 know about that and they will take their lead from him,
15 because if the commanding officer has a soldier up on
16 a charge of drunkenness and that soldier knows that the
17 commanding officer behaves like that as well, you can
18 see the structure of trust/respect fractures.

19 So the commanding officer sets the tone and he sets
20 it from the moment he takes command. That's just
21 something you grow up with. You learn to accept that.
22 In good units that is just part -- to use the Purdy
23 expression -- it's just part of the DNA.

24 Q. The setting of the tone, behaving in the way that you
25 have described to those below you in the chain, as it

1 were, and ensuring that your standards are kept --
2 proper standards are kept -- is that something that can
3 be trained or is it something that is in the man or
4 woman or not there?

5 A. I think it's a learned behaviour. There is a programme
6 called "Junior officers' leadership programme", J-O-L-P.
7 This examined in its first iteration how a junior
8 officer is trained in the leadership skills, and it
9 absolutely recognised that the one year at Sandhurst,
10 which is entirely a leadership year -- that is what we
11 concentrate on at Sandhurst -- that by the time the
12 officer is commissioned after a year's training, he has
13 been given all the leadership tools and he has been
14 rehearsed under some pretty arduous conditions in the
15 use of those tools, the application of them, both by the
16 military staff and by the very large academic staff at
17 Sandhurst.

18 So he has both a practical knowledge that he will
19 have learnt from his sergeant instructors, from his
20 platoon commander, from the academic staff who will have
21 introduced the officer cadet to the intellectual
22 underpinnings of leadership, but he is a pretty raw
23 object when he turns up on his unit. The junior
24 officers' leadership programme makes the point that, in
25 order to make this officer into a fully rounded leader,

1 he needs to be mentored in his first months in the unit.

2 Now that mentoring is carried out at one level by
3 the platoon sergeant, who will make sure that this young
4 man doesn't do anything too bizarre which will bring the
5 platoon's reputation into disrepute, and generally
6 brings him on in his relationship with his soldiers. It
7 is done by the company commander, who plays a very large
8 role, who will -- I was going to say "indoctrinate".
9 That's the wrong word -- but will show him how things
10 should be done.

11 For instance, one of the duties of a platoon
12 commander in a company is to be the duty officer for the
13 week, and one of the jobs, it says on the bit of the
14 paper, is "At the end of the week you must go to the
15 armoury and make sure all the weapons are there".
16 A good company commander will take the platoon commander
17 down there the first time he does it and say, "Actually,
18 it's much more than that. You need to count all the
19 weapons, but you need to take one or two out of rack and
20 check that they are clean. You need to unwrap a weapon
21 bundle and make sure all the supporting bits from the
22 machine guns are in there". So this is about being
23 a professional. So these are skills that a leader needs
24 to learn and in that sense he need to learn them at the
25 knee of an experienced officer, and that's what happens

1 in good units.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Presumably you can recognise a leader, but it
3 is more difficult in the earlier stages of training him?

4 A. Yes, Sir, that's quite true, and the system of selecting
5 army officers through the selection process and the
6 commissioning board is extremely thorough. There is
7 lots of psychometric testing, lots of practical tasks
8 that they are given to see if they can think on their
9 feet, to see if they can communicate with the other
10 people.

11 It is so well done that, in my time at Sandhurst,
12 I think out of each intake of 250, there would only be
13 one or two who failed to make the grade. There would be
14 some who said, "I'm going, this isn't for me, it's not
15 what I thought it was", but failing because they hadn't
16 got leadership attributes was very few.

17 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. We may be just marginally straying from
18 the major issues.

19 MR ELIAS: I was just going to take us back, Sir, to the
20 document that I think you may have been referring to.
21 Could we have on the screen BMI02485, please? Can we
22 just highlight the top half of the page please?

23 This is directive 2, Queen's Dragoon Guards, as we
24 can see, and under the introduction:

25 "We are a disparate group of peoples and units,

1 pulled together at the last minute to execute a task of
2 considerable size and complexity. We do so against
3 a background of uncertainty both in the international
4 arena, but more importantly within the theatre of
5 operations. In addition, we do not yet have knowledge
6 of the final shape of our organisation, our resources or
7 the security environment in which we will operate."

8 If we look at paragraphs 5 and 6, please.

9 "Professionalism" is the heading:

10 "I demand of every soldier the highest professional
11 standards. In this task we represent our service and
12 nation. We will be in the public eye very shortly and
13 should conduct ourselves with pride in our competence.
14 Nonetheless you are to pay particular attention to two
15 areas."

16 Military standards being one and perception being
17 the other, the camera lens and the public eye, as it
18 were.

19 I don't know, Sir, whether that was the document you
20 had in mind.

21 THE CHAIRMAN: It was the document I had in mind. Have you
22 seen that before?

23 A. I have, Sir. When I first read it in my bundle of
24 documents, I thought that should be extracted and it
25 should be put into one of the training pamphlets because

1 I think it is a very fine example --

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

3 A. -- of a man pulling together and impressing his
4 personality, setting the tone and recognising the
5 difficulties as well. It's not a sort of rose-tinted
6 document.

7 MR ELIAS: Can we highlight paragraph 6, under the

8 "Conclusion":

9 "We have been given a difficult and somewhat
10 unglamorous task. Many, I have no doubt, would rather
11 be out in front doing acts of extreme valour.
12 Nonetheless, our task is of strategic importance in a
13 way individual heroism is not. We, the coalition
14 forces, will not be judged on how we fought; a win is
15 a win despite of the way it was done. In the end we
16 will be judged on how we treated the Iraqi people. The
17 way we deal with our [prisoners] will be the first
18 prolonged exposure the Iraqi people will have of us.
19 And every one of those [prisoners] will return home in
20 time. They can do so knowing that they were treated
21 decently and with dignity, or not. In the end the whole
22 force will be judged by our efforts. I ask for your
23 absolute and unswerving loyalty to this cause."

24 That sets out much of what you have been saying to
25 us, doesn't it?

1 A. Absolutely.

2 THE CHAIRMAN: Of course not everybody, even the commanding
3 officers, will have the skills to write something like
4 that.

5 A. No, but it appears to me that there is the voice of
6 experience. There is somebody who had thought very
7 deeply about his role as commanding officer, probably
8 before he assumed the role.

9 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

10 MR ELIAS: May I move on then from leadership and mission
11 command to something that may be connected to it. There
12 are two issues really. The first is moral courage and
13 the connected topic of whistle-blowing.

14 As to moral courage, General, how is that
15 inculcated? Is it satisfactorily inculcated at present?

16 A. It certainly forms part of the leadership syllabus at
17 Sandhurst. I don't know how it is tackled in developing
18 junior NCOs in their leadership training. I recognise
19 that this is a very difficult area for an organisation
20 which is by nature hierarchical, but I don't think that
21 it's impossible to position junior members of the
22 organisation so that they know that they can speak up
23 and indeed ought to speak up if things are going badly
24 wrong.

25 I don't have a clear process-driven answer to moral

1 courage, but I think there are some things that can be
2 further explored. One is simply training in which you
3 pose questions of minor moral -- which require moral
4 courage to overcome, and perhaps in the same training
5 timescale as MATT 6 and MATT 7, there ought to be
6 encouragement to have discussions about moral courage
7 and to set small problems: "Should you have done this?
8 You have heard this, what would your reaction be?";
9 something along those lines, very low level.

10 I know at Sandhurst they used to pose simple
11 questions: "Your vehicles are going to be inspected
12 tomorrow, they will gleam if you wash them down with
13 paraffin. Washing vehicles down with paraffin is
14 forbidden. Your platoon sergeant wants to do it. How
15 are we going to deal with this problem?" Very simple
16 stuff, but it is a basis for exploring interesting
17 things.

18 I think too -- and I think this happens, but I don't
19 have the detail -- that in stage one training it is
20 explored very early on or may be explained very early on
21 that by joining the army, you have not surrendered your
22 democratic rights and you do have a right to complain if
23 you think things are going wrong, particularly in the
24 area of bullying. If that is already being done -- as
25 I believe it is -- it is clearly a foundation which

1 should be built upon.

2 Q. You say, General, at paragraph 23 of your statement, in
3 relation to JDP 1-10, which I think you are commenting
4 on in particular at this part of your statement -- but
5 you say in the third line of the paragraph:

6 "To stand out against the chain of command or your
7 immediate superiors in a hierarchical organisation like
8 the army takes immense moral courage. A separate
9 paragraph here explaining the protection given to
10 'whistle-blowers' and tackling the problem of loyalty to
11 comrades rather than to the successful outcome of the
12 mission would make this section of JDP 1-10 a stronger
13 document."

14 So there could be, could there, a specific direction
15 which you would suggest should be taken in doctrine
16 which deals with the issue and indicates the necessary
17 protections that might be offered?

18 A. Yes, I believe it's possible to do that, but I think it
19 would take a sustained effort by the services or by the
20 army in particular, in this case, to work out exactly
21 what those protections were and how they would be
22 implemented. I don't believe that in a broad sense
23 those currently exist. I may be wrong, but I'm not
24 aware of them.

25 The second point, if I may pick it up, about

1 tackling the problem of loyalty to comrades rather than
2 to the successful outcome of the mission is well
3 recognised in institutions, particularly hierarchical
4 ones. It is the police canteen culture, where groups of
5 people believe they know better than the hierarchy and
6 set out to do it their own way.

7 There have been cases of health-workers, nurses in
8 particular, refusing to acknowledge that things are
9 wrong, and there is an author called James Bowman who
10 has written a book on honour which deals with this very
11 deeply. The concern is that when you have a group of
12 people like that, it's very difficult for the leader to
13 break into it, understand it and stop it happening,
14 because inside those groups they will not blow the
15 whistle because that is seen as the ultimate disloyalty
16 to the group.

17 So it requires a neat balance between constructing
18 your teams and bonding them closely so that they will
19 unflinchingly support each other in times of extreme
20 danger, but not allowing them to think that that is the
21 ultimate team. So you have to -- I am afraid I come
22 back yet again to the commanding officer. You have, as
23 commanding officer, to make people understand that their
24 loyalty is to the unit and its mission and not to some
25 smaller sub-section and their loyalty to each other, and

1 I think that works into whistle-blowing as well.

2 Q. Because of the hierarchical point that you have made,
3 would you accept that perhaps complaining or raising the
4 issue through the chain of command may not be sufficient
5 and that there may be a need for some route outside the
6 chain of command to raise these issues?

7 A. I recognise that it is more difficult to do it
8 internally than externally, but I'm not sure how you
9 would set up a system of external complaint because, if
10 you run your unit properly, people will say to you as
11 you wander around, "This is worrying me, Colonel".

12 This is the whole business of -- you know, you
13 wander into a storeroom and a corporal who you don't
14 know very well, who has an unglamorous task, says to
15 you, "Colonel, would you like a cup of coffee?", and you
16 have to say "yes" because he is making an offer about
17 something more than the coffee. If you say "No", what
18 you are saying is "You are too far down the food chain
19 to be of any importance to me". And when you say "Yes"
20 and you sit there drinking coffee, you will begin to
21 hear things about the unit that otherwise you do not
22 hear and sometimes you will hear things about yourself
23 which other people would not be prepared to tell you.

24 So there is this art of leadership, of being open
25 and available, and it is really difficult and it is

1 really bruising occasionally because people say things
2 to you that are uncomfortable. But I would say that
3 this is just one of the many tasks of the commanding
4 officer.

5 So that's to answer it in a slightly emotional way.
6 The external way, I suppose the answer is that you have
7 a call centre somewhere where somebody rings up and
8 makes the complaint. The trouble with that is that it
9 is therefore instantly official and there will have to
10 be a set of procedures, which I am sure will involve the
11 SIB coming and pounding around your organisation.

12 While one shouldn't be afraid of that happening, but
13 how much better to train all your officers to behave in
14 a manner in which they are open to people coming and
15 talking to them? But I expect -- I expect -- that the
16 efficient way is to have some form of call centre,
17 however distressing I would find that.

18 THE CHAIRMAN: So are you saying that one should consider in
19 the report saying, "You should investigate
20 a whistle-blowing procedure" without being prescriptive
21 about how to do it or are you saying that I should leave
22 it alone?

23 A. In the Baha Mousa incident, Sir, it appears to me that
24 there was no procedure for somebody who was worried
25 about what was going on, who felt it was against all

1 standards of decency, let alone army values and
2 standards. There didn't seem to be -- in an
3 organisation where being even constructively critical
4 was frowned upon, there was no way of getting the
5 message out.

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. I'm trying to get more in the general
7 sense. Should the army be thinking now about at least
8 recognising that they may have to have a whistle-blowing
9 procedure and trying to sort out some way? I recognise
10 that your first way of dealing with it is, it seems to
11 me, at any rate, at first blush, entirely sensible, but
12 should the army or the services be considering that they
13 ought to have something slightly more formal?

14 A. I believe they should, Sir.

15 THE CHAIRMAN: You do.

16 A. But it needs to be positioned in such a way that the
17 absolute requirement for the commanding officer to
18 command his unit is not overtaken by this. So perhaps,
19 in examining how junior members of the organisation can
20 make their voices heard, the army ought to first of all
21 examine how it should be done in a traditional manner --

22 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

23 A. -- whether the skills are in place still, whether
24 commanding officers understand their responsibility in
25 this area, at the same time as working on a subordinate

1 way of doing it.

2 MR ELIAS: What we might call the "extreme outlet valve", if
3 you like?

4 A. Sorry?

5 Q. You might call it some sort of extreme outlet valve that
6 allows a complaint to be made outside the chain of
7 command in absolute necessity.

8 A. Yes. It should be supplementary to and secondary to the
9 main way of dealing with it.

10 Q. I understand.

11 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, that is very helpful.

12 MR ELIAS: Can I move on, General, to a few more topics?

13 The first is the question of TQ&I. You deal with that
14 in your report. Perhaps I can take this now more
15 shortly.

16 You remark in your report that there seems to have
17 been a blurring of the lines between tactical
18 questioning and interrogation, which you do not
19 regard -- my word not yours -- as healthy. I think you
20 would accept, would you now, that it appears from the
21 documentation at least that there has been a separation
22 in the policy documents --

23 A. Yes, absolutely.

24 Q. -- as we saw last week. But you still remain
25 concerned -- would this be a fair summary of what you

1 say in your report -- that some of the practices from
2 interrogation should not find their way into tactical
3 questioning without there being specific training and
4 direction in relation to them.

5 A. Yes. I make the point in my report that I knew nothing
6 about TQing until I started reading into it as part of
7 the inquest. So I came to it with a fresh mind,
8 I suppose, and it did seem to me that in quite a few
9 areas it was incoherent and lacked logic.

10 I was concerned that the expression "TQ&I" was
11 written and probably spoken as being one inseparable
12 event, and yet reading the doctrine and guidelines,
13 there is an absolute division made between these two
14 activities. I was also aware, in reading some of the
15 training supporting documents, that this was an area
16 which did not seem to have been tackled and revitalised
17 in any way, and because of that, there were a lot of
18 inconsistencies in how people were actually being
19 taught. It's a muddle.

20 I think the separation of the two new doctrines,
21 which we saw being introduced last week, is a major step
22 forward. But if I was responsible for the training of
23 these two areas, I would have -- to satisfy myself,
24 I would have to get very closely involved in how those
25 two areas are translated at Chicksands into delivery.

1 Quite a lot of the inconsistencies could be sorted
2 out rapidly by a brief directive to whoever is in charge
3 of those particular training departments, to sit down
4 with a large bottle of Snopake and just eradicate all
5 the inconsistencies. We are not asking for -- I don't
6 see this as being a major intellectual struggle followed
7 by a major rewrite. It's just bringing the thing into
8 some form of intellectual coherence.

9 Q. Moving on just to briefly a consideration of the harsh
10 approach within this topic, at paragraph 74 you are
11 referring to the TQ&I policy documents.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. "Section 5 includes 'recommendations' for the use of
14 harsh approaches. It is seemingly ambiguous [you say]
15 about whether or not these are permitted only for
16 interrogation or also for TQing. The serial refers to
17 'the application of specific interrogation approaches'
18 but I cannot see any equivalent for TQ approaches. One
19 is left unclear whether harsh approaches are permitted
20 as part of TQing or just in interrogation. It is
21 surprising and concerning [you say] to see this kind of
22 ambiguity in such an important high level doctrinal
23 publication, especially one dealing with an area that is
24 known to carry high operational risk."

25 Could I just ask you this because I think that's

1 clear: you want the separation?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. That's clear. You want the separation in training of
4 these two topics?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. That's clear. From what you have now seen and heard
7 about the harsh approach -- I'm not asking you for
8 a legal opinion, of course -- but from what you have
9 seen and heard about it, does it have a use in your view
10 in firstly the TQing process?

11 A. Well, if I may step a little back from your question,
12 I think that the use of the word "harsh" itself opens up
13 so much misinterpretation, so much misunderstanding,
14 that the word needs to be removed from all TQing
15 documents and teaching. We need to ensure -- or the man
16 in charge of training at Chicksands needs to ensure that
17 people who are undergoing TQ training never hear the
18 word "harsh". It only creates confusion if you say,
19 "Oh, by the way in interrogation we have this thing
20 called 'harsh' but you are never to use it". You have
21 just opened Pandora's box by doing that. So I think the
22 word "harsh" needs to be eradicated.

23 I'm not sure, after the evidence we have heard here,
24 whether this particular activity is still in the
25 syllabus for TQ training and there did appear to me to

1 be some confusion between the people who were talking
2 about it in these seats. If it's not to be used in
3 TQing, then it needs to be entirely, completely and
4 comprehensively removed from the TQing syllabus in every
5 sense. So that's my first view on it.

6 It lends itself to people inadvertently stepping
7 over the line. We have heard, I think it was,
8 Professor Brice Dickson talking about all those fine
9 lines of handling people in detention under the various
10 international legal agreements, and I think just the
11 very word allows people to overstep the mark too easily.
12 Anyway, my understanding -- limited though it is of
13 interrogation -- is that being kind to people tends to
14 produce a better response.

15 Q. That is another issue.

16 A. But that may be further back in the chain.

17 So I would think that either harsh has got to be
18 very clearly described, although I think it would still
19 leave room to step over the line, or it has to be very
20 clearly prohibited.

21 Q. Just on a related matter then: you would expect now,
22 would you, the commanding officer to know what his TQers
23 were up to; that is the bounds to which they could go,
24 the questions they could ask --

25 A. Well, not if he relies on the TQing document that was

1 entered last week as the new policy, because although
2 the interrogation one describes the interrogation
3 activities --

4 Q. Yes.

5 A. -- in some detail, there is no such guidance in the TQ
6 document, and in a sense the commanding officer is left
7 flapping in the breeze.

8 Q. So we come back again, don't we, to the need for clarity
9 and certainty about what is or is not permitted within
10 the policy documents, the doctrine and detail where it
11 may be required?

12 A. Indeed. I have to say that I don't know what happens
13 under the new arrangement that we have read about, where
14 the commanding officer goes to PJHQ for a legal
15 briefing. I don't know if he has TQing explained there.
16 I suspect he probably does.

17 What I'm not sure about is whether a commanding
18 officer has enough knowledge of the process of TQing --
19 the actual relationship between the TQer and the
20 CPERS -- to be able to say, "You should be doing it like
21 this, but you shouldn't be doing it like that". He
22 knows the five banned techniques, but I think, beyond
23 that, the commanding officer is probably quite innocent
24 of what the TQer should be doing. So I don't think that
25 document has fulfilled that requirement.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Perhaps to ask the question to the second
2 half of Mr Elias' question, the commanding officer, to
3 put it in a slightly different way, should know what the
4 TQer can or cannot do?

5 A. I think it's imperative for his mission success that he
6 has a firm grasp not only of the principles, but also of
7 the techniques.

8 MR ELIAS: So any suggestion that "That's a black art and
9 I don't need to know about it, TQers get on with it",
10 would find short shrift with you?

11 A. Well, I think we see what happens if that is the
12 approach taken and I genuinely don't believe, from what
13 I have read, that the commanding officer's position has
14 been enhanced at all in this area by that document.

15 Q. But what you do say is he should be made to be aware of
16 what TQers under his command are doing --

17 A. Yes, he should.

18 Q. -- the legal limits that are imposed upon them and the
19 approaches that they may use, in general terms?

20 A. He should, in general terms, because otherwise there is
21 some activity going on in his unit for which he will be
22 held legally responsible and yet he doesn't know
23 anything about it. So he does need to have it.

24 The description of TQing is the "gathering of
25 short-term tactical information at the point of

1 capture", so I can't believe the techniques that are
2 allowed are in any way complicated. So I don't think we
3 are going to load up the commanding officer with another
4 great bulky aide-memoire in his pocket. He just needs
5 to know that, "The TQer has been trained to gather this
6 information swiftly by using the following two
7 techniques, which are encouraged, and by the way, you're
8 not allowed to use the five techniques". I don't think
9 it's a big load, but I think it's important that it
10 happens.

11 Q. Thank you. Finally then in TQ&I, if I will be forgiven
12 for running the two together, shock of capture. The
13 Inquiry has heard a lot about shock of capture over many
14 months now and you have heard evidence about it over the
15 last ten days. It is capable of meaning many things to
16 many people --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- maintaining it, prolonging it, enlarging it, and
19 what, in any event, it means.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Could I just ask you a few questions in relation to it?
22 Do you see any reason why a guard force should know
23 anything all about the shock of capture or whether the
24 terminology should be used in respect of those who
25 guard?

1 A. Can I first just answer the terminology thing? Just as
2 I'm discomforted by the use of the word "harsh" because
3 it can be misinterpreted so easily and will mean
4 different levels of severity to different people, so
5 I think the words "shock of capture" is difficult
6 because it always seems to be coupled with "maintaining
7 the shock of capture".

8 If you are to maintain something, how long are you
9 to maintain it for and what activities are you
10 authorised to carry out to maintain the shock of
11 capture? I have been captured. I was captured on
12 a resistance to interrogation course. Even when you are
13 expecting to be captured, you go through a set of
14 emotional turmoil about what is going to happen to you,
15 why have you arrived at this stupid position of being
16 captured. "What have I done? Where is the rest of my
17 team? Have I let them down?" All these things go
18 through your mind. Knowing that, how would I set out to
19 maintain those emotions over time in somebody I
20 had captured? Well, I would probably have to step over
21 the bounds that have already been described as the
22 limitations.

23 So I don't think we are maintaining the shock of
24 capture. I think we are allowing it to run its natural
25 course. I am encouraged that in the new policy -- if

1 I give you the reference of MIV012273, paragraph 6 --
2 they talk about in line 4:

3 "... as close to, the point of capture as
4 operational circumstances permit before a CPERS can
5 recover their composure ..."

6 I think that what you are dealing with is somebody
7 who is in emotional turmoil and they will eventually
8 recover their composure and you are not required to do
9 anything to slow down that recovery process. So I think
10 "composure" is much better than "shock of capture" and
11 "maintaining it".

12 The second part of your question, I think, was about
13 what the guard force need to know. I don't think the
14 guard force need to know anything about the emotional
15 turmoil. That is something between the TQer, who is
16 trained and in licence, to deal with this set of
17 emotions and presumably to use them -- I don't know how
18 TQers work -- but presumably to use that emotional
19 discomfort and lack of composure to get tactical
20 information from them.

21 The guard force do not need to know anything at all
22 about it. We read -- or I have read elsewhere in the
23 documents about how the guard force is required to
24 operate in the major holding facilities and therefore
25 I see no reason why they shouldn't behave the same way

1 at every level, and they are required to be firm, fair,
2 neutral, calm, efficient, and that's how they need to
3 handle their people. They are not there to hand out tea
4 and biscuits; they are not there to chat to the people.
5 They are there to be a silent, efficient, humane, but
6 remote, reserved, set of people.

7 Q. Thank you very much. Then I think three short topics to
8 finish, please.

9 The first is to put before you with apologies -- and
10 I use you, General, because you are, as it were, in the
11 witness-box -- but documents have been distributed which
12 I think you, Sir, have copies of. I'm not sure the
13 witness will have.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: "Camp Bastion"?

15 MR ELIAS: Can I have on the screen, please, the
16 "Camp Bastion THF S012 escort duties document".

17 These, we understand, are the orders that relate
18 currently in Afghanistan to detainees at Camp Bastion.
19 I don't want to take a lot of time over it, but just to
20 go over the page, please, to security at 8(a):

21 "In order to maintain the security of detainees, the
22 following rules should be followed:

23 "(a) All detainees are to be blindfolded using
24 blacked-out goggles when moving outside the THF and
25 whilst on aircraft."

1 If we go on to paragraph 12, please, under "Escort
2 responsibilities":

3 "The IC escort is to:

4 "(a) Supervise the fitting of handcuffs/plasticuffs
5 and blacked-out goggles and ensure that they are fitted
6 correctly and that handcuffs/plasticuffs have not been
7 overtightened."

8 We have similar provision in the THF KAF document.
9 I just raise it with you, General, not really to ask
10 your specific comment in relation to it because the
11 suggestion is that there may be, in the operational
12 circumstances, a specific reason for this requirement,
13 but it does, on the face of it anyway, doesn't it, raise
14 issues as to whether the practice of blindfolding here
15 is not, as it were, being applied as a routine in ways
16 that we were discussing earlier, where perhaps greater
17 thought should be given to matters of avoidance, last
18 resort and things of that kind?

19 A. I would agree with you in so much as I would -- because
20 I haven't read the document in detail --

21 Q. No.

22 A. -- and I don't know the circumstances. But paragraph,
23 I think it was, 8(a), which talks about blindfolding
24 with goggles, of course it is completely an anathema to
25 me because it is imprecise use of language and may lead

1 people to do the wrong things. But a brief reading of
2 this, as you have taken me through it, does seem to
3 indicate that quite a lot of that is running entirely
4 contrary to what I thought we were meant to be doing.

5 Q. As I say, we haven't gone into --

6 A. No, absolutely.

7 Q. -- and we can't go into with you the operational
8 requirements in this specific situation.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. But it throws up the question again, doesn't it, that
11 these matters should not, as it were, be routine -- and
12 maybe they are not here -- but it does raise that issue
13 again, doesn't it?

14 A. I think if it is said in paragraph 12, that bit
15 about plasticuffs and things -- 12(a), "Supervise the
16 fitting ...", that makes it appear to be routine. If it
17 said, "If it is necessary to fit blah, blah, blah, the
18 IC escort is personally to supervise it", it would be an
19 entirely different matter.

20 Q. This is why I say it raises these issues at the least.

21 A. Yes, but I would not wish to comment on an operational
22 area where I do not fully understand what the
23 requirement is.

24 Q. Absolutely. Thank you. We can take the document down.

25 Could I just ask you to deal with this briefly? You

1 probably know -- I am sure you do know -- that the
2 Inquiry heard evidence in relation to Modules 2 and 3
3 where, putting it in shorthand anyway, it seems that
4 orders and requirements were lost on handover --

5 A. Yes, I remember that.

6 Q. Could that happen today?

7 A. I think in all honesty I would have to say it is much
8 less likely to happen today, and that is because the
9 orders that were being used in the first and second
10 operation were FRAGOs that had been put together in
11 a hurry and there was an assumption that people coming
12 into theatre would have seen those FRAGOs. Making
13 assumptions in an operational area is not a professional
14 thing to do because it leaves room for too much
15 confusion and chaos.

16 I believe it's much, much less likely to happen now
17 because there is a continuity of the documents used in
18 theatre and the documents used in mission-specific
19 training. So people, as far as I can understand it, are
20 trained absolutely before they go into theatre on the
21 way they should behave and the authority they are given
22 when they will get into theatre. That is not to say
23 that a person in a particular position of responsibility
24 should blindly go into the new job without talking to
25 his predecessor in that appointment about how things

1 actually work, but the way that the process has been
2 organised is that people should arrive in theatre for
3 a quick top-up before they forward deploy, where they
4 will find no difference between what they have been
5 trained on in the UK and what they are going to do in
6 theatre. So I think, as far as is possible, the
7 breakdown that was so clearly evident in the cases you
8 cite is much, much less likely to happen now.

9 Q. The processes are improved?

10 A. The processes are improved and they have been tried over
11 many iterations of the Herrick operation.

12 Q. Thank you. Then could I ask you just this, please,
13 about the RMO and the padre? I don't want to ask you
14 about their role as such within the battalion, but
15 perhaps if you can indicate to us from your experience
16 the relationship that they would have with the CO and
17 how that might feed into what I might call "informal
18 whistle-blowing".

19 A. Yes. I am afraid this will be a bit "I", "I", "me",
20 "me" in talking about it because it is based on how
21 I was taught to employ these two people and how I did
22 when I was commanding officer and indeed as a brigade
23 commander as well.

24 The regimental medical officer will see things and
25 get a feel for what is happening in your command that

1 will not be seen or heard by other people. The last
2 regimental medical officer I had when I was commanding
3 officer was a highly efficient female doctor known
4 across the battalion as "Dr Jenny". I made it my
5 business to occasionally drop in at her workplace to
6 talk to her.

7 At one level I wanted to know that everything she
8 required for her job -- medicines, pharmaceuticals and
9 so on -- were available to her; I wanted to know that
10 her combat medical technicians, who are -- or were, in
11 those days -- regimental soldiers who had been trained
12 as health workers, that they were what she required and
13 were doing things that she required. But, of course,
14 when a commanding officer comes for a chat like that, it
15 is, in fact, an offer being made by the commanding
16 officer for the person he is visiting to broaden the
17 conversation into areas of their concern.

18 Dr Jenny would occasionally say to me things like,
19 "I think you'll find there's rather too much drinking
20 going on in C Company"; no names, no authoritative
21 statements, no formal complaints, just "I sense that
22 that is going on". That immediately allows a commanding
23 officer to get his antennas a bit more revved up and go
24 and find out what is happening, and, of course, never
25 telling the people that that is where he's heard it

1 from.

2 So the MO is an alternative conduit of information
3 about what is happening in the unit. And the MO,
4 I suspect, would not say that to a commanding officer
5 unless the commanding officer, in the early days of the
6 medical officer's tour with that unit, has made quite
7 clear that this is the relationship he wants to have
8 with the doctor. If you don't, then -- most doctors are
9 early on in their military career when they are a GP
10 with the battalion, and although they will all have been
11 through the specialist officers' course at Sandhurst,
12 they will, very understandably, be in a slight state of
13 trepidation about what their relationship should be with
14 the boss. So the commanding officer has to make it
15 quite clear and I used mine in the way I have described.

16 My padre was exactly the same. An example is when
17 I was the general chief of staff of land command in
18 Wilton, I was working late in my office one night and
19 there was a knock on the door and it was the padre, who
20 said "Can I come and have a word?"; "But, of course".
21 He said to me, "There are eight people working late in
22 your headquarters tonight and all of them would much
23 rather be here than be at home". He didn't have to say
24 any more. He had explained to me that I had a problem.

25 So there we have two examples of how, in my view,

1 quite apart from their professional attributes, these
2 two people are available. It used to be a complaint in
3 Germany when doctors, who had become slightly rare
4 objects, were put into garrison medical centres and
5 didn't belong to units, and the padres were the same,
6 they didn't belong to you in that rather paternal way,
7 and commanding officers felt that an important source of
8 information and indeed comfort for them had been
9 inadvertently removed.

10 Q. Thank you very much. Just one last matter, just to be
11 clear about it, because I know that you wanted to deal
12 with it and I think I didn't give you the opportunity to
13 deal with it. In relation to the detention officer,
14 I think you did want to indicate to the Inquiry that it
15 was your view -- you said, "It might well be the
16 adjutant", but I think you did want to say that it,
17 perhaps for obvious reasons, should be not connected
18 with intelligence.

19 A. Absolutely. Yes, to have -- one of the battlegroup
20 staff officers is the intelligence officer and it would
21 be quite the reverse of everything we have discussed
22 here if somehow we ended up with the intelligence
23 officer looking after the CPERS; too much room for
24 confusion, I feel.

25 MR ELIAS: Thank you very much.

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. As you know, there will be other
2 questions, probably. Mr Singh?

3 Questions to GENERAL TROUSDELL by MR SINGH

4 MR SINGH: Sir, thank you. General, can I start with the
5 training videos we saw on Tuesday of last week?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. You made some reference yourself to them this morning.

8 First of all, do you think the training video on
9 prisoner handling should itself expressly set out the
10 prohibition on the five techniques?

11 A. Well, if I'm to hold true to what I said earlier on,
12 that no opportunity should be missed to express the five
13 techniques and their prohibition, I would say yes,
14 absolutely. But I also feel that the best use of that
15 training video is not to show it straight through.
16 I think that an imaginative instructor would stop it
17 occasionally and question his audience about what they
18 have seen and it would be a perfect opportunity to put
19 the five techniques in like that.

20 Q. I understand. Thank you, General. That leads to my
21 second question about the videos and may derive from
22 what you just told me about stopping the video from time
23 to time, General.

24 Do you recall that those depicted on the video --
25 the way in which a Muslim woman is treated and searched,

1 for example, and also the way in which a child, one
2 presumes her child --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- is treated -- did you find that the way that that was
5 all depicted was perfectly appropriate or do you have
6 any comments on that?

7 A. Well I think we were told that it was based on a real
8 incident, so I think we have to accept that something
9 like that happened. I make the assumption that a video
10 film like that is put together after a good deal of
11 thought by the training organisations who sponsor it
12 about the doctrine involved, but I have to say I was
13 uncomfortable with it. I felt that the -- I think it
14 was a radio message that "There are no female searchers
15 available so we are going to have to do it ourselves".
16 I can understand that culturally the woman would have
17 been extremely distressed by being patted down -- might
18 be the expression -- by a soldier.

19 Q. A male soldier.

20 A. A male soldier, indeed. There is some sort of
21 justification, isn't there, because we see she is
22 carrying a pistol, which somehow seems to say that this
23 difficult decision was the correct one to make. Well,
24 it would be the correct one to make if you knew she had
25 a pistol before you started doing it, to make it a bit

1 circular. So I did feel a bit uncomfortable in that,
2 but I'm not certain what the doctrine is for dealing
3 with that situation if there is a woman who appears to
4 have been involved in the incident and there are no
5 female searchers. Again, it's one of those areas where
6 there needs to be more guidance, I suspect.

7 Q. The same might be said, one might think, about the
8 circumstances in which, in extreme situations, it may be
9 legitimate to order a Muslim woman to take her headscarf
10 off and feel her hair, which is depicted on the video as
11 well. Do you think that might be the sort of thing
12 where it would be appropriate to stop the video and
13 perhaps have a discussion about it?

14 A. I think it would be an excellent opportunity to have
15 a discussion, as long as the instructor had a summary at
16 the end to say, "This is the doctrine about how we do
17 this. I'm glad you all understand how difficult this is
18 for all the parties involved, but we are authorised to
19 do this", otherwise you have a discussion that ends
20 hanging in the breeze.

21 Q. Thank you. Can I ask you about a different topic,
22 please? You gave some evidence to Mr Elias earlier
23 today about the importance of keeping good records. If
24 I may say so, we entirely agree with you about that.
25 But is there anything that can be done, do you think,

1 about the difficulty that may arise in practice, which
2 is that even when there are requirements to keep
3 records, that records may be manufactured after the
4 event? Can one ever legislate against that kind of
5 possibility?

6 A. Well, if I may answer that in a slightly tangential way.
7 Frequently a person turns up at my front door at home
8 and hands me packages or my Tesco shopping and he has
9 a perfectly simple handheld electronic device which I'm
10 required to go "tick, tick, tick, tick, tick, sign". It
11 does seem to me that there is technology of the simplest
12 and robust kind which may overcome that problem.

13 Failing that, the design of the tag perhaps should
14 be so simple that it simply requires a cross to be made
15 in the right box. I'm not sure that would overcome your
16 concern about falsification of documents, though.

17 Q. The last topic I would like to ask you about, General,
18 is this: you, if I can use my phrase rather than yours,
19 have I think expressed some exasperation at the
20 different kinds and volume of documentation that there
21 can be, often covering the same subject matter.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. I would like to ask you a slightly different question
24 arising from that, if I may. Would you share what, if
25 I may say so, is my exasperation at the fact that there

1 seems to be a constant process of re-drafting documents
2 at all sorts of levels, so that one is never quite sure
3 what in fact one is supposed to be complying with, or is
4 that not a fair comment?

5 A. Well, as I think I said earlier on today, I have come
6 back into military publications after five years and I'm
7 astounded by the quantity of them and I share your
8 frustration. It does seem that every time a document is
9 re-drafted, it puts on weight, maybe to cover extra
10 things that have emerged --

11 Q. If I finish perhaps by giving one specific example.
12 Even on, say, the definition of what a "stress position"
13 is, you have been here for the last week or so and you
14 have seen there is still uncertainty. Today we have
15 been given a document about Afghanistan, I think, which
16 defines "stress positions" in yet another way. I'm just
17 wondering -- I don't know whether you would like to
18 comment on this -- how on earth a soldier on the ground
19 is supposed to know what they are supposed to be doing
20 in reality.

21 A. Well, I think you make a very good point. One of the
22 principles that soldiers and officers and units, when
23 they do things, are constantly reminded is the acronym
24 "K-I-S-S", "Keep it simple stupid" --

25 Q. Right.

1 A. -- and that seems to not apply to some of this work.
2 What concerns me is that it is very evident that this
3 lack of precision in definition exists and yet nobody
4 seems to have got together the people who should
5 re-define it and come up with a re-definition, and it's
6 got to be really simple.

7 Q. Thank you.

8 A. We talk about stress positions and control positions.
9 Surely the principle is that under our values and
10 standards we treat people humanely, therefore if you are
11 going to sit somebody and make sure they sit on their
12 hands so they can't use their hands -- well, after a few
13 minutes that is going to be uncomfortable, so the
14 principle is you are trained to make them change
15 position frequently. It doesn't seem to me to be too
16 big a problem.

17 MR SINGH: Thank you very much.

18 A. I have rather expanded on your question and I apologise.

19 THE CHAIRMAN: Documents and their production may be
20 something which the Inquiry will concentrate on in the
21 report, Mr Singh.

22 Yes, Mr Garnham.

23 Questions to GENERAL TROUSDELL by MR GARNHAM

24 MR GARNHAM: Just one matter, General. A good deal of what
25 you have told us today concerns structural changes that

1 might usefully be contemplated to army functioning.

2 Would I be right to detect that, in addition, you
3 see a need for something of a cultural change as well,
4 so that you place emphasis on the need for not only
5 precision, but economy in the production of documents;
6 yes?

7 A. Well, "economy", I suspect, will be a fairly major
8 watchword in the armed forces in the next few years.

9 Q. I mean it not only in financial terms.

10 A. Yes. It appears to me -- and of course I don't have
11 a complete vision of the problem -- but it does appear
12 to me that the organisation, particularly at the higher
13 levels, is hugely publication-dependent, and it just
14 allows gaps to emerge into which confusion will sit.

15 Q. Thank you. The second respect in which you appear to be
16 contemplating cultural change is in the idea that the
17 essentials of detention need to be understood.

18 I wondered whether that was a reflection of a belief
19 that there needs to be thought over routine in the way
20 the army operates.

21 A. Are you talking about detention of CPERS or --

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. I think it is an area in which there is a good deal of
24 understanding. What I think has become unusual for the
25 army is the whole business of point of capture and then

1 a system of moving people back and interrogating them,
2 because this is something that certainly up until about
3 2000 the army simply had not done. You didn't do this
4 in Ireland -- well, not after internment anyway; you
5 didn't do it in Sierra Leone or Cyprus or anywhere else.
6 So this is something that in a way there was a small
7 nugget of knowledge which was kept alive in a dark
8 corner in Chicksands which has had to be nurtured and
9 brought on to be a mainstream activity in the army.

10 Q. But you say, do you, that it is a good thing that people
11 now have acquired and understand the mechanics of it and
12 that it is not just a matter of routine?

13 A. I think it is a requirement in the operations we
14 currently undertake and will undertake for the
15 foreseeable future that the relationship between
16 capturing somebody and the success of your mission
17 because of what you learn from them is thoroughly
18 underscored, and it's not that we should understand it
19 simply from the legal point of view; we should
20 understand its place in the development of mission
21 success.

22 Q. Finally, as to what I wonder whether was an example of
23 your comment about culture, was your observations about
24 mission command and how you now see it as necessary to
25 be of a questioning or challenging type of mission

1 command. It's not just "The rule comes down from above
2 and everybody below does as they are told". You now
3 contemplate that being questioned?

4 A. I don't contemplate it being questioned. It is how it
5 has been taught since the mid-1980s. Mission command is
6 a well-constructed organisation. It first came into
7 being in 1870 in the German army, when they found they
8 were too authoritarian. It has in a sense been the way
9 the army has operated long before the 1980s, but in the
10 1980s it was codified, and its teaching and its doctrine
11 is very clear about the openness. But some people find
12 it easier to be open than others.

13 MR GARNHAM: Thank you very much.

14 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Dingemans?

15 Questions to GENERAL TROUSDELL by MR DINGEMANS

16 MR DINGEMANS: We have heard a bit of evidence over the last
17 two weeks about the desirability of telling soldiers
18 what they can do as well as what they can't do. Do you
19 agree with those comments?

20 A. Yes. If somebody is going off to undertake a task for
21 you, he or she needs to have a full understanding of
22 what they are authorised to do. And simply to tell them
23 what they are not allowed to do is somehow to only give
24 them a partial view of the mission that you have given
25 them.

1 Q. Would that apply to telling soldiers what they can do to
2 control prisoners?

3 A. Yes, I think it must do.

4 Q. Secondly, you have talked a bit about maintaining the
5 shock of capture and the misunderstandings that have
6 flown from that and "conditioning" was another term that
7 might be thought, on the evidence, to have caused some
8 confusion. We have also seen some of the updates that
9 have come in, some of the new videos. Do you think it
10 is necessary in any future training to address the
11 historic misunderstandings that might still exist among
12 more senior soldiers?

13 A. That's a very interesting question. Do we ignore that
14 these things have ever happened in the hope that we
15 won't keep the distant memory alive or should we simply
16 say "There used to be a thing called 'conditioning' and
17 there used to be a thing called 'harsh'". I think you
18 have to treat your audience, your training audience, as
19 an intelligent group of people, and if you are going to
20 eradicate something, I think you have to expose it and
21 say, "You may still hear about this but it is absolutely
22 forbidden".

23 Q. Then finally this, just on the small debate between you
24 and the provost marshal army in relation to detention
25 officers. I'll put a proposition to you and ask you to

1 comment on it: isn't one proper reason in support of
2 your position rather than the provost marshal position
3 that what might be thought to have been a problem
4 exposed in 2003 was that in infantry battlegroups there
5 simply was no understanding of prisoner handling at all,
6 and having a detention officer and having those trained
7 in prisoner handling would supplement what is at least
8 addressed in MATT 7 now?

9 A. Well, I would agree with you that there was very little
10 understanding of prisoner handling, and the closest that
11 we got, I suspect, to dealing with that in an
12 operational sense would have been in Northern Ireland,
13 where there was occasionally a requirement in street
14 violence to lay hands on the guy who had just thrown
15 a petrol bomb at you and run him into the back of the
16 cordon where he would be arrested by the police. So you
17 weren't really dealing with somebody because, as soon as
18 you let go of him at the back, the RUC or the PSNI would
19 deal with it. That was the closest we had have come for
20 decades in handling prisoners, so there was almost no
21 understanding.

22 THE CHAIRMAN: I think the point that Mr Dingemans is making
23 is that if you are going to get it into the soldiers'
24 DNA, it is better that it is done in the battlegroup
25 rather than with the MPS or someone coming in. It helps

1 that process. Is that what you wanted --

2 MR DINGEMANS: It is indeed, Sir.

3 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, and I can see the force of it.

4 A. And I would agree absolutely, Sir, with that.

5 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

6 MR DINGEMANS: Thank you very much.

7 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr?

8 Questions to GENERAL TROUSDELL by MR BARR

9 MR BARR: Thank you, Sir.

10 General, can we start, first of all, with the chain
11 of command within a battalion for responsibility for
12 captured persons? Can I posit this structure to you:
13 starting at the top with the commanding officer; the
14 level below being the detention officer with
15 a rebuttable presumption that that will be the adjutant;
16 below him the RSM; below him the regimental provost
17 sergeant; and then finally the regimental provost
18 corporal, which I think inserts the RSM into the
19 structure that you were discussing with my learned
20 friend Mr Elias earlier in your evidence.

21 If you keep the RSM in that chain of command,
22 admitting that, like the CO, he is going to be a very
23 busy man, doesn't it bring the benefits of the senior
24 non-commissioned officer and his finger on the pulse of
25 what is happening in the battalion into that chain of

1 command for prisoners?

2 A. Well, I think I would have to make a definition between
3 "command responsibility" and people being used in that
4 area but not having the absolute command because, in my
5 view, the responsibility would go from the commanding
6 officer -- responsibility in the sense of who is going
7 to end up in front of the board of inquiry or the court
8 martial if it goes wrong -- would be the commanding
9 officer, the officer who has been nominated to command
10 the unit holding area, and then to go below him to the
11 company commander because he employs, as part of his
12 structure, two TQers and therefore he is absolutely
13 responsible for how they behave. So I would say that's
14 the responsibility chain.

15 Then you have other people who carry out various
16 functions in support of the chain. There would be the
17 detention officer, who would be the right-hand man of
18 the commanding officer for things like advice, would
19 be -- would carry out things like being told by the
20 commanding officer to ring up the company commander to
21 make sure he understands what's happening, but he
22 wouldn't bear any responsibility in the same way the
23 commanding officer would for things going wrong.

24 I know this is a very narrow line I'm trying to draw
25 here, but what I'm trying to say is that there are

1 people who are given an order, "You are in charge of the
2 unit holding area, that's your responsibility. You can
3 ask the -- what did we call him -- the detention officer
4 for advice on what you should be doing, but it's your
5 responsibility to make it work"; "Sergeant Smith, you
6 have done the Colchester course, you have been in charge
7 of unit detention, your responsibility in here is to
8 make sure the administration works. I'm going to turn
9 to you to ask you about the meal timings, the bedding,
10 all that sort of stuff, and that is your
11 responsibility".

12 So if things start to go wrong, if the
13 independent -- I don't know -- the Red Cross or somebody
14 turn up and they say, "We have just been talking to one
15 of the detainees and he says he hasn't been fed for
16 a fortnight", the first port of call is the person to
17 whom you have given that task, the sergeant. But you
18 would of course say to the unit holding area officer,
19 "What's gone wrong? You have got overall responsibility
20 for this and you have let Sergeant Smith fail in his
21 duties".

22 So this is quite difficult. It's going to be even
23 more difficult if you have got an RMP corporal who sort
24 of is helping, but isn't really. So what will be
25 required in -- if we have these two new people, the

1 detention officer and the sergeant with extra
2 responsibility -- is you need to write down what their
3 responsibilities are, because that is the only way you
4 can be absolutely certain that they know what they are
5 meant to be doing and what you hold them responsible
6 for.

7 Q. Accepting immediately that the responsibilities have to
8 be very clearly defined and in writing, isn't the chain
9 of command that you first described, when answering my
10 question, the one that runs from the commanding officer
11 through the unit holding officer, company commander,
12 down to the tactical questioners, one that only covers
13 responsibility for what happens during tactical
14 questioning and isn't the other chain of responsibility
15 that has to be considered the one which covers the guard
16 force and isn't it because the guard force are going to
17 be coming under the direct responsibility of the
18 regimental police when they are guarding that you have
19 a chain that goes up through the provost corporal,
20 sergeant, RSM?

21 A. Well I'm rather re-designing the battalion on the hoof
22 here. I would think that in my battalion, if I was
23 doing this, I would say, "Right, Captain Smith, you are
24 in charge of the unit holding area. I'm giving you ten
25 men to be the guard force. They are your guard force,

1 you are responsible for them, and the duties that they
2 are going to undertake and how they undertake them, if
3 you don't know what they are, then the unit detention
4 officer will come and rehearse them with you, but they
5 are your responsibility. I'm also giving you the
6 provost sergeant and he is going to be your
7 administrator and you are responsible for him doing his
8 administration properly". That is how I would set it up
9 because -- I would try and keep it as simple as possible
10 with the lines of responsibility as sharply drawn as
11 possible.

12 Q. Thank you. My next question, which is on a related
13 topic, is posit now the commanding officer, who has the
14 luxury of an RMP sergeant attached to his unit, who is
15 well trained to act as a custody sergeant. You
16 mentioned in your evidence the idea of him working as an
17 adviser, a custodial specialist, which is obviously one
18 way obviously of doing it.

19 Could I ask you to consider another, which is if the
20 CO, hard-pressed as he probably will be on operations,
21 wants to release his provost sergeant for other duties
22 and insert the RMP sergeant into the chain, assuming
23 that it's done with the change of responsibilities being
24 very clearly communicated, doesn't that lead to the
25 situation where the person with the most apposite skills

1 is acting in the custody sergeant role and the battalion
2 has the benefit of an extra sergeant for other duties?
3 Do you see any difficulties with that arrangement?

4 A. Well, it is certainly a very plausible option, but
5 I think there might be some practical difficulties. You
6 would need to know that this RMP sergeant was available
7 to you for at least six months before the operation
8 started. He would have to come and embed himself with
9 the battalion so that you had the full benefit of his
10 knowledge and so that he would be a known quantity
11 bonded into the organisation.

12 You would also need to know that he was going to be
13 with you for the complete length of the operation, that
14 he was yours and yours alone, and that when you were in
15 theatre, you weren't told by the force provost marshall,
16 "That guy's cap-badged to me and I need him to go and
17 run an interrogation centre which is suddenly
18 overflowing with people". So there would have to be
19 large numbers of certainties in there. And on a very
20 minor note you would also have to ensure that you hadn't
21 put your provost sergeant's nose out of joint too badly,
22 but those are manageable.

23 But, yes, it is certainly an option, and it could be
24 a Colchester man, an MPS man, who comes to do it.
25 I don't see any difficulty with that, except -- to go

1 right back to an earlier answer of mine that, in the
2 Afghanistan setting, that seems pretty good. In four or
3 five years' time, when there may not be the number of
4 RMPs around, then you may have to fall back on your home
5 team, and that's why I believe you need someone in your
6 home team who has those skills.

7 Q. It is obviously correct that the battalion must have the
8 skills to deal with prisoners because there are
9 occasions, aren't there, when whole armies surrender and
10 there would never be enough policemen to deal with that.
11 Can I move onto a --

12 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr Barr, you may have a number of
13 questions --

14 MR BARR: I've one more thing I would like to ask, if I may,
15 Sir.

16 THE CHAIRMAN: By all means. Off you go.

17 MR BARR: Coming on to my final question to you, which
18 arises from my learned friend Mr Singh's question about
19 whether the prohibition on the use of the five
20 techniques should be incorporated into the MATT 7 video.
21 Now, of course, the prohibition is already in the MATT 7
22 slides and dealt with during the presentation. I just
23 wanted to explore with you the outer limits of your
24 maxim of "Don't lose any opportunity". Is it really
25 necessary to repeat it twice in the same course when, as

1 my learned friend Mr Singh points out, there may be
2 other points of detail which at the time could be
3 valuably used to expand upon?

4 A. A very good point. I suspect that in the necessary
5 re-drafting of that film, to overcome some of the things
6 that we have seen in the inquest as being wrong, that
7 there should be real consideration given to how best, in
8 the MATT 7 period, to reinforce the ban on those five
9 techniques. It may be that in rewriting it, they find
10 it easier -- I don't mean find it easier -- it would be
11 more effective as an instructional method to put it into
12 the film, rather than put it on the slide. I just think
13 a balance needs to be made on the effectiveness of the
14 instruction.

15 Q. I see. But you would be satisfied to see it referred to
16 just once in the MATT 7 presentation, would you,
17 whichever turns out to be the most effective way of
18 doing it?

19 A. I think it is now so firmly embedded in so much teaching
20 in the army that people are going to see it quite
21 frequently, but I would like to see it used in MATT 7 as
22 a point of discussion, rather than just something else
23 that goes up on a slide.

24 MR BARR: Thank you.

25 Further questions to GENERAL TROUSDELL by MR ELIAS

1 MR ELIAS: I suppose ultimately, General, it is not
2 a question, is it, of how many times it is said; it is
3 how effective is it in getting the message home.

4 A. I agree with you entirely.

5 Questions to GENERAL TROUSDELL by THE CHAIRMAN

6 THE CHAIRMAN: Before we let you go, General, you have been
7 sitting here for last week and this week and we are very
8 grateful to you for doing that. Is there anything you
9 think that we have missed or has been missed in the sort
10 of things that one ought to be thinking about arising
11 out of this incident that the army can do better than
12 those ones which we have been over over the last eight
13 days? Have we missed anything?

14 A. No, I think this Inquiry, from the small part of it
15 I have seen, has delved very deeply into the minutiae of
16 some of the things that I suspect, I can honestly say,
17 have gone badly wrong for a variety of reasons.

18 The only thing that I feel about all this, a sort of
19 overarching emotion about it, is that culturally the
20 senior leadership in the army has to be forever
21 inquisitive about itself, about whether they are doing
22 things correctly. I suspect in a way they are because
23 there is the -- I'm trying to get his title right --
24 Brigadier Purdy, the army inspector, I think his proper
25 title is --

1 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes.

2 A. -- who is given things to go and look at that are of
3 concern to the chief of the general staff. And the
4 chief of the general staff also has a briefing team
5 which visits units and runs question and answer
6 sessions, and, about, I think it is, once a quarter
7 publish for the chief of general staff, but on quite
8 a wide distribution, things that they have discovered
9 are troubling the army. So that's one area. But
10 I think that what has gone on here is refreshing in the
11 sense that it will make recommendations to the army that
12 I can only imagine the army hasn't spotted for itself.

13 THE CHAIRMAN: Well, there are no other questions for you.
14 As with all our witnesses who have come in the last
15 eight days, I'm extremely grateful to you for being here
16 and spending time listening to the evidence and also the
17 not inconsiderable effort of preparing your witness
18 statement and reading all the documents. I'm really
19 very grateful for you doing that indeed and thank you
20 very much.

21 A. Thank you, Sir.

22 Words of thanks by THE CHAIRMAN

23 THE CHAIRMAN: We have just one other thing that I need to
24 do now and I do it gladly. I shall bear in mind what
25 you said about "keeping it simple stupid", and simply

1 say I wish now, this being the last time that we shall
2 sit, to thank a number of people.

3 I have, on several occasions, expressed my thanks to
4 all the legal representatives who have appeared here and
5 I do that sincerely. I don't just do it for the sake of
6 form. You have all been brilliant and I'm very grateful
7 to you.

8 I need also to go on and thank those who have helped
9 the Inquiry itself. We have the technicians in the
10 background, who are not immediately in sight. They have
11 also done terribly well. We had interpreters.
12 I thanked them when they were here and I do so publicly
13 again.

14 We have the ushers' team. Two of them are here
15 today. I thank them and their two others who are here.
16 One of them, Mr Connah -- you may remember his son,
17 Ben Connah, who was here at the earlier stage. He has
18 gone to do more important things like running the
19 Ministry of Justice, but he helped with Lee Hughes and
20 Frances here and Rhian and Dee, all of whom have, I hope
21 you will feel, helped to make the Inquiry run smoothly,
22 and I do not forget Jane, who may still be sitting
23 outside, greeting people as they come in. I discovered
24 around about 6 o'clock that she was still there because
25 someone had not actually left -- nor had I at that time,

1 but that was rare for me. I normally go earlier.

2 May I also thank the LiveNote team, Lisa and Laura,
3 who have been terrific. You can find them -- if you
4 come back to the Inquiry after the hearings, they will
5 still be hard at it, correcting the transcripts, and
6 that is why we are able to send them out in the evening
7 of the actual hearing that they have been transcribing
8 for.

9 The whizzkid, I'm told he is, Tom -- whether you are
10 still a kid I don't know, but that is how you have been
11 described -- really Tom would be better off -- he
12 doesn't need to be told what documents to put up. He
13 will put them up in the right order in any event by just
14 simply listening, without even getting the reference for
15 them.

16 It is a formidable operation. I have not
17 experienced it before. I thought it was marvellous when
18 we first started and now take it completely for granted.
19 I'm reassured that most of them, if not all of them,
20 will be here before the end of the year starting on the
21 next inquiry that is going to take place in this hearing
22 centre and I wish them all good luck and anybody else
23 who is taking part in it.

24 Merrill, we have had hiccoughs from time to time,
25 not necessarily their fault. Concordance, which I'm

1 still yet to fathom out personally, has been of huge
2 help, so I'm told, to those people who understand it.

3 Down below we have had the security guards, who I am
4 sure you have all got to know. I know it is a very
5 tedious business each time to have to turn out all your
6 pockets and get a new security badge so that you can get
7 in here, but it helps to see that the place is actually
8 secure and that it is not just routine; no doubt
9 important.

10 I think that has included everybody. I have
11 mentioned Lee. Who I have missed out?

12 The press officer comes. When she does, I tease her
13 and ask her why the reports aren't better or why they
14 have not put more in about it. But she comes, looks
15 after us and she is outside most times, isn't she,
16 sorting out people who come to look at the Inquiry.

17 To all of you, you have my thanks. I am extremely
18 grateful. I must say I find it rather a sad moment to
19 come to the end of this part of the Inquiry because it
20 is the part I have really enjoyed and now comes the part
21 which is not quite so enjoyable, but interesting.
22 I think that is about all.

23 We have taken 20 minutes out of your lunch, I see.
24 You will no doubt have other things to do by 2 o'clock,
25 I expect. Thank you very much indeed.

1 (1.20 pm)

2 (The Inquiry concluded)

3 I N D E X

4 Opening remarks1

5 PHILIP CHARLES CORNWALLIS TROUSDELL1
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